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Ignatenko Briefs Press on Current Issues

On Andreotti, G-7, Free Travel Law

LD2105152391 Moscow TASS in English 1508 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti's visit to the USSR, which began today, is a logical continuation of the Soviet-Italian dialogue, including personal contacts between the leaders of the two countries, said Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko.

Speaking at a briefing here today, Ignatenko stressed that the Soviet president was in favour of making "this intensive dialogue deeper and broader and imparting new shades of confidence to it."

"We shall welcome Giulio Andreotti to Moscow as a leader whose contribution to a new situation in Europe and the world is indisputable and considerable," the presidential spokesman said.

Ignatenko told the briefing that Margaret Thatcher was due to arrive in Moscow on May 27 at the invitation of the Soviet president. The former British prime minister will meet President Mikhail Gorbachev, scholars, students and cultural personalities and address the Soviet parliament.

In accordance with an agreement between Mikhail Gorbachev and President George Bush, presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov, a member of the USSR Security Council, and Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shcherbakov will leave for the United States on Monday, May 27, Ignatenko announced.

He said they were expected to talk with the presidential economic council and probably meet President George Bush as well.

Asked if the Soviet president will take part in the G-7 meeting in London, Vitaliy Ignatenko replied: "I can say with certainty that Mikhail Gorbachev will accept the invitation."

"As regards Mikhail Gorbachev's attitude to the USSR Supreme Soviet's adoption of the law on free travel by Soviet citizens out of and into the Soviet Union, "he is satisfied with the fact that the law has been passed." The adoption of this law, Ignatenko said, "can be viewed as yet another step forward in the process of democratizing the country."

Asked if it was true that the Soviet Union, as reported by THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, was interested in selling a nuclear reactor to Israel, Ignatenko said that no such contacts in whatever form had been established between the USSR and Israel.

On Mikhail Gorbachev's attitude to the Russian presidential election campaign and candidates for the post, Ignatenko said that the president was absolutely quiet with regard to the campaign. "He does not consider it possible for himself to take a stance toward any of the candidates and as the Soviet president will display reserve," the spokesman noted.

Commenting on Eduard Shevardnadze's recent statement on the possibility of using UN forces to settle ethnic conflicts in the USSR, the presidential spokesman said: "This is Shevardnadze's personal view. It does not reflect the stance of the Soviet leadership, which does not share the view."

More on G-7, Cuban Missiles

PM2205162991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by A. Pokrovskiy: "What Is Happening With the 'Seven'"]

[Text] At a routine briefing, Vitaliy Ignatenko, the USSR president's aide and leader of the press service, answered questions from Soviet and foreign journalists. Our report also includes answers to IZVESTIYA's questions.

On Important Contacts

[Question] There is a lot of talk now about the participation of USSR President M. Gorbachev in the conference of the "seven" in London. There is talk of the ideas of Doctor Yavlinskiy and his group...

[Ignatenko] In recent days there have been substantial items published on this score. Attention is drawn by the article in IZVESTIYA and G. Yavlinskiy's interview with Yegor Yakovlev in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. But these important works need more detail.

The idea of contacts with the "big seven" belonged to President Gorbachev and has been examined for many months. Certain steps have been taken in various channels, including diplomatic channels. In brief, it was not born "suddenly." It is not an improvisation. Before Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's trip to the conference of experts he had a detailed conversation with Academician Primakov who briefed him on the whole picture. Then a letter appeared signed by Ye. Primakov and G. Yavlinskiy.

[Question] Can all this be called "the Gorbachev plan?"

[Ignatenko] I would call it a continuation of President Gorbachev's initiative. But I think that this action was thought over and found support among representatives of the republics. Incidentally, during President Gorbachev's recent telephone conversation with President Bush, mutual interest was voiced in visits being paid both to the Soviet Union and the United States by representatives of sufficiently high rank who would be able to analyze the situation on the spot, exchange opinions with their colleagues, and reach particular conclusions on subsequent economic cooperation. At the

end of this month Security Council member Ye. Primakov and First Deputy Prime Minister V. Shcherbakov will go to the United States for this purpose. There is the certainty that for two days they will have contacts with the chairman of the U.S. President's Council of Economic Advisers.

[Question] Is Ye. Primakov expected to meet with President Bush?

[Ignatenko] A meeting is desirable. At the same time I want to add that a meeting is proposed between President Gorbachev and a group of U.S. figures in the field of economics and agriculture which is already in the Soviet Union.

[Question] Does this have a bearing on the conference of the "seven?"

[Ignatenko] I think it has. It is known that the problem is being worked out at expert level. It is a case of coordinating positions, which will make it possible to link the programs for the stabilization of the economy and advance toward a mixed economy in the Soviet Union with the economic aid which is being implemented not only unilaterally but also bilaterally with the Western countries.

[Question] Will M. Gorbachev himself go to the session of the "seven?"

[Ignatenko] I can say confidently that he will accept an invitation from the West.

[Question] Will G.A. Yavlinskiy take part in this whole business?

[Ignatenko] Yavlinskiy, with his group, is already in the United States. He is holding contacts there with U.S. experts on conceptual questions of our collaboration. And he will obviously join in the talks which Ye. Primakov and V. Shcherbakov will have in the United States.

About the Missiles in Cuba

[Question] The U.S. press has published a report whose thrust is that Soviet SS-20 missiles have been detected in Cuba. What can you say?

[Ignatenko] That is a fabrication from beginning to end. I know that this report has already been officially denied in Washington. It is true that we have a missile in Cuba... but it is in a museum. A nonoperational SS-4 Soviet missile is kept in Havana as an exhibit. The treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles authorizes the use of such missiles as static exhibits provided there is prior notification. The Soviet Union has fulfilled those terms.

On UN Troops in the USSR

[Question] E. Shevardnadze has mentioned the possibility of the use of UN troops on USSR territory in certain conditions...

[Ignatenko] That is the personal opinion of Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze. It does not reflect the position of the Soviet leadership, which does not think that.

[Question] THE WASHINGTON POST has published an article saying that during the Persian Gulf crisis the Soviet Union played a "dual game." It is claimed that Soviet military men took part in combat operations and that there were arms deliveries...

[Ignatenko] The reports published in THE WASHINGTON POST do not accord with reality. Not only did no Soviet military specialists take part in combat operations on the Iraqi Army's side, but they were not in the Persian Gulf zone during the war. There were no secret deliveries of arms or military equipment after the introduction of the relevant UN Security Council sanctions. The reference to the CIA in this report puts us on our guard: At any rate I would not like to link this reference with the appointment of the new CIA director.

INTERFAX on Gorbachev-G-7

OW2305015991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 22 May 91

[From our Diplomatic Panorama correspondent Mikhail Mayorov]

[Text] President Gorbachev's close aide, Mr Vitaliy Ignatenko, told reporters in Moscow yesterday that the Soviet leader was ready to take part in a G7 meeting in London in July. Asked to confirm this, the Soviet Foreign Ministry refused to say anything definite whether or not Mr Gorbachev would take part in the London summit. It said that even President Bush would be unable to answer this question meaning consultations that Washington is holding with its partners whether or not to invite the Soviet leader.

However, the information offered by the Soviet Foreign Ministry makes it clear that Moscow is probing the possibility of including one other member to the London summit through diplomatic channels. (Consultations are due to be held today with Canadian officials. The Canadian prime minister, Mr Brian Mulroney, had promised to inform Moscow about the resolutions taken at annual G7 meetings signalling Ottawa's benign attitude to Moscow's involvement in G7's work.)

Our correspondent was told the Soviet Foreign Ministry had no evidence indicating reluctance by the United States, Canada, or any West European country to see the Soviet leader at the same negotiating table. The ministry made it clear that although there was no formal reaction from Japan, the absence of "yes" or "no" did not mean that Tokyo was opposed.

Soviet diplomatic circles believe the present stage of mutual expectations to be natural. While Moscow is awaiting a positive answer to its request for cooperation the G7 countries would probably expect a clear signal

from the Soviet Union about the irreversibility of its reform and stabilization of its internal situation.

The G7 nations would probably prefer the Soviet Union to contact the IMF and World Bank first. This would be more in Moscow's interest because G7 in itself has no extra money to finance the Soviet reform.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry does not believe there will be any problems in meeting the political conditions set for implementing a cooperation plan with G7 the draft of which is now being worked out in Washington by Soviet economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy together with his U.S. colleagues. The Soviet Union has started to set up a multi party democracy. It has just adopted a new emigration law and has improved its human rights record.

Things are less bright on the economic front since the Soviet Union will have to implement the policy of internal stabilization which Mr Yavlinskiy calls "social consensus" as a condition for foreign aid. His cooperation plan carries a number of elements which can be seen as "an offer to the West to pillage this country" when it comes under discussion in Soviet parliament.

Until more recently, Soviet officials have not raised the question of a possible Soviet participation in summit meetings. President Gorbachev's messages to G7 leaders in the past two years was the only sign of Moscow's interest in G7 proceedings. But the Soviet Foreign Ministry made it clear some effort to this end had been made. One Soviet diplomat told our correspondent he opened a "7+1" file in 1987.

IZVESTIYA Continues KAL Downing Investigation

Fourth Installment

91UF0764A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 May 91 Union Edition p 6

["IZVESTIYA Investigation. Part Two," by Sergey Agafanov: "Secret of the Korean Boeing 747"; fourth article of the current series]

[Text] Tokyo—"So, let us assume," French expert Michel Bran [as transliterated] continued, "that the official version is correct, and the Boeing with 269 passengers on board, hit twice by the missiles fired by Lieutenant Colonel Osipovich, fell. I am a former civil aviation pilot and I can imagine the behavior of the crew—an order is given to fasten seat belts, a 'rain' of oxygen masks is released, life jackets are pulled out... A horrendous crash against the water, the aircraft breaks into pieces, everything turns into 'fragments.' As an unnamed military functionary told IZVESTIYA (Issue No. 11), two or three hours after the information that the plane had been shot down was released, one of the ships sent to a potential quadrant of impact reported that a multitude of small items on the surface was found. 'Presumably,' said IZVESTIYA's source, 'parts of the disintegrated Boeing. But the current is powerful in that area. The floating items were constantly being carried south...'

"I would like to stop here, since the mention of strong currents will be encountered many more times in the Soviet version of the catastrophe, as well as in the American and Japanese ones. As is known, eight days after the tragedy pieces of aircraft skin, wreckage, and luggage remains were washed ashore in large quantities on the coast of Japan's Honshu Island; they were also found on Hokkaido. The following explanation was given: 'Material evidence' from the downed Boeing had drifted with the current and thereby 'floated' to the Japanese shores from the north—from the location where the aircraft fell. Everything seems to be logical. Except for one very significant circumstance that nobody to this day has bothered to check on: During the end of August and in September, there is not a single current in the area of Moneron Island and Sakhalin that would push the waves from the north to the south. Only from the south to the north! Let us add to this the fact that, according to weather reports, at that time the wind was blowing steadily in the direction of the mainland. So, how could the Boeing's pieces float to Japan against the current and against the wind?

"Nature does not play a game of political secrets, so there can be only one explanation—the wreckage of the Boeing passenger plane was indeed brought to the Japanese shore and to Sahkalin by the current; not the invented one, however—from the north to the south, but by the real one—from the south to the north. Which means that the airliner fell into the sea considerably south of Moneron. Then what about the quadrant of impact, search expeditions, and the findings? Nobody questions the reality of this. It is simply that, I repeat once again, the aircraft that fell into the water near Moneron was some other aircraft, not the South Korean Boeing. This, by the way, explains the missing bodies, the remains of 269 people—by my reckoning, your fighters could have shot down an RS-135. The crew of this aircraft numbers more than 20 (there are many 'electronic personnel' on board, including women). This is supported by some details mentioned in the IZVESTIYA investigation. For example, your newspaper published a photo of items found among the wreckage, including an ashtray. Trust me as a former pilot—there is no such 'housekeeping equipment' on board a civilian aircraft; nor are there pilots wearing black gloves (I cannot admit the possibility that someone in the passenger cabin was wearing gloves in August); in military aviation, however, pilots always wear gloves, while electronics personnel equip their workplace much like a city office, and ashtrays are not against regulations.

"These are, however, small details, and there is no need to dwell on them since there are other interesting circumstances. For instance, the only eyewitness to the air combat over Moneron is alive and well—he is Hayashi Shitsuka, captain of the fishing schooner Tidori-Maru 58. The International Civil Aviation Organization

report, which is regarded as the basic document in the Boeing story, does not contain a word about him, although his testimony complements the remarks of the Soviet MiG pilot about the air battle with amazing precision. For some reason, the sensational information (or disinformation?) about the South Korean airliner's landing on Sakhalin entirely disappeared, although it had been confirmed by the CIA, with references to 'electronic' sources, and was supported by the Japanese data. Nobody had any desire to follow up on the story of an amazing find, discovered by Japanese fishermen in the Sea of Okhotsk several weeks after that unfortunate day—a fragment of a titanium wing, which, in the experts' opinion, could have come off only one known airborne construction in the world—the American reconnaissance plane SR-71, although the U.S. Air Force had not officially registered such a loss. To this day the mystery of another find that floated into Wakkanai on Hokkaido together with the wreckage of the South Korean Boeing remains unsolved—the remains of the tail unit of a live missile with markings that were clearly not Soviet. There was even an official press release put together on occasion of this discovery, but it has never been published, while the material evidence itself is kept under seven locks in the Maritime Safety Administration in Wakkanai. For some reason, nobody is asking questions about such an unexplained happening as the sending of an American special Navy aircraft, normally used in rescue operations, into a quadrant of the Sea of Japan far removed from Moneron. This flight, registered by Japanese radars, took place at that same time and to that same location where, in my calculations, the South Korean Boeing really lies—near the Japanese island of Kuro-Shima, not far from Sado Island. Neither before nor after that fateful day has the American military appeared there; meanwhile, two weeks after the Boeing catastrophe—on 13 September 1983—it was, for some reason, precisely here that Soviet reconnaissance planes violated Japanese airspace, necessitating the sending of Japanese fighters to intercept them...

"There are many questions. But the most important one, of course, is this: Where are the bodies? Where are the remains of the 269 unfortunate passengers who were on board the South Korean Boeing? The more time goes by and the more facts related to the catastrophe surface, the more firm I become in my guess—in my view, the real Boeing is still resting today at the bottom of the sea where it fell seven and a half years ago—near Sado Island—together with its crew and passengers. I have calculated this location, using as the basis the speed of local currents and the characteristics registered by the radars—approximately eight days south of Sangar Strait on the course the Boeing was following during the last minutes 'controlled' by the ground services.

"To be honest, I can only guess in regard to the reasons for the airliner's destruction. It is possible that the Boeing was in fact shot at during the brouhaha that was going on in the Sakhalin sky, was damaged, and developed cracks that later 'imploded' the aircraft. It is possible that KAL-007 was indeed shot down—not by a Soviet fighter, however, but by an American missile, the same missile whose tail unit was found in Wakkanai. (As the analysis shows, it was a live missile with an infrared guidance system that 'produced impact' as it entered the exhaust). I understand that such a supposition probably sounds ridiculous, but Captain Turner first wrote in U.S. FORCE JOURNAL [as published] several years ago that the Boeing's destruction was an operation of American intelligence; second, I have my own interpretation in this regard. If we assume that in the sky over Moneron, Osipovich 'downed' an RS-135 or an SR-71, then everything looks logical—the point is that these supermodern airborne intelligence gatherers not only are stuffed with the miracles of electronics, they also have a series of secret codes that allows them to access the electronic 'brains' of military computers and even communicate directly with the White House. You imagine this kind of 'souvenir' falling into Russian hands, and you will have a motive for the rest of the intrigue. Your pilots, as it is clear from the IZVESTIYA investigation, did not know which aircraft they had shot down. The Soviet side learned that the South Korean Boeing had been downed from a Western source, when the commotion started about the 'Russian terrorism.' Your officials believed this version, and thus the 'Boeing tragedy over Sakhalin' was born, although in reality a completely different tragedy took place over Sakhalin. What I fail to understand is why all this mystification has been dragging on for so long? The details described in IZVESTIYA publications clearly confirm that it is not a Boeing passenger plane but a completely different aircraft that lies near Moneron. In this, it is not possible to be deceived by the KAL company emblem mentioned by the divers, or by tape players, compacts, and other civilian items—there are still no bodies. There is no trace of 269 people who should be on board—held to the chairs with seat belts or thrown out by the impact, but they must be there!

"I want to be understood correctly—I do not insist on my assumptions in regard to the reasons for the airliner's destruction, the role of special services, and some high-level agreement that probably exists between the Russians and the Americans in regard to this incident. It is simply that as a professional, I encounter obvious discrepancies. After the first publication of my research, the CIA, to my knowledge, did a special investigation on whether I, Michel Bran, am a KGB agent. (Funny: And I was suspected of being a CIA agent.—Andrey Illesh)... After all, let it rest, this air combat over Sakhalin, the downed plane that was successfully recovered and studied by your specialists, and all these discrepancies that I mentioned. If the Soviet side finds it so hard to step away from its previous position, let us assume that on the night of 1 September 1983, two Boeing-747s were shot down, both of them passenger planes, but one with people, and another—without. The latter had already been found near Moneron. Let us try to find the other! Without references to state secrets, without unmasking



spy missions, without searching for cause and effect—let us simply look for it. For some reason, I think we will definitely find it..."

When I was finishing this material, the irrepressible Michel Bran called me and said that should the need arise, he is ready to go to the Soviet Union with all his documents and calculations, having prepared for this trip a whole list of "naive questions." But will it do any good? The Soviet military and special services do not give answers even to less "naive" questions—the ones asked by IZVESTIYA.

The drawing: A map of Soviet military aircraft flights during the operation against the KAL-007. This map was put together literally immediately after the incident, and therefore it is hard to suspect its producers—the Japanese Coast Guard—of supporting one or another theory among those that emerged later. A study of this map shows that, as a minimum, Michel Bran is mistaken in regard to the location where the Boeing was shot down and, of course, in regard to the site where the remains of the giant "jumbo" rest at the bottom of the sea...

We believe that the IZVESTIYA investigation, conducted together with experts, brings us much closer to the discovery of the secret of the South Korean Boeing than M. Bran's work. But in the investigation of such an

international and extremely muddled case one cannot dismiss outright any ideas, no matter how absurd they may seem at first glance. Any published document is a step forward. And there are many such steps still ahead of us. They will be the subject of future publications in our newspaper. (To Be Continued)

Fifth Installment

91UF0769A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 May 91 Union Edition p 7

["IZVESTIYA Investigation. Part Two." by Aleksandr Shalnev: "Secret of the Korean Boeing-747"; fifth article of the current series]

[Text]

V.

New York—What have I been able to find out during the "pause" between the two parts of the investigation here, in the United States? Alas, not as much as I would have liked. I will come back later to why this is so, and to a specific reaction on the part of special services, newspapers, and Congress toward the series of articles in IZVESTIYA. But first I will relate some discoveries of principal importance. I want to note at the outset, though: Alas, there are still far more questions than answers when it comes to the American side, too.

In the category of answers, for instance, I would place a solution to the riddle of where the "disinfo" published in January by the weekly U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT came from. I am talking about the disinformation that the Soviet Union had secretly cremated the bodies of the passengers who perished on the KAL-007 flight. This short report—just a few lines, actually—appeared in the 14 January issue and contained a direct reference to information ostensibly received from IZVESTIYA. It produced considerable "effect." In any case, it provoked indignation in South Korea.

James Oberg, a NASA scientist who has been quoted by IZVESTIYA on many occasions, including the Boeing investigation, sent me a letter with a virtual confession that he, Oberg, was one of the sources of this disinformation—as I understand it, an unwitting and even deceived source. From what he told me, he had apparently mentioned in his interview with the magazine staff some rumors he had come across as early as in 1984. Rumors that ostensibly some group of Japanese, visiting Sakhalin a little more than three weeks after the tragedy, saw black smoke belching out of the chimney of a building which ostensibly was a crematorium that had not been used for quite some time. (The rumor is ridiculous: Why would anybody restart the crematorium precisely on the day when the Japanese showed up?!—A.Sh.).

A few weeks later, in another conversation with U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, the reporters asked Oberg to confirm that he was talking about facts, not rumors; as Oberg writes to me, "the most I could say was that such a horrible scenario" was only one possible version of the events. "I remember clearly," Oberg continued in his letter, "that I was extremely careful in what I said. And I asked (the magazine staff.—A.Sh.) to be just as careful."

I am not the one to judge who was more and who was less careful. What is important is the result: Referring to IZVESTIYA articles that at that time had not even been published, and which did not contain such information, the magazine—a respected one in the United States, by the way—produced a classic sample of disinformation.

So far, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT has not published any retractions of its "disinfo."

It is easy to assume, however, that all kinds of scenarios of the Boeing passengers' fate will keep circulating until a definitive version—not just official, but also totally convincing and precise—is presented. By the way: Among the various things one hears even now are quite a few suppositions that far from all of the passengers perished, and that many somehow survived and found themselves on Sakhalin. Relating one of these rumors to me, the widow of a scientist who was on flight 007 from New York to Seoul said that according to some data (I quote her verbatim) "it was suddenly noted that the demand for Japanese noodles, imported from Japan, increased sharply on Sakhalin in the fall of 1983. This could only have been caused by the fact that it became necessary to feed a large number of people who were used to precisely this kind of food."

I was listening to the widow and could not refrain from commenting that although she, a scientist herself, could not believe it to be true, she still had that hope—a small, microscopic one—that the Boeing passengers were still alive. And, perhaps, her husband was alive, too.

Tales of a miraculous escape by the passengers are not born in a vacuum. Even the information that has already been confirmed as fact contains a multitude of things that only add to the mystery of KAL-007.

Let me explain. Speaking on the morning of 1 September at a news conference in Washington, George Shultz, then secretary of state, stated: "At 1826 (Greenwich Time.—A.Sh.) the Soviet pilot reported that "the target is destroyed." At 1830, according to radar, the Korean aircraft was already at an altitude of 5,000 meters. At 1838 the Korean aircraft disappeared from radar."

In some estimates, at 1838—that is, at the moment it disappeared from the screens—the aircraft was at an altitude of a little more than 300 meters. It follows from all of this that, first, KAL-007, having been hit by two missiles at an altitude of almost 12 km, had been falling for 12 minutes.

The definition of "falling" is quite relative: When in January 1985 all four engines on a Boeing-747 owned by an Asian airline went out over California, the aircraft

was indeed falling—in two minutes it plunged 10 km, until the pilot managed to restart the engines.

Second, while it took the Boeing four minutes to fall from an altitude of 12 km to 5 km, descending at a rate of approximately 2 km per minute, its subsequent fall to 300 meters took eight minutes. Therefore, the speed of descent was two times less, was it not?

This could not have happened unless during these minutes the aircraft was somehow piloted. This is the opinion of a number of authoritative experts who have closely studied the KAL-007 problem. One of them, Robert Lee, also believes that the pattern of the Boeing's descent is fully consistent with the way standard procedures direct a pilot to act when the aircraft engines suddenly fail, decompression takes place, but the aircraft can still be maneuvered. According to these procedures, the pilot must attempt to get the aircraft as quickly as possible to an altitude where the air is not as rarefied as it is at 10 or 12 km, and where the temperature is higher. Having accomplished this, the pilot is supposed to slow the rate of descent and start looking for a place for an emergency landing.

In an experiment on a Boeing-747, conducted at R. Lee's request by Capt. Joe Ferguson, who had considerable experience flying this type of aircraft, a scenario was programmed in which at an altitude of 12 km engine No. 4—the same as the one that was damaged by SU-15 missiles on the KAL-007—went out and quick decompression occurred. (Attention: Osipovich maintains that he hit the left engine with his missile. Engine No. 4 is located on the right side of the plane, on the right wing.—Andrey Illesh). Following standard procedures, Ferguson accomplished the "descent" in almost the same time, and in the same pattern, as happened with the Korean airliner.

There is almost no doubt that for at least 12 minutes KAL-007 was under the control of its crew, which, on top of that, did not send a single SOS signal during that time, although, according to instruction, it was supposed to do this continuously up to the last moment. Without sending an SOS signal, the crew nevertheless kept reporting on how the descent was proceeding. Judging by the transcript of the conversations between the damaged Boeing and air traffic control in Tokyo, the co-pilot clearly reported that the aircraft descended to 15,000 feet, and then continued descent to 10,000 feet.

So, the next question: Why was there no SOS? Perhaps the crew did not believe that the situation was absolutely critical, since the aircraft still responded to controls?

Further. Democratic Congressman Larry McDonald was on board that Boeing. The congressman's press secretary Tommy Touls [name as transliterated], concerned over not hearing from his boss, who by all reckoning should have arrived in Seoul, started calling various Washington departments. Finally he heard this from a representative of the Federal Aviation Administration (I quote): "This is Orville Brockman, at the duty desk of the administration's headquarters in Washington. We have just received the following information from our representative in Tokyo, Dennis Wilhelm: "Mr. Takano, Wilhelm's colleague at the air traffic administration at the headquarters of the Japanese Bureau of Civil Aviation, informed us, that, as confirmed by the Japanese Air Defense Forces, the radar on Hokkaido had been tracking (the aircraft.—A.Sh.) up to its landing on Soviet territory on the Island of Sakhalinsk (as rendered in the text.—A.Sh.). The manifest confirms that Congressman McDonald is on board."

One can easily dismiss, and probably disprove in a documented manner, the scenario of the Boeing landing in "Sakhalinsk" as totally groundless. It is much more difficult to dispute two facts: that Japanese radar tracked the aircraft up to the last moment, and that the aircraft was moving in the direction of Sakhalin. Which means that it was flying in a direction opposite to that in which it was traveling when it was hit by the Soviet missiles: When Lt. Col. Osipovich fired at it, the Boeing was flying away from Sakhalin... And if the aircraft was controllable to such a degree that it could make a 180-degree turn in order to attempt to make a landing at one of Sakhalin's airports, why did it not make it to the island? And if it did make it?—No, this scenario is just too much of a fantasy!

Another set of questions. There is not a single researcher who would not be surprised by how nonexistent all that remains from the Boeing is. According to calculations (which, as Andrey Illesh reported, of course do not include those items which Soviet divers discovered on the sea bottom), all in all 1,020 fragments were fished out of the sea and collected on shore by Japanese and Soviet search teams. Among them are 13 remains of human bodies. All thirteen were found by the Japanese. Whatever was found by us was not passed over to anybody. At least officially. By the way, it is still not clear beyond doubt: Are these the remains of the Boeing passengers?

In the estimates of experts the explosion that destroyed the Challenger, with seven crew members on board, in the Florida sky in January 1986, was many times more powerful than the one that felled the giant Boeing. The Challenger fell into the sea from an altitude 3 kilometers higher than the one from which the KAL-007 plunged down. But while officially only an insignificantly small number of Boeing fragments were found, all the collected fragments from the Challenger weigh over 20 tons, and their total number is 245,000. Almost 90 percent of all cabin fragments have been recovered. In addition, the bodies of all crew members were found as well.

The situation with the Challenger is not an exception. When in June 1985 an Air India Boeing-747 exploded over the Atlantic at an altitude of almost 10 km, 123 bodies were found on the very first day. Eight more were found the next day, and one more was lifted from the ocean floor four months later—this was the body of a passenger held to his seat by the seat belt.

In the case of the Korean Boeing there were almost no bodies. Judging, of course, from what we know. Strong current? Crabs? The powerful impact against the water that pulverized the bodies and dispersed the remains who knows where? All three assumptions have some validity, but not to the point that would explain, once and for all, the disappearance without a trace of 269 passengers and crew members.

..."These remains belong to us; it is something that is ours, something personal. Governments and politics have nothing to do with it. This tragedy will always be with us... We will speak about at again and again, no matter how many generations it takes." These are the words of a woman who was deprived of a husband and son-in-law by the tragedy over Sakhalin. But they can be repeated, and will be repeated, by any of those for whom that September night held a terrible blow.

But there are, after all, people who do know precisely what happened, and why, seven and a half years ago! They do exist, both here and, I am convinced of it, in America as well.

When will the time come for them to finally speak?.. (To be continued)

Western Plans 'Cast Doubt' on CSCE Pledges

PM2205152791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 91 First Edition p 5

[Colonel A. Vasilyev article: "Old Approaches to a New Europe"]

[Text] The last five years have been "productive" for Europe in terms of events of exceptional political importance: the signing of the Treaties on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and Reductions in Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, German unification, and, lastly, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact military structures. This means that there is just one military-political grouping left in Europe—the NATO bloc—instead of the two on whose existence the postwar system of regional security was based.

NATO experts evaluate the military disintegration within the Warsaw Pact as just a "domestic" problem for the Eastern bloc that will have no effect on the future of the North Atlantic alliance. That is, a trend has clearly emerged not only for the need to retain and further strengthen NATO to be justified in all manner of ways, but also for a new system of European security to be focused on it.

At present two areas—the Atlantic and the European—predominate in regard to setting up such a system. The first is geared to NATO as the fundamental element in the future system, the second to the Western European Union [WEU]. At the same time specialists are now arguing with increasing frequency that these two areas can be combined.

The idea of creating a NATO-WEU axis is seen as the best option and is viewed positively by both "Europeanists" and "Atlanticists." It is thought that this would, first, help resolve the question of the North Atlantic alliance's forces operating outside Europe since the WEU could, to use NATO Secretary General M. Woerner's expression, "perform a separate role outside the alliance's zone of operations." Second, it is thought that NATO's "European pillar" could be reinforced via ties of association with the WEU for East European countries.

You get the impression that people in NATO are deliberately disregarding the CSCE or simply refuse to see it as the main element in a new nonbloc system of security comprising all countries in the region, including the Soviet Union. And if the conversation turns to the CSCE, it is largely to note the difficulties, for instance, involved in the institutionalization process, along with its amorphous structures and vague concepts.

Regrettably, East European countries also hew to the same position. On leaving the Warsaw Pact military organization they began actively to seek guarantees of their security outside the CSCE framework. One of the directions this quest has taken is bilateral and multilateral integration in Central Europe. This process began with Czechoslovakia's signing an agreement with Hungary and Poland on military cooperation. Alongside this we can trace those countries' effort to create a "tripartite" alliance, one of the elements of which could be military cooperation.

The question of creating a regional "Centagonal" (pentagon) grouping—the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Austria have already expressed a desire to take part—is also still being studied. Poland has also displayed an interest in joining. Some specialists reckon that it could in that case act as a link between the "pentagon" and the Baltic region countries.

Another area is rapprochement with NATO. At present the alliance is taking a very cautious approach to this question. It is thought to be a bad time and a hasty move to admit new members—and one that is even provocative toward the Soviet Union. Nevertheless there are people in NATO who admit the possibility of the USSR's former allies joining the alliance. Not right away, but via a system of consultations, the gradual broadening of military and diplomatic contacts, and associative forms of cooperation. Joining the WEU is regarded as a possible interim option for them.

These actions by NATO countries pursuing a policy of preserving bloc ties and the political maneuverings by East European states cast doubt on how seriously they take their pledges to create new structures of collective security in Europe, strengthen trust, and ensure equal security for everyone. The fact that such steps might undermine confidence in the disarmament movement also arouses misgivings.

Soviet UN Debt, Funding Detailed

PM2205143191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[Correspondent A. Shalnev report: "Our UN Debts"]

[Text] New York—Our debt to the United Nations totals almost $200 million. That is the total of our commitments for the regular UN budget and the budgets funding UN peacekeeping activities in various parts of the world.

Those are the statistics cited in a report just circulated by the UN Secretariat assessing the state of affairs as regards UN finances as of 30 April.

For comparison's sake, the U.S. debt, interest payments on which are 2.5 times ours, tops $700 million.

To go on: Our debt is an aggregate figure. It includes the debts of both the Soviet Union and the Ukraine and Belorussia, both of which are full-fledged UN members.

Our debts to the regular budget were the largest—$109 million. Our debt for the maintenance of UN forces in Lebanon, which has been with us for many years—virtually since these forces were set up—is tremendous, a matter of $85 million.

On the other hand we have paid off everything for the group of military observers in the Iran-Iraq border region.

But now—and IZVESTIYA has already written about this—we are faced with more spending and, in particular, spending to ensure the activity of the mission that will monitor the holding of a referendum in the Western Sahara. Late last week the General Assembly approved the mission's budget: It will be issued with more than $180 million.

That is less than half the amount the UN Secretariat originally requested and which it has in many respects proved possible to cut thanks to the efforts of Soviet diplomats and the diplomats of a number of other UN Security Council members. Cuts have been made, in particular, by substantially reducing the number of military personnel who will be attached to the mission to supervise the referendum and by removing certain items of unwarranted spending from the draft budget.

Nevertheless, by delving deeper you can find plenty in the budget that cannot fail to elicit surprise. Like every organization and every department, the United Nations has its own bureaucracy, whose effectiveness is proven by how successfully it defends its projects, above all its financial projections.

Salvation Army To Open Schools in Leningrad

PM2205133191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Vladimir Nevelskiy report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Salvation Army Returns to Russia"]

[Text] Leningrad—A branch of the Salvation Army, the international religious organization, has been formed in Leningrad.

It has been founded by the city's Christian communities.

The Salvation Army, which performs religious, educational, and charitable missions, now operates in almost 100 states. Expelled from Soviet Russia in 1923, it is resuming its activity on the basis of a general agreement on social cooperation signed by the Leningrad Soviet Executive Committee and the international organization's leadership.

The agreement envisions that the new Christian association will open Sunday schools in Leningrad to provide children and adults with religious education, along with children's boarding schools and charitable snack bars and cafeterias for down-and-outs.

United States & Canada

Further Reportage on Moiseyev Visit, Arms Talks

Meeting With Bush

LD2205131791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1130 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] U.S. President Bush has had a meeting with Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Union's General Staff. Although TASS is reporting that the talks are continuing, news agencies are reporting that the Soviet side is not preparing to make concessions and the issue of signing the treaty in the sphere of disarmament is hanging in the air. Incidentally, this is also true of the summit meeting between Gorbachev and Bush.

Concludes Visit, Comments

LD2205205991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 22 May 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Army General Moiseyev, first deputy defense minister of the USSR and chief of the general staff of the Union's Armed Forces, has completed his working visit to the United States.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent B. Kalyagin] Full, intense talks took place in Washington over three days. U.S. President George Bush received General Moiseyev in the White House. The Soviet military commander also met General Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces, and Defense Secretary Cheney. There were conversations with U.S. Secretary of State Baker and with Scowcroft, the U.S. President's national security adviser. During the discussions, our side sought to remove the obstacles standing in the way of the Soviet-U.S. summit planned for the summer.

The main point at issue is connected with different interpretations of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signed in Paris last November. The Americans insist that this agreement should be extended to four Soviet marine infantry divisions and that the tanks, armored personnel carriers, and guns, numbering over 1,100, with which these divisions are equipped, should be subject to reduction. Our representatives, on the other hand, assume that naval units do not fall within the terms of the treaty.

The U.S. Administration declares that, until this dispute is settled, it will not send the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces to the Senate for ratification and will not agree to hold the Soviet- U.S. summit. Army General Moiseyev gave the U.S. side new compromise proposals from the Soviet Union, which are intended to help resolve the problem, but the American reply to our inititaive remained unclear right up to the last moment. The final stage of talks between General Moiseyev and U.S. Under Secretary of State Bartholomew ended just two hours ago.

[Moiseyev] A certain degree of understanding was achieved. We did not manage to remove the one, sole position, regarding the naval forces, but the talks will not end there. Each side has undertaken the obligation to seek a solution. We shall continue a constructive dialogue in this spirit. [end recording]

Press Aide on Visit, Ties

OW2305033691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 22 May 91

[Report by "Diplomatic Panorama" correspondent Pyotr Vasiliyev]

[Text] A White House official said the Soviet Union's position at talks in Washington in an attempt to remove differences on the conventional arms treaty in Europe did not instill optimism. The two sides are still wide apart in their assessments and approachments.

For his part, a spokesman for Mr Gorbachev's press service, Mr Vladimir Tumarkin, said the information arriving from both sides raises the hope that "positions will be clarified in the nearest future." He was hopeful that the results of General Moiseyev's trip to United States would be optimistic.

Mr Tumarkin brushed aside speculations that the general's mission to the United States was caused by discontent among the Soviet military over recent agreements reached by the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state in Kislovodsk to remove a large part of differences on the conventional arms treaty.

At the same time, he said the military "are entitled to their own judgments and to differences with the Foreign Ministry on matters of detail." Mr Tumarkin referred to the words by the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Yazov, stating commitment to the policy of sustained cooperation with the Soviet foreign minister, Mr Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, and his ministry.

"At any rate, went on Mr Tumarkin, it was President Gorbachev's own move to send a top military official to the United States for on-spot clarification of controversial issues." [quotation marks as received] In his view, the inclusion of the deputy foreign minister, Mr Kvitsinskiy, into the delegation was designed to give the mission a politico-diplomatic thrust.

Asked what exactly was causing optimism for a success at the talks, especially after the military denied an IF [INTERFAX] report on the substance of General Moiseyev's proposals to Washington, Mr Tumarkin said: "We do not know at all what can be in his politico-diplomatic luggage."

However, he said General Moiseyev was most likely to offer concrete proposals on Mr Gorbachev's behalf for clearing the remaining obstacles to the conventional arms treaty. "This follows the content of a 45-minute telephone conversation between the two presidents and

it is with these powers and guidelines that General Moiseyev is taking his trip to the United States."

Also, Mr Tumarkin did not rule out the possibility of the two presidents resorting to the hotline again to remove differences if their envoys failed to reach agreement. "All kinds of contacts are being maintain and I do not rule out that the presidents will hold back to this type of communication to resolve whatever difficulties may arise."

Mr Tumarkin also said "we are still hopeful" for a fruitful and substantative summit in Moscow this summer rather than any formal statements of support." [no beginning quotation mark as received] He said "there are not reasons to think otherwise."

Mr Tumarkin disagreed with a judgment saying general Moiseyev's trip was "a last-minute chance to settle the differences." He said "it is a routine trip and as such is another chance. One would wish, of course, it were fruitful for both side."

Primakov To Meet President Bush on Investments

LD2205124891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 22 May 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] It was announced in the capital that Yevgeniy Primakov will, as part of a special delegation, fly to Washington to talk with George Bush. The main subject of the meeting will be a program for attracting large-scale foreign capital to surmount the economic crisis at home.

Cheney on Advisability of Soviet-U.S. Summit

PM2005115191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Unattributed report from IZVESTIYA, RIA, TASS, INTERFAX, REUTER roundup: "Cheney Favors Contacts With USSR"]

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney has said in an interview with CNN-TV: "We are interested in continuing contacts with the Soviet Union. These are important relations." According to him, these ties have never been as important as they are now when "fundamental changes" are under way in the USSR. At the same time, he stressed, recent events in the Soviet Union give cause for alarm.

In response to the question of whether he now thinks it advisable to hold the next Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, Cheney said: "I believe it is in U.S. interests to periodically hold summit meetings with the Soviet Union." He pointed out that although there may be debates over the date and agenda for a meeting, the "main hypothesis boils down to the fact that regular contacts between the U.S. President and the head of the Soviet Union should continue."

Shcherbakov, Primakov To Visit for G-7 Talks

OW1705101391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 16 May 91

[From the "Business Today" feature]

[Text] The deputy Soviet prime minister, Mr. Vladimir Shcherbakov and the presidential adviser, Mr. Yevgeniy Primakov, in the near future will fly to the USA for talks on cooperation between the Soviet Union and the seven leading industrialised nations. This was announced at a press-conference in Moscow by Mr. Shcherbakov.

He also said that Mikhail Gorbachev and the president of the Foreign Political Association of the USSR, the former foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, had been actively working on plans for cooperation with the Group of Seven in the course of a year.

Mr. Shcherbakov said that Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, one of the authors of the 500 day program and a participant in the Washington meeting of the Consultative Council of the Group of Seven at the end of April, has found an "informal channel for developing cooperation with those forces and circles in the USA which support the development of relations between the seven and the USSR."

Mr. Yavlinskiy said Mr. Primakov, according to the MOSCOW NEWS paper, on May 5 sent a statement to the leaders of the seven countries. It contains a plan of cooperation of leading industrial countries in the economic reforms in the Soviet Union, envisaging in particular relieving the burden of the country's foreign debt, the acceptance of the Soviet Union into international economic organisation, and a working out of future investment programs.

The necessity for the Soviet side to take part in the London meeting of the Seven in June was also emphasised.

The president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, has spoken of the necessity of working out an economic partnership concept with other countries. Talking on May 15 at a session of the Cabinet of Ministers in Moscow, Mr. Gorbachev, discussing cooperation with the West, also said: "We must not underestimate the importance of economic cooperation with the West, especially if this brings with it quick returns."

Last Sunday, the Soviet premier, Mr. Valentin Pavlov, told IF [INTERFAX] in an exclusive interview that the working out of a program to attract foreign capital had already begun in the Government and that this could become "some kind of Marshal Plan for the Soviet Union."

Mr. Gorbachev at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, which was discussing the anticrisis program, spoke out against the self-isolation of the Soviet Union and said that the development of cooperation with the West does not mean that the country will fall "into the bondage of capitalism".

"We will build such cooperation which will bring advantages to both sides," said Mr. Gorbachev. At the same time he warned that the Soviet Union "should not become a Klondyke for foreign businessmen."

Fitzwater on Summit Venue, Participation at G-7

PM2205111791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report from "IZVESTIYA, RIA, TASS, INTERFAX, REUTERS" column: "Question Undecided, Consultations Ahead"]

[Text] Official White House Spokesman Fitzwater, answering a question on the possibility of M.S. Gorbachev taking part in the London conference of the heads of the seven leading industrially developed Western countries and the organization of a Soviet-U.S. summit within the framework of the conference, stated: "We have not yet taken a position on the venue for a meeting and so forth. Our first concern is the meeting itself, and, as soon as this question is decided, we will definitely find room for it. However, our aim is still Moscow. We would not want to speculate on the subject of various venues for the meeting until the question of actually holding it is decided. Let's wait and decide first whether we will be meeting." Fitzwater also said that the administration as yet has no clear and definite position on inviting M.S. Gorbachev to participate in the London "G-7" conference. "We would like to discuss this with our partners," he said. "We will be consulting with them, but we have not yet decided on this question."

Shevardnadze Urges Congress To Support Credit

LD1605141991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0703 GMT 16 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Dmitry Shishkov]

[Text] San Francisco, 16 May (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, president of the Soviet Foreign Policy Association, has called support from the U.S. legislative body for the provision of credits to the Soviet Union a major event. "I view this as a very important step, as active support for the process of democratization, renewal, and perestroyka in the Soviet Union," the former USSR minister of foreign affairs said at a press conference in the Marriot Hotel in San Francisco, where he is on a private visit. "I have no doubt that the Soviet people value this step very highly."

Replying to a question about the extent to which it has proved possible to attain the aims of his trip, including the matter of U.S. economic assistance for the Soviet Union, the prominent Soviet politician replied: "The final answer will probably come once my trip around the country is over. I can note with great satisfaction that I am not doing poorly with the job I have. We are establishing new contacts with new people, including business circles. I have had very important meetings with and appearances before students, intellectuals, and political figures. I think that such meetings indubitably promote the cause of development of our relations."

Dwelling on the problem of credits for the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze said, in part: "We had a detailed discussion of this issue with President Bush, the secretary of state, and in the Senate and the House of Representatives. I tried to explain to all my partners and to the leadership of the administration why these credits are needed right now, and not in a year or two's time. The country is in a crisis. There could be serious complications, serious troubles. Gorbachev is saying that the country may end up in a state of chaos. That must not be permitted. If such a prospect is a realistic one, then a dictatorship would grow out of such a state".

While in San Francisco, Eduard Shevardnadze will speak before political and public figures and American businessmen in the "North California Council for International Affairs." Meetings are planned with former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. On Monday, the president of the Soviet Foreign Policy Association will set off for Los Angeles, in the south of the state.

Senate 'Of Two Minds' Over Credits for USSR

PM2205154191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 May 91 Second Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent V. Gan: "'Of Two Minds.' U.S. Congress at Crossroads: Just How Are Relations With the USSR To Be Built?"]

[Text] Washington—It is paradoxical but true: The Senate of the U.S. Congress has ended up in a situation which people in United States call "being of two minds." By 70 votes to 28, the upper chamber advocated granting government guarantees for credits to the Soviet Union totaling $1.5 billion to purchase agricultural produce.

This is, so to speak, the first mind, which considers that additional deliveries of U.S. grain are very necessary for its own U.S. farmers, who do not know what to do with the surplus and are interested in our market. This same mind suggests that it is unreasonable to complicate the already extremely difficult situation in the USSR by refusing credits. For it is no coincidence that some legislators have spoken of the unacceptability of using farmers as an "instrument of diplomacy" and of imposing the "commercial equivalent of a grain embargo" and a "trial of the strength" on Soviet-U.S. relations.

In this context, the resolution adopted by the Senate urges President Bush not to extend to the Soviet Union one of the points in the existing legislation under which it is forbidden to grant credits to "insolvent" countries. President Bush himself recently placed our country in just this category, although he expressed a desire to find ways to help the Soviet economy.

But there was also the second mind, working in the opposite direction. Senators literally crammed the resolution with all sorts of provisos and conditions which, in my view, considerably diminish its, on the whole, positive resonance. There is nothing unusual in the fact that the granting of credits is linked with Soviet payments of interest on previous credits—obligations must be fulfilled. The Senate's "recommendations" to strive for "clear and firm guarantees" that the central government will not use the credits "to support the Armed Forces, the state security apparatus, or the Communist Party apparatus" or to "put pressure" on the Baltic and other separatist-minded republics are another matter.

Evidently to make things tougher, the legislators propose allocating the credits in installments of $500 million and to make the granting of each subsequent installment dependent on the "proper use" of the preceding one.

It is essentially a question of an attempt at political diktat—we will give you credits, but you must do with them as we indicate. One wonders whether it is decent to behave like this, particularly now that the potential for chaos in the Soviet Union is certainly not diminishing. Then what about the greetings addressed to perestroyka and the repeatedly declared desire to sincerely aid our reforms? Somehow all this does not jell logically...

The administration itself has not yet defined its stand on the question of credits and probably will not do so until the return from Moscow of a group of U.S. Agriculture Department experts sent to us by the President, who are expected to make recommendations. Senator R. Dole, the resolution's sponsor, has reported that on the eve of the vote Bush expressed "enthusiasm" for it in conversations with Republican legislators. There is, as yet, nothing more concrete than the President's well-known statements about a desire to help. On the other hand, it is known that invited and uninvited advisers are insistently "suggesting" that the White House use the credits as a pretext for establishing direct relations with the republics, bypassing the center. The following appeal has also been heard—to secure from M.S. Gorbachev in exchange for credits a "new pledge" to implement political and economic reforms. As though we had already abandoned these reforms and no longer considered them necessary!

It is hard to say which path President Bush will choose. People here evidently do not lose sight of the incontestable fact that undermining the central government's positions will strengthen still further such "brakes" on perestroyka as, for example, the "laws war" and the "parade of sovereignties." One must not, and cannot, deny the republics' important role in the matter of technical and economic cooperation. But, as an administration official, who asked not to be named, pointed out, such cooperation "cannot be secured if we simply operate at the republic level."

On the whole, the debate over credits shows how deep the split is on the question of how to build relations with the Soviet Union and what course to take. THE WASHINGTON POST has called the present stage "delicate." Without fear of exaggeration, I would also add: and extremely important.

Paper Cited on U.S. Credits for Soviet Economy

LD1805150991 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0000 GMT 18 May 91

[Text] The U.S. Senate has favored giving the Soviet Union additional credits worth one and a half billion dollars. The resolution passed by 70 against 28 votes reflects the mood that prevails in the Senate. President Bush has said that if he were asked to vote on the issue he would back up the resolution on credits.

In this light, a popular Soviet newspaper NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA observer writes that he believes the USSR stands a good chance to secure American Government credits for purchasing grain and in this way at least partially to solve the food problem in the near future. The paper feels the U.S. Administration cannot disregard the fact that Western public opinion agrees on the possibility of a large scale aid to the Soviet Union. Washington should realize the consequences that a political and economic chaos in the USSR could lead to, the paper writes.

The paper has come up with an optimistic forecast that the USSR can hope for some thaw in its relations with the U.S.A. soon. It proceeds from the assumption that certain political stability in the USSR has given President Gorbachev the chance to revitalize Soviet foreign policy. Even now it's clear, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA writes, that Soviet diplomacy will aim at attracting the Western investments into Soviet economy.

In the newspaper's view one of the Washington's traditional mistakes after World War II was its misconception that the world can be safe for America only when it looked like it. The paper voices hope that the Bush administration may now take a different approach. In this case, Washington cannot make a thaw in American-Soviet ties stiffly depend on a drastic political reform in the USSR.

Moscow, too, has an opportunity to use the favorable economic situation that is now emerging to enlist large-scale international support for Soviet economic reforms.

At the same time, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA notes that the market of free capitals is very limited at present and will most likely remain such in the future. In its opinion, new opportunities for bilateral relations will appear only if the issue of transition to a market economy and of the rouble's convertibility will be resolved. Then American businessmen will themselves initiate contacts with a solvent nation.

Dzasokhov Urges Ending COCOM Fiber-Optic Ban

PM1705085991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Soviet-U.S. Ties"]

[Text] On 14 May, A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, received the cochairmen of the Soviet-U.S. Mixed Commission on Cooperation in the Sphere of Basic Scientific Research—E.A. Bromley, adviser to the U.S. President on science and technology, and N.P. Laverov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology—who are participating in the work of the commission's second session in Moscow.

E.A. Bromley noted with satisfaction the stability acheived recently in Soviet-U.S. contacts within the framework of the mixed commission, at the same time emphasizing the tremendous significance of the potential of Russian and Soviet science and its connection with the achievements of modern U.S. technology.

A.S. Dzasokhov noted the importance of Soviet-U.S. ties and the need for release from the residue of the Cold War in bilateral cooperation for the purpose of its dynamic development. He gave as an example the well-known COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] ban on the construction of the Trans-Soviet Line (Japan-Europe communications line), which envisages the extensive use of fiber-optic equipment.

U.S. Agencies Stress Economic Intelligence

91UF0750A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 May 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by N. Danilov: "The CIA Is Eager To Get Into Business"]

[Text] Economic power is the key to world influence and might.... International disagreements will, most likely, be reflected increasingly in economic relations. For this reason, decisive significance is attached to the requisite information on these problems. And intelligence will undoubtedly participate actively in the gathering of such information.

These are fragments of some speeches by ex-CIA Director W. Webster [as published]. They formulate briefly, but accurately, the new mission set for the American intelligence department for the 1990's.

Some American intelligence experts maintain that a country's economic and technological possibilities are becoming indicators of national strength. In their opinion, these are more important than the traditional indicators of military power. With regard to this, the quest for intelligence on economic activity should, they believe, occupy a leading position.

However, despite the outward persuasiveness of arguments in support of the idea of widening the "subjects" of CIA interest, the "economic" bias in the department's activity gives rise to a number of questions, at least. In doubt primarily is the actual proposition that it is now impossible to protect the financial and commercial secrets of U.S. companies without the support of the CIA.

It is known that specially formed and well-equipped security services are engaged in the protection of this information. For instance, the U.S. Department of Commerce alone has three such special subdivisions. One—the intelligence relations department—maintains direct contacts with the headquarters of the intelligence community, monitors technology exports, briefs employees on security matters, conveys intelligence information to the leadership of the department, and prepares intelligence assignments.

The Bureau of Export Administration's intelligence department has virtually similar functions. It monitors practically all American technology exports. A department for evaluating the possibilities of export control overseas was additionally formed in 1984. Its computerized data bank inputs data on the "drain" of modern technology from the United States. The department's experts prepare proposals for other U.S. special services on preventing the theft of American companies' technology secrets by foreign intelligence services.

No less saturated with employees of the special services is the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Its structure accommodates an intelligence support department. It is headed by an assistant treasury secretary, who represents the department in the intelligence oversight body. The department analyzes commercial information and coordinates work with other members of the intelligence community. Leventhal, the American intelligence theorist, has written in his books that gathering intelligence information overseas is usually performed by financial attaches [attashe po finansovym voprosam]. The U.S. Energy Department also has a special subdivision. Within its international security administration the defense intelligence information department gathers information on the state of other countries' nuclear power industries, including the manufacture of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing.

As we can see, the United States' commercial secrets are by no means lying around on the surface. If we remember that the CIA is concerned primarily with intelligence, it is perfectly feasible that, given an "economic" bias in its activity, foreign companies will most likely become a target of its activity. In this situation, it may perfectly well be expected that information on foreign partners or firms which are U.S. rivals obtained by this department through agents or technical means will regularly be "fed" to American businessmen. Also prompting misgivings is the fact that the CIA intentions include, unfortunately, not only the gathering of information but also operations to inflict damage and influence individuals and organizations. As work on economic issues is perfected, there will inevitably be the

temptation to flex "intelligence" muscles and "pacify" some of the most intractable overseas offices. Such a turn of events would in fact signify a joint "offensive" of American special services and business on foreign economic targets.

It would seem that many figures in the United States share such apprehensions. None of the other proposals included on an extended list of the new assignments for intelligence, G. Lardner pointed out in THE WASHINGTON POST, have encountered such opposition. On Capitol Hill members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and other prominent lawmakers have differed in their evaluations of the idea of an "economic bias" in the work of the CIA, which they regard as espionage in support of American corporations. It would not make sense to switch intelligence resources to solving the problems of corporations, Democratic Senator B. Bradley pointed out. In his opinion, it is unlikely that reliance on intelligence would appreciably improve management's economic policy or the competitiveness of American companies. Sharper in his evaluations is the Republican Senator Arlen Specter, who called commercial espionage a "flawed practice." The methods of the United States would encourage competitors in the same flawed practice.

Whatever, the CIA's specialization in economic problems promises American businessmen's overseas partners nothing good. The "Golden Age" of the American intelligence department could cost many of them not only their pocketbooks but also, perhaps, their lives.

China

Experts Hold Talks on Military Conversion

PM1705101091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 91 Union Edition p 7

[Report: "Soviet-Chinese Meeting on Conversion Problems"]

[Text] A meeting of Soviet and Chinese specialists in questions of the conversion of military production, organized by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the Chinese People's Association "For Peace and Disarmament," was successful. Apart from the discussions in Moscow, a seminar on this topic was held in Smolensk. The guests visited the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry "Conversion-91" exhibition in Nagatino, and visited a number of enterprises in Leningrad.

During the exchange of opinions, the idea was put forward of setting up a Soviet-Chinese public information center, which would be responsible, in particular, for exchanging information on the conversion process in the two countries, would provide mediation services, and would help organize exhibitions. Representatives of the Chinese Society for the Peaceful Use of Military Industry Technology who took part in the meeting announced that an international conference in the PRC is planned in October of this year on questions of cooperation in this sphere.

Jiang Zemin Visit, Bilateral Ties Viewed

91UF0742A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 19, 15 May 91 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Portyakov, candidate of historical sciences: "Restoration of Ritual?"]

[Text] To Confucius, the celebrated sage of antiquity, belong the words: "Ke ji fu li," which means "Master yourself and restore ritual."

Given the desire, it is not difficult to discern tokens of a "restoration of ritual" in the official visit to the Soviet Union beginning today, 15 May, of Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the PRC Central Military Council, if only because it is occurring on the same date as M.S. Gorbachev's visit to China in 1989.

True, as distinct from the criticism which came crashing down quite unexpectedly on Confucius' appeal in the first half of the 1970's in China—what wonders does history not perform at times!—we have every reason to adopt the most positive attitude toward the present "ritual."

First, this "ritual" is the highest standard, rightly meriting solemn ceremonies. After all, the breakthrough on the Chinese salient, which was crowned by the full normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations two years ago, has without any allowances been a most important foreign policy achievement of the "new thinking."

Second, this "ritual" is young, only just coming into being. The fact that this visit will solidify top-level Soviet-Chinese meetings and, it may be said, elevate them to the rank of a tradition, is gratifying in itself. In fact, why has M.S. Gorbachev already had nine meetings with F. Mitterrand, while the top leader of the PRC is coming to Moscow for the first time since 1957. And, generally, "our meetings are infrequent on the taiga track...." The manifest gap is to be intensively filled in by joint efforts both because our countries are neighbors in perpetuity and because in terms of all parameters, it would seem, Beijing is no less deserving than Paris.

Nonetheless, despite all our respect for them, "ritual" motives are not the main ones. The key, determining feature of the visit may be considered, I believe, however paradoxical this sounds, naturalness.

For the leaders of the two great powers to evaluate the development dynamics and present quality of mutual ties and to outline reference points for the future is natural. And our relations with China are before our eyes becoming increasingly broad and diverse, encompassing increasingly new levels and spheres.

It would be wrong to believe that in Soviet-Chinese contacts, everything is already on a well-trodden track and is proceeding without a hitch. There is most likely still much in our bilateral relations, at their working level, at least, which requires, figuratively speaking, ironing out, adjusting and mastering of the complex skills of consideration of the partner's interests without one's own being waived. In this respect, maintenance of the normal state of Soviet-Chinese relations is not an automatic process but one which is controlled with the help of constant deliberate efforts.

A manifestation of these efforts is the negotiation on a mutual cutback in armed forces and confidence-building measures in the Soviet-Chinese border area, which has already produced the first specific results. Our countries have, it would seem, heeded the behest of another Chinese sage—Lao Tzu—who more than two millennia ago maintained: "Weapons are an instrument of disaster. The wise ruler is oppressed by them...."

Of course, political contacts and economic relations and cultural cooperation should not be lost sight of either—each of these spheres has both its own problems and new opportunities.

It is perfectly natural to also expect a comparison of the views of the leaders of the USSR and the PRC on the general picture of international politics—and many changes in both the painting and in the range of colors have occurred here in the past two years.

Just as natural also is the desire to learn first-hand, more precisely, "from the horse's mouth," about the state of affairs in the partner country and to ponder the likely development of events. For the Chinese side, perhaps this could be the main interest.... There are also things for the Soviet side to inquire about—for example the wealth of Chinese experience in surmounting the economic crisis: the "antereform" experience after the "Great Leap Forward," the "prereform" experience of 1979-1981, the "reform" experience of 1989-1990....

I concede that the purposes of the high Chinese guest's visit to our country are not exhausted by these aspects and that it also has other facets and dimensions, up to and including the purely personal—after all, in the now-distant 1955, Jiang Zemin underwent a period of industrial training at the capital's Likhachev factory.

But we should hardly be conjecturing—we will learn much in just a few days.

The main thing, let us remember, is that the visit which is just beginning is the visit by the leader of an amazing, infinitely interesting country which is now in the takeoff phase. A country, one of few, perhaps, which sincerely believes in our capacity for ultimately emerging from the difficulties with dignity. A country with which, as practice has shown, we need good-neighborly, equal relations at all turns of history.

Ties at 'Qualitatively New Level'

LD1805173591 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 18 May 91

[Aleksey Kondratyev commentary]

[Excerpts] The general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the chairman of the Central Military Council of China, Jiang Zemin, has completed the official part of his visit to the Soviet Union. Judging from reports about the progress of the top-level talks in the Kremlin, the visit has been a success. Here is the opinion of our analyst, Aleksey Kondratyev:

It wouldn't be an overstatement if I say that there are enormous opportunities for developing and improving interstate contacts between the Soviet Union and China. So I put the question a bit differently: What kind of new targets, new horizons of Soviet-Sino cooperation have come to the fore during the Moscow summit? [passage omitted]

The range of cooperation is very wide. From political and interparty contacts to economic, scientific, and cultural ones. But the main accomplishment of the present-day relations between the two states is to my mind the restoration of political trust and mutual understanding. Without these two major factors it would have been difficult to reach the current level of Soviet-Sino relations in such a relatively short period of time. It is trust and mutual understanding that enabled the two sides to take bilateral steps toward removing the problems inherited from the time when, as Jiang Zemin put it, relations between the two countries did not necessarily enjoy a tailwind boost. [passage omitted]

And now a few words about prospects of Soviet-Sino cooperation. During the talks it was decided to make this cooperation broad, stable, and to put it on a long-term basis. Contacts are expected to cover new areas: Nuclear power engineering, civil aviation construction, space and other hi-tech branches. Scientific contacts are expected to broaden as well. Cooperation will be promoted both at the central and regional level. In short, the horizons of mutual contacts are broadening considerably. [passage omitted] In short, Soviet-Sino cooperation seems to be reaching a qualitatively new level both in the area of interstate contacts and in international relations.

New Railway Connects Kazakhstan, Alataw Shankou

LD1805045291 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 17 May 91

[by TASS correspondent Vladimir Ganzha]

[Text] Alma-Ata May 17 TASS— A new railway line has been built between the stations of Druzhba in Soviet Kazakhstan and Alataw Shankou in China.

The link was opened in keeping with a Sino-Soviet inter-governmental agreement.

Freight trains are expected to start running along the new route on June 15, 1991. They will bring about one million tonnes of mineral fertilizers, ferrous metal rolled stock, rubber and other goods to China this year.

China will supply the Soviet Union with raw materials and foodstuffs from Xinjiang-Uygur autonomous district.

This is the shortest railway route from China to the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Its construction began about 25 years ago but was suspended after relations between the Soviet Union and China strained.

Only recently did construction work on the transcontinental transport route resume. The railway will help expand trade and economic ties between China, the USSR and other European and Middle East countries.

The Alma-Ata and Urumqi railways have established close bilateral contacts and hope the new route will help develop them.

Northeast Asia

Prospects for Improved Ties With Japan Assessed

OW2205145091 Moscow Radio Moscow in Japanese 1100 GMT 21 May 91

[Commentary by (Uvizenskiy)]

[Text] Over a month ago, Soviet-Japanese relations were in the spotlight of world diplomacy for the first time in their long history. Needless to say, President Gorbachev's official visit to Japan was the primary cause of this happening. Dynamic development in Soviet-Japanese relations in recent years was accelerated by the new political philosophy of the Soviet leadership, a more flexible attitude on the Japanese side, and persevering efforts by both Soviet and Japanese people. Bilateral dialogue was promoted at every level by the public sector, political parties, and the private sector. The two countries have also explored measures for further bilateral cooperation in the fields of technology and culture.

Development in these process has been prevented by complicated holdovers from the past, prejudice, and bias lying between the two countries. However, President Gorbachev's Japan visit has marked the first step toward overcoming the situation.

Now that the fever concerning Soviet-Japanese relations has already eased, the results of the Gorbachev visit can be praised from a very objective viewpoint. It was remarkable that the two countries had taken the first step towards breaking the deadlock in bilateral relations, since the effort helped them to take an obviously favorable turn in overall relations.

Regarding negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty in connection with the territorial issue, the two countries have succeeded in overcoming a sense of deadlock. A joint statement issued on the results of President Gorbachev's Japan visit noted that both sides had given up their extreme positions on the issue. Throughout the summit talks, the two leaders indicated the possibilities of not only bilateral concessions on the issue, but also a solution acceptable to both sides, taking the balance of benefits of both sides into account.

All of 15 agreements and other documents signed this time are closely related to the most important aspect of Soviet-Japanese relations, and each one of these agreements will in nature affect others in their execution. Among those which are very important are the memorandum on intergovernmental consultations, the agreement on Japan's technological assistance to Soviet efforts for introducing the market economy, and the document on Soviet-Japanese trade in the Soviet Far East region. Meanwhile, humanitarian cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan was improved by the memorandum on relief for Chernobyl victims and the agreement on former Japanese prisoners of war who were detained in the Soviet Union. In the same manner, the Soviet Union proposed measures for promoting personnel exchange between the Japanese and Soviet citizens living on the South Kurile Islands, and for allowing Japanese people to travel to those islands without visas.

It is quite favorable that dialogue between the two countries is being accelerated on grounds of these agreements coming into effect. Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama have already started planning their visits to the Soviet Union. Subcabinet-level talks will shortly reopen on foreign affairs, and a Japanese Diet delegation led by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Diet's League for Japanese-Soviet Friendship is scheduled to visit the Soviet Union in early June. Moreover, local-level exchanges are also booming.

On that ground, the Soviet side is slightly unconvinced of recent remarks by Japanese leaders that Japan has rather overrated results of President Gorbachev's Japan visit in the first place, and that Japan should take a prudent stance toward promoting exchanges with the Soviet Union at the present, waiting for the Soviet side to make new proposals on the territorial issue. The Soviet side assumes a standpoint that overall and equal Soviet-Japanese cooperation is the only approach to perpeture the new favorable mood in bilateral relations, and to promote making a solution of the unsettled and complicated problem acceptable to both countries. The Soviet side intends to adopt that very stance for future negotiations with representatives of Japan.

Japan's Concern Over Soviet Threat Refuted

OW1805181291 Moscow Radio Moscow in Japanese 1100 GMT 17 May 91

[Commentary by Kalinin]

[Text] According to a recent report by YOMIURI SHIMBUN, the Defense Agency has been claiming that Soviet forces in the Far East are a potential military threat to Japan. In this connection, Radio Moscow military commentator Kalinin comments:

The Defense Agency deleted the phrase, Soviet military threat to Japan, from the 1990 Defense White Paper at the request of Prime Minister Kaifu. There are various indicators, however, that the Defense Agency still thinks that the Soviet military threat to Japan still exists.

As YOMIURI SHIMBUN has reported, the Defense Agency is racking its brain over on how it might restore the phrase, Soviet military threat to Japan, in the next defense white paper. The Japanese military thinks that the Soviet Union is deploying its forces in the Far East over and above defense requirements and continues to strengthen them. The Japanese military, proceeding from this view, claims that the Soviet military threat to Japan will not fade as long as Soviet forces in the Far East are not drastically reduced.

Although the Japanese military contends that this view is correct, I would like to set the matter straight. The Soviet Union has unilaterally reduced its forces in the Far East. The Soviet Union has reduced ground forces to the tune of 120,000 troops and 12 divisions and has disbanded an air squadron, the only one in the region. The Soviet Union also has decommissioned sixteen ships, including three large surface ships and three submarines from the Soviet Pacific Fleet. As a result of these reductions, the Soviet Union currently deploys fewer forces in the Far East than the ROK.

I would like to explain the power structure in the region. According to data available from the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces, the United States and Japan now maintain twice as many tactical fighters and naval air squadrons as the Soviet Union does in the Far East and four times as many large ships. These two countries have a marked edge over the Soviet Union in numbers of ships carrying cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers. The Soviet fleet in general carries no such missiles. Therefore, the only nation with grounds to claim that any military threat exists is the Soviet Union, not Japan.

Japan's concerns about the Soviet military threat, however, would end if trust on military matters can be built between the two countries. The Soviet Union has made the appropriate proposals in attempting to build such trust. For example, the Soviet Union has proposed restricting the size and scope of military exercises, inviting military observers to exercises in each country, and exchanging military delegations.

I had hoped that this proposal would be welcomed by those Japanese concerned about the Soviet military threat to Japan, but my hopes has so far been left unfilled. Japan has shown no interest in the Soviet proposal for holding a multinational conference on Asia-Pacific security. I cannot understand why Japan has returned to the topic of a Soviet military threat. What I can say is that Japan's attempt to create this image of an enemy runs counter to positive international trends emerging in the post-cold war era.

Agreement Reached on Fishing off Northern Islands

OW1905065691 Tokyo KYODO in English 0558 GMT 19 May 91

[Text] Moscow, May 19 KYODO—Japan and the Soviet Union have agreed on this year's Japanese gathering of sea tangle, an edible seaweed, and sea urchins in the Soviet waters off Kaigara Islet on the tip of the Soviet-held Habomai Islands east of Hokkaido.

Under an agreement signed here Friday, a total of 375 Japanese fishing boats will be allowed to gather sea tangle between June 1 and September 30, the same conditions as in the previous year. Japan will pay to the Soviets 120 million yen, up 2 million yen from a year before, for this, officials of the Japanese Embassy said.

Ten Japanese fishing boats, meanwhile, will gather sea urchins in the Soviet waters for three months from November 1, the same conditions as a year before. Japan will pay 42 million yen in gathering fees, compared with 38.38 million yen in the previous season.

The signing of the accord followed four days of negotiations here on the fishing operations near Kaigara Islet, only 3.3 kilometers east of Nosappu Point at the eastern tip of Nemuro Peninsula on Japan's northern island of Hokkaido.

The Soviet Union has occupied the Habomais and three other islands, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu, since the end of World War II, and Japan's territorial claim over the so-called northern territories is a key problem between the two countries.

Tokyo Hosts International Financial Conference

LD1705101791 Moscow TASS in English 0720 GMT 17 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Kuchko]

[Text] Tokyo May 17 TASS—Finances, the banking system and credit-lending in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are under discussion at an international conference that began here on Thursday.

Representatives from financial agencies, leading banks and economists from Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, the United States, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Japan discuss the current financial and economic situation in East European countries and the Soviet Union, problems that they encounter during the transition to a market, cooperation with international financial-and-lending institutions and the drawing of foreign capital.

Current economic reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe rivet the attention of financiers because they are connected with the intergration of those countries into international economic relationships on a large scale, Yasuo Matsushita, chairman of the board of governors of the Mitsui-Tayo Kobe Ginko, the largest Japanese bank, told the conference in his opening remarks.

Market reforms open up fresh opportunities for foreign investors, he said, pointing out that appropriate conditions, including political and economic stability, are needed for financial aid to be rendered or long-term capital investments to be carried out.

The Soviet Union has taken the road of a radical reform of the financial and economic structure, making the choice in favour of market relations, Soviet Finance Minister Vladimir Orlov emphasised in his report at the conference.

He acquainted participants in the conference in detail with a government-elaborated programme for practical measures to stabilise the economic situation in the country, to normalise money circulation and strengthen the rouble.

Along with the establishment of joint ventures that are so far the main sphere for the application of foreign capital, the process of establishing more elaborate forms of business cooperation between the Soviet Union and foreign partners, including the setting up of joint consortiums, investment funds, and banks, is intensifying of late, the leader of the soviet delegation said.

The Soviet Government aims to create businesses fully belonging to a foreign investor and to grant the commercial activity rights to foreign physical persons in the near future, the minister emphasised.

These steps, backed up by an appropriate legal basis, create new opportunities for an intensive integration of the Soviet Union into world division of labour, Orlov said.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Trade, Debt Agreements Signed With Cambodia

LD2105144191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1305 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Pavel Bogdanov]

[Text] Phnom Penh, 21 May (TASS)—Agreements between the Governments of the USSR and the State of Cambodia on trade and economic cooperation for 1991 and on settling Cambodia's debt to the USSR through state credits have been signed here.

In accordance with the first document the sides have agreed to continue the trade exchange of traditional goods on terms of payment in convertible currency at world prices. With the aim of maintaining and developing bilateral trade ties, the sides will carry out mutual deliveries this year at the state level according to agreed lists. They include virtually all the main types of goods that the sides supply to one another.

To pay for certain types of goods from the USSR, the Soviet side will grant Cambodia interest-free credit of up to $12 million, the agreement states.

In accordance with the document, the Soviet side has pledged continued assistance to Cambodia in completing the construction and modernization of a number of civilian installations, in particular the state printing works, a circus, a medium-wave radio station, a diesel electric power station, and water purification plants in Phnom Penh. The resources for this will be allocated on the basis of credit or free aid.

The agreement on settling debts envisages a start this year to the cancellation of debts on credits granted in previous years in the form of the supply of goods or in other forms.

Both agreements were signed by Yu.N. Myakotnykh, USSR ambassador to the State of Cambodia, and Nhim Vanda, minister of foreign trade of the State of Cambodia.

Cambodia's Hor Namhong on Peace Proposals

LD2205101891 Moscow TASS in English 2208 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Pavel Bogdanov]

[Text] Phnom Penh May 22 TASS—A Cambodian delegation is going to Jakarta to put forward concrete proposals on the Cambodian settlement worked out by the U.N. Security Council permanent members and the co-chairmen of the international Paris conference on Cambodia, Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong said in an interview with TASS and Soviet television.

"Out concrete proposals will primarily contain measures to prevent the restoration of the Pol Pot genocidal regime," the minister said.

"The time when Pol Pot could seize power by military means has passed. Today, his followers can come to power only through a political settlement. In order to prevent this, the Cambodian sides should reach agreement and the countries that will sign an agreement on the settlement should give their guarantees.

"Pol Pot military and political organisations should be disbanded. The Cambodian Armed Forces need to be preserved, and provisions ruling out the recurrence of genocide must be included in the country's new constitution. People responsible for this crime cannot be allowed to participate in elections," he said.

During a recent meeting with a U.N. mission, Khmer Rouge representatives said they will resume military

activities on June 5, 1991 if the Cambodian parliament, expected to meet between June 2-4, does not approve the plan proposed by "the five" and the co-chairmen of the international Paris conference on Cambodia on November 26, 1990.

The minister said that this threat aggravates the situation at talks in Jakarta, and stressed that Cambodia proposes to prolong the cease-fire until an agreement on a comprehensive settlement is signed and stop military assistance to the Cambodian sides.

He proposed that a U.N. intermediary mission be sent to Cambodia.

He described his recent visit to the Soviet Union as fruitful. The USSR is one of the authors of the Cambodian settlement plan and Cambodia's big friend. The Soviet Union's understanding of the situation in Cambodia and its position on the settlement is very important, the minister stressed.

Commentary Views Asia-Pacific Region Policy

HK2205070591 Moscow Radio Moscow in Tagalog 1400 GMT 21 May 91

[Commentary by Viktor Valentinov]

[Text] Soviet ambassador to Manila Vitaliy Kachuk recently met with Filipino businessmen to inform them that the Soviet Union is prepared to assist the countries of the Asia-Pacific on security matters.

Moscow's position on security problems in the Asia-Pacific region is based on the following lines. As enunciated by Kachuk, the Soviet Union has no plans to break relations with its former allies in the region in order to set up a new security system. The Soviet Union's present arrangements in the region are not a reflection of its former security systems, but a wish for a consensus on ways to ensure the security of all the nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Kuchov said that among the Soviet Union's present relations, main support will be given to those which will guarantee peace in all the countries and maintain a balance of interests.

Next month Kachuk will attend an international meeting on security for the Asia-Pacific region to be held in Manila. It is hoped that an open and constructive dialogue can be held, in the face of massive changes in the world, particularly the end of the cold war and the growth of peaceful coexistence. These have included the recent visit to Japan by Mikhail Gorbachev, and the visit to Moscow by Chinese Communist Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin.

At the Tokyo summit, both Japan and the Soviet Union aired their stand on security matters in the Asia-Pacific region. Both Tokyo and Moscow averred that improved relations between them does not exclude third parties.

The position of the Soviet Union is clear: each country can uphold its own interests; however if a country thinks only of its own interests, it will be disappointed. The Tokyo summit showed that a balance of interests is important.

At the Sino-Soviet summit, even though some differences exist between the Soviet Union and China, these were based on clear and stable positions. During foreign policy discussions, agreement was reached on the fact that not just the interests of one nation should be served, but the interests of other countries should be taken into account.

The Soviet-Sino summit indicated that cooperation on many matters is required, and prospects are that these will succeed in future.

The result of Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow showed the world the desirability of a treaty on common borders, to ensure the security of the Asia-Pacific region.

According to the Japanese newspaper MAINICHI, the agreement between Moscow and Beijing will be received positively by India and the other Asian nations who have territorial disputes with China.

New ASEAN Dialogue Plan Examined

BK2305060791 Moscow Radio Moscow in Indonesian 1630 GMT 18 May 91

[Commentary by Vladimir Viktorov: "Enhancing Cooperation for the Sake of Common Interest"]

[Text] The ASEAN official circle has decided to include the Soviet Union and the PRC as its dialogue partners. Speaking to reporters in Kuala Lumpur, Kamil Jaafar, secretary general to the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, described the ASEAN decision as having many dimensions.

The inclusion of the two biggest Asia-Pacific countries as fully-pledged dialogue partners is proper and in line with the changing times. ASEAN's decision, made against the background of the Soviet-PRC summit meeting in Moscow, has a special significance. During the summit meeting, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev stressed the important role of Soviet-PRC relations in creating mutual understanding and accord among many countries. On his part, CPC Secretary General Jiang Zemin said the PRC was ready to establish friendly and good-neighborly relations with Asia-Pacific countries and promote joint development and prosperity.

The active participation of the two biggest Asia-Pacific countries in all affairs of the Asia-Pacific region is being increasingly felt. ASEAN has described the Soviet-PRC summit meeting, like the recent Soviet-Japanese one, as important factors for the stabilization of the region. The similar or near-similar views adopted by the Soviet Union and ASEAN countries toward the issue of regional security have satisfied many quarters. ASEAN has also given a positive response to the PRC's recent moves, including the normalization and opening of

diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Singapore, the promotion of bilateral cooperation between the PRC and ASEAN countries, space projects, mineral exploration, and establishment of new air links.

New opportunities to promote mutually beneficial relations between the Soviet Union and ASEAN are emerging amid the rapidly growing trade volume between the Soviet Union and Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore. A plan to establish free economic zones in the Soviet Far East has attracted the ASEAN countries' interests. The potential of the two biggest Asia-Pacific countries to further develop their relations with ASEAN countries is far from being exhausted.

The two new dialogue partners have [words indistinct] in the political, economic, and trade areas. Dialogues with such new partners have a bright future and suit the common interests of this region.

Near East & South Asia

Israeli Science Minister Arrives for Visit

OW2305093491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0930 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] The Israeli Minister of Science and Energy Ne'eman arrived in Moscow on Tuesday for an official visit at the invitation of the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Guriy Marchuk.

The minister and representative of Israeli scientific circles accompanying him will hold talks at scientific centers in Moscow and Leningrad with the purpose of signing agreements on cooperation.

On Tuesday Neeman met the first deputy Prime-Minister of the USSR Vladimir Velichko.

A meeting with Prime-Minister Pavlov is scheduled for Wednesday.

Meets With Pavlov

LD2205203891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1515 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 22 May (TASS)—Today USSR Prime minister Valentin Pavlov received Yuval Ne'eman, Israel minister of science and technology, who is in Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In the conversation which took place in a businesslike atmosphere the state of and prospects for mutually beneficial Soviet-Israeli ties which have developed within the last few years, first of all, in the trade, economic, scientific and technical spheres, were examined.

There was also an exchange of views on the problem of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in view of the necessity to speed up the beginning of the peace process in the Near East. Guriy Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, also took part in the conversation.

Ne'eman Cited on Meeting

TA2305082991 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 23 May 91 p 12

[Report by Greer Fay Cashman]

[Text] Moscow—Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov believes that an official visit by Foreign Minister David Levi would be a "good idea," according to Science Minister Yuval Ne'eman, who met with him here yesterday.

Ne'eman said he had told Pavlov that a visit by Levi would be an appropriate followup to Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh's visit to Israel. Ne'eman said Pavlov responded, "That sounds like a good idea."

"There were no commitments by Pavlov that they would invite Levi, but the indications were very positive," Ne'eman said. He added that Pavlov spoke of "remarkable progress" in Israeli-Soviet relations highlighted by the Bessmertnykh visit.

Ne'eman, who is here at the invitation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences said that during his 90-minute meeting with Pavlov, a number of joint economic ventures, such as the stalled project to build a civilian aircraft, were discussed. Ne'eman said that Pavlov promised to push to get that and other projects back on track.

He said he informed Pavlov that the absence of full diplomatic relations was "creating a certain feeling of instability" that prevents increased economic cooperation. Ne'eman said Pavlov responded that he realizes there is difficulty on this point, but said that there were "other aspects" to the question.

Ne'eman said he expects to sign a protocol agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences on the next stage of scientific cooperation between the two countries tomorrow, but declined to give details. He strongly denied published reports that Israel is interested in purchasing a nuclear reactor from the Soviets, but confirmed that he is interested in developing a nuclear power program beyond the research reactors at Dimona and Nahal Soreq. He said Soviet equipment could be used in future Israeli reactors, as it had proven successful in Finland.

He confirmed that before leaving he would visit Baku for political discussions with Ayaz Mutalibov, the president of Azerbaijan. Ne'eman said that Mutalibov is "interested in relations with Israel."

Ne'eman noted that his upcoming visit to Baku together with an invitation he received from the Academy of Sciences of Turkmenia to visit that republic shows that "there is a lot of readiness in the Moslem republics of the Soviet Union to deal with Israel."

Shevardnadze Urges Normal Relations With Israel

OW2205121391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 21 May 91

[From "Diplamatic Panorama"]

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, president of the Soviet Foreign Political Association, who is curently in the USA on a tour of lectures about the Soviet Union's foreign political and domestic problems was interviewed by IF's [INTERFAX] Petr Vasilyev.

The interview covered a wide range of subjects. IF presents Shevardnadze's views on the domestic problems in the Friday, May 27, issue of THE NATION AND SOCIETY. DP presents here the ex-Soviet foreign minister's views on this country's foreign agenda.

Question. The Soviet Union and the United States have lately been taking energetic efforts to find ways toward a settlement in the Middle East, one of the region's inveterate conflicts. How close are we to having the parties involved in the conflict to get together and start to talk?

Answer. Closer than previously at the very least. I believe that the Persian Gulf developments have set the stage for a large-scale regional settlement—not in relations to one conflict, mind you, but a universal Middle East settlement, with a new order there and limitations on arms supply to the region. It is necessary to prevent the advent to the region of nuclear weapons and to eliminate chemical and bacteriological arms. The region's states must take guidance from the principles of reasonable sufficiency doctrine. There is a good idea to set up a centre to prevent conflicts in the region. I favour parallel actions; The uprooting of the causes of the oldest conflict on the one hand and the formation of security and confidence-building structures in the region on the other.

Q. Does this mean that you favour a bilateral and multilateral dialogue and a multi-version approach?

A. Yes, a multi-version one. I have been favouring this kind of approach from the very beginning. If we succeed in arranging for a regional conference, one of the versions of a settlement, bilateral talks will certainly take part within the format of such a conference. But, it is the result that counts while form or the format, bilateral or multilateral, that will provide for a settlement in the Middle East is not a matter of principle.

The Soviet Union has good chances to play a big role in effecting the Middle East settlement. Previously, we tied our hands ourselves. Today, we have good relations with nearly all Arab countries, including those involved in the conflict. We have been patching up our relations with Israel—a very good trend. It was in relation to Israel that we put restrictions on ourselves beginning in 1967 when we severed relations with Israel. I do not believe that decision was correct. We need to restore diplomatic relations as soon as possible, and that will improve our chances and provide another channel for more active work in the Middle East both with the Arabs and the Israelis.

Regrettably, we are divided in our country on this score, as the Arab world is. But, if the Arabs want us to take part in the process of Middle East settlement and if they want our presence there, they should view such a step with understanding.

I spoke in favour of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel and said I was sorry that I failed to have them restored, and though consulate-level relations were in fact established, this is too little. We need normal diplomatic relations.

Q. In relation to the situation in Europe after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact's military structures and statements by some East European countries, including Czechoslovakia, of their willingness to accede to NATO, can one reasonably expected to see them admitted to NATO?

A. I do not think so. If the European process gains momentum, if the decisions and documents of the Paris meeting that gave priority to European structures, including a Security Centre (perceived as a European Security Council of sorts) are really acted upon, a new type of relations will be on the agenda.

The Paris meeting also spoke of the transformation of the NATO and of the need for changes to the organisation's military doctrine. A declaration to this effect has been made at a meeting of the alliance's member countries in London. If NATO is transformed and if the European structures and a common European space take shape, I believe that fears concerning NATO's growing strength and the possibility of its becoming a source of military threat are ungrounded. It has been enshrined in documents that the members of the two military and political alliances are no longer enemies and that they are extending friendship and mutual understanding to one another. Another problem is that of stability in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; but if we succeed in normalizing the political and economic situation and begin to integrate ourselves into a normal European process, that is no danger.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact was inevitable. Neither generals nor diplomats could have preserved the structure because the peoples living in the Warsaw Pact countries took a different decision. They opted for a different social system. They could not be held in check by force.

INTERFAX on Response to Gandhi's Death

OW2305025391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 22 May 91

[From Our Diplomatic Correspondent Igor Porshev]

[Text] President Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders have expressed condolences to the Indian president and the Indian nation following the death of the former Indian prime minister and the leader of the Indian National Congress (I), Mr Rajiv Gandhi. Top Soviet officials have attended the Indian Embassy in Moscow today signing in the book of condolences. Moscow is expected to send its representative to Delhi to take part in funeral ceremonies.

Indian embassy officials in Moscow this morning were unprepared to comment on the death of Mr Rajiv Gandhi. However, a leading Indian journalist, Mr Rajiv Shakh, who works as correspondent for PATRIOT newspaper, told DP [Diplomatic panorama] correspondent that the crime was the doing either by Sikh extremists (who assassinated Mr Gandhi's mother, Indira Gandhi, then the country's prime minister, in 1984) or by terrorists from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] separatist group based in Sri Lanka. The latter theory was also backed by a Soviet foreign ministry expert, who preferred to stay anonymous, specializing in Indian affairs. He said that while in office as prime minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi had initiated the signing of an agreement with Colombo under which Indian peace-keeping troops were moved in Sri Lanka. They were also involved in military operations against LTTE rebels. The Government also cracked down on Tiger camps in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The Soviet diplomat said it must have been the main reason leading to the assassination of Mr Rajiv Gandhi.

Besides, he said, it must taken into account that Mr Gandhi's Congress (I) Party had real chances of winning at the country's general election, the first part of which was held on May 20 and there were reasons to believe the Congress (I) Party might have swayed a substantial number of votes. Reports from Delhi say the election has now been put off following Mr Gandhi's assassination. The Soviet diplomat said that in all probability, Mr Gandhi may have been again in charge of the Indian Government. However, he ruled out the possibility that Mr Gandhi's opponents from the Bharatia Janata Party or its ally, Shiv Sena, had part in the crime.

The diplomat said Mr Gandhi's name was linked to a whole period of Soviet-Indian relations. He and Mr Gorbachev signed the 1986 Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nuclear-free world without violence. He said the Declaration had become the first paper of the policy of new political thinking. And no wonder, he said, it was India that Mr Gorbachev had visited after taking in charge of the Soviet Union. Bilateral relations developed steadily even after Mr Gandhi's Congress (I) Party was replaced in power by other political forces.

Mr Rajiv Shakh named among possible successors to Mr Gandhi as leader of the Congress (I) Party a number of prominent politicians including Mr Narayan Datta Tivari and Mr Narasimho Rao, both of them holding key posts in previous Congress governments. In the view of the correspondent for PATRIOT, this question will be resolved within days.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angolan Peace, Political Prospects Viewed

91UF0770A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent M. Pavlov: "Angola Between War and Peace"]

[Text] Luanda—**As delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] were being received in Lisbon on 15 May by Portuguese Prime Minister Silva Cavaco, the capital of the Angolan province of Moxico—the city of Luena—came under heavy artillery fire.**

The next day the newspaper JORNAL DI ANGOLA began its lead column with the headline: "Peace in Lisbon, War in Luena," thereby reflecting the contradictory nature of the situation in the country and at the negotiations. The words of the spokesmen for the belligerents quoted by the newspaper testify to this. Thus in the Portuguese LUSA Press Agency J. Chitunda, head of the UNITA delegation, called the bombing of Luena a lie since, according to him, the guns had already fallen silent. I do not know how sincere the UNITA spokesman was. But he could not have failed to have known that lethal shells were crashing down on the city and its inhabitants many hours after Radio Black Cockerel had announced a midnight cease-fire. I concede that J. Savimbi's order had not reached the remote villages and numerous groupings, but that the UNITA armed forces, composed of 15 battalions (approximately 3,000 men) sent to capture Luena, did not know about it seems unlikely. And could it have been otherwise if J. Savimbi during his European tour let slip certain words, saying: Curbing the combat ardor of the UNITA subunits will be very difficult. In other words, the military opposition is continuing its military operations.

Col. Ribeiro Fonseca, who heads the defense of Luena, said that in 17 years of service he had never seen such intensive fire as UNITA was inflicting on this city. According to figures from an official General Staff spokesman, on 16 May UNITA continued military combat operations in a number of other localities, thereby violating the agreement which had de facto come into effect on 15 May.

But, despite this, the Angolan Government is preparing for peace. At its session the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Angola gave President Jose Eduardo dos Santos a mandate for signing an agreement on a peace settlement in the republic in Lisbon on 31 May. According to the head of state, "a very important, even decisive, step en route to the establishment of a stable and lasting peace, about which the Angolan people

dream, will be taken." As the president observed, it is needed by UNITA also, which will obtain the right to register as a political party, publish and propagandize its program, replenish its ranks with new members, nominate candidates for the coming elections, and open offices throughout the country.

According to the Portuguese newspaper EXPRESSO, UNITA has already chosen a location in a private company to house its central office, which will begin work immediately following the signing of the agreements by the president and the UNITA leader. While in Brussels, J. Savimbi promised to send an official delegation to Luanda on 1-2 July. It is believed that he himself will arrive in the Angolan capital this same month. I recall that he had said somewhere or other that he would only come after the withdrawal of Cuban forces. Although, who knows. The UNITA leader is suddenly accepting dos Santos' proposal for "a dialogue between Angolans in Angola," not in the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, as Savimbi wished.

And although Angola is still between war and peace, the new parties are losing no time. Eight parties recently applied to the Supreme Court for consultation for the purpose of officially legalizing their status and beginning preparations for the elections. According to EXPRESSO, UNITA is not slumbering either. Its supporters and political activists "are preparing a campaign to seduce local journalists and former senior employees of the machinery of state who have come to oppose the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]." Another weapon in the election struggle for UNITA, obviously, will be realization of a large-scale operation to supply the population with food thanks to monies granted by the United States for this purpose.

In the newspaper's opinion, the government could respond to UNITA by reliance on the strong support of certain EEC countries, primarily France and Portugal. So it will, possibly. Meanwhile we are waiting for peace.

East Europe

Hungarian Foreign Minister in Moscow for Talks

LD2205111491 Budapest MTI in English 0857 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow, May 22 (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky arrived in Moscow for a two-day visit on Wednesday.

His visit will be the first occasion for a bilateral foreign ministerial meeting since the new Hungarian Government's taking office.

Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall attended the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw treaty in Moscow last year, when he also held brief talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

In the course of Jeszenszky's talks in Moscow, the sides are to discuss issues of bilateral ties and the other most pressing tasks, Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow Sandor Gyorke told MTI's correspondent.

The issue of the Soviet-Hungarian general agreement and that of bilateral economic relations will also figure on the agenda, with special regard to Soviet debts to Hungary and problems of bilateral trade.

A close aide of the Hungarian foreign minister on Tuesday evening warned of exaggerated expectations in connection with the Hungarian- Soviet general agreement.

At the meeting of Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky and his Soviet counterpart Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, scheduled for Thursday, the sides are to discuss international issues including the situation in eastern Europe.

On the first day of his visit to Moscow, Jeszenszky will meet leaders of the Russian parliament and representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Later, he will hold a lecture at the Hungarian Institute on how the West judges eastern Europe.

On Thursday, Jeszenszky will meet Bessmertnykh. After the meeting, Jeszenszky is to hold an international press conference.

Pre-Visit IZVESTIYA Interview

PM2205201191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 May 91 Union Edition p 5

[Interview in Budapest with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by correspondent F. Lukyanov; date not given: "A 'Magic Formula' Must Be Found, Hungarian Foreign Minister Says"]

[Text] Budapest—On the eve of Hungarian diplomatic department head Geza Jeszenszky's visit to Moscow—the first since the formation of the Christian Democratic government—our correspondent F. Lukyanov met with him in Budapest.

[Lukyanov] Mr. Minister, how would you describe the present state of Soviet-Hungarian relations?

[Jeszenszky] It seems to me that relations between our two countries have entered a phase where they can indeed become good. There used to be a lot of talk about friendship and cooperation, but, in my view, there was more talk than action.

Until recently, in my view, the principle of free self-determination was not fully implemented in bilateral relations. It has to be said that Hungary did not itself choose the Stalinist system, which, incidentally, caused the Soviet Union untold problems, or the bloc it was in until recently. Now, in the course of the implementation of the policy of new thinking proclaimed by Gorbachev,

the situation has changed and our countries are building their relations not at someone's behest, but on the basis of free choice.

Of course, one must not forget all the good things that have forged links between us in past years. The thousands and thousands of Soviet soldiers who died on Hungarian territory in World War II gave their lives for freedom. Soviet aid in the postwar years and supplies of raw material at prices lower than the world price played a considerable part in the country's development. But, at the same time, an alien, Stalinist model of development was imposed on Hungary. However, I repeat, the situation is changing, and we are standing on the brink of a new era in relations with the USSR.

[Lukyanov] Originally it was planned that during your visit to Moscow a new treaty between the USSR and Hungary would be initialed, a treaty that would formulate the principles of new relations between the two countries in the era following the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact Organization. In recent months, however, certain differences have emerged between the sides' approaches to certain security questions. What is Hungary's position on this and how soon, in your view, can we expect the treaty to be signed?

[Jeszenszky] The Hungarian Government and the Hungarian Foreign Ministry have repeatedly said that they recognize and respect the Soviet Union's interests, in particular in the security sphere, and are prepared as far as they are able to guarantee the security of the small section of the USSR's border that it shares with Hungary. In this sphere, in our view, the aspirations of the two countries and their governments coincide.

It seems to me that to emphasize and stress claims and certain differences while the talks are still going on in no way makes the course of the talks any easier and does not contribute to their speediest completion. I believe that both the Soviet and Hungarian Governments want one and the same thing, but there are differences over the wording of the security guarantees.

So far talks have been successful, the treaty is agreed for the most part, there remains a problem with one formula, and we very much hope that agreement can be reached on it during the Moscow talks. It often happens—what you fail to achieve at talks between experts, even highly skilled experts, you achieve at a higher political level. Perhaps in this case it will be the level of foreign ministers, but I can see it requiring an even higher level.

[Lukyanov] The conclusion of new interstate treaties between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bringing the final withdrawal of Soviet forces from East European countries closer, will to all appearances mark a new stage in their relations. How do you see the immediate future of the East European countries and Hungary, in particular in East-West and Soviet Union-Western Europe terms?

[Jeszenszky] It is not that I do not see myself as a forecaster, but the thing is that the future remains open. It is impossible to say what will happen in the region in five-ten years' time, what will happen to the Soviet Union, to Western Europe. But, at the same time, the future is in our hands, in the hands of politicians, in the hands of the peoples. You can establish relations and you can ruin them. Hungary sees itself occupying a place in a united Europe, where we have been living for more than 1,000 years, sharing its culture and system of values.

Ideally, I see a Europe in which there is a very high degree of integration and cooperation among all countries, in which people are tolerant of one another and live in friendship, in which there are no political "iron curtains" and no sharply defined economic borders either. Naturally, we also regard the Soviet Union as an essential part of Europe.

[Lukyanov] Thank you for the conversation.

Criticizes 'Stalinist Policies'

LD2205224991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2129 GMT 22 May 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky arrived in Moscow today. It is his first trip to our country as head of the Hungarian Republic's foreign policy department.

[Begin recording] [Video shows Geza Jeszenszky speaking to camera] [Jeszenszky, in Hungarian with superimposed Russian translation] Relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary after the Second World War could have been quite different, if Stalinist policies had not prevailed in both countries. Now, when there has been an end to this, the cold war era has finished and Hungary has a government formed on the basis of a free expression of the people's will, we can say that a new stage in Hungarian-Soviet relations will begin on 30 June. It is on that day that the last Soviet soldier will leave Hungary.

Henceforth we have an opportunity to formulate our relations on an exclusively voluntary basis. The peoples of the Soviet Union and Hungary are equally interested in this. [end recording]

Sees 'Regaining' of Sovereignty

LD2205112991 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 22 May 91

[Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by correspondent Gabor Izbeki in Moscow on 22 May—recorded]

[Text] The Hungarian foreign minister arrived in the Soviet capital today. Gabor Izbeki reports:

[Izbeki] The most important event of Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky's first Moscow visit will take place tomorrow. That is when he will confer with his Soviet partner, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. This afternoon's host will be Yeltsin's deputy, Ruslan Khasbulatov, and in the evening Geza Jeszenszky will give a lecture about international issues and our country's foreign policy in Moscow's Hungarian Cultural Institute. Tomorrow afternoon, the Hungarian foreign minister will sum up the results of his Moscow talks at an international news conference.

Mr. Minister, what results of the discussions would satisfy you here in Moscow, and have you brought any new proposals in those disputed issues which exist today in regard to the two countries' future agreement?

[Jeszenszky] I think that the Hungarian proposals are well known, but I do not feel that I have now come to resolve disputed issues. It is my custom to stress that I see before us the coming of a new era, with Hungary's regaining her sovereignty to the full extent. [two-second break in recording] in these relations.

[Izbeki] Don't you think that some disadvantage could result for us, with regard to our neighbors, from the fact that this is only your first visit to Moscow since the formation of the new Hungarian government?

[Jeszenszky] I do not think at all that we would have any kind of disadvantage. First of all, we are not competing with one another. We have been in contact for a long time. This depends on a schedule. In no way did it depend on my good or bad intentions, and neither did it depend on the intentions of the Soviet leaders. The Hungarian leadership, since the formation of the new government, has been in contact. The Hungarian prime minister was here in Moscow at the start of last June. And I think that my meetings, not only with the new Foreign Minister Mr. Bessmertnykh, but also with Deputy Foreign Minister Kvitsinskiy, extend back over a good many months by now. So fortunately, my partners do not represent an unknown factor for me. In other words, we are already acquainted.

Seeking 'New Era' in Soviet Ties

LD2205190491 Moscow TASS in English 1723 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Ryabinkin and Nikolay Veretin]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky arrived here today for a working visit. This is his first trip to the Soviet Union as head of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

It is essential to lay down a good basis so that relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union could enter "a new era", Jeszenszky told TASS at the airport.

He believes that economic cooperation problems will be the most complex issue at the forthcoming talks. The two countries' transition to settlements in convertible currency are known to have brought about a host of complexities. "It is essential to find new solutions precisely to this issue," Jeszenszky said.

In addition, matters concerning further bilateral cooperation and a number of important international problems will be raised during the two countries' foreign ministers meeting.

Meets Bessmertnykh

LD2305092291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0810 GMT 23 May 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Ryabinkin and Nikolay Veretin]

[Text] Moscow, 23 May (TASS)—Talks have begun at the USSR Foreign Ministry private residence between Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Geza Jeszenszky, Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, who arrived in Moscow yesterday.

In a conversation with a TASS correspondent, Ivan Aboimov, the Soviet ambassador to the Hungarian republic, stated that there is every reason to suppose that the current visit will be a fruitful one and will be an incentive for further contacts at a higher level.

At the present time the East European countries, the ambassador noted, and Hungary in particular, occupy a proper place in the system of the USSR's international ties. The Soviet side sees them as its neighbors and builds its relations accordingly. Hungary has always occupied and continues to occupy a special place, since it has a particularly active foreign policy and carries out active international work.

We are currently going through a period of transition in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, Ivan Aboimov said. The system of old ties has to some extent been destroyed, and new ones have not yet been finalized. We find ourselves in a process of formation. The new relations between the USSR and Hungary, in the ambassador's opinion, from the poiont of view of state and national interests, will be no less effective.

At the conclusion of the ministers' talks it is planned to sign a protocol on consultations between the USSR Foreign Ministry and the Hungarian Republic's Foreign Ministry.

West Europe

Italy's Andreotti, Gorbachev To Hold Talks

LD2105145491 Moscow TASS in English 1446 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—Prime Minister Guilio Andreotti of Italy arrives in Moscow this evening on a

brief working visit at President Mikhail Gorbachev's invitation. It will be the first meeting between the two countries' leaders since the USSR and Italy signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on November 18, 1990.

Moscow's diplomats say that the Soviet-Italian dialogue is developing and assuming increasing confidence. Andreotti's visit furnishes further proof that Italy supports Perestroika in the USSR and Gorbachev's efforts to enact reforms and maintain the integrity of the USSR.

Talks will focus also on international issues, among them the Middle East, the Vienna talks, the situation in Europe, the Horn of Africa, Soviet-American dialogue and forthcoming international forums—the Berlin meeting of the CSCE countries' foreign ministers and summits of the economic community, NATO and the group of seven major industrialised countries.

Andreotti Meets Pavlov

LD2505081991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0720 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 22 May (TASS)—A conversation began in the Kremlin this morning between USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov and Guilio Andreotti, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic. The guest arrived in Moscow on a brief working visit on Tuesday evening at the invitation of the USSR president.

As TASS diplomatic correspondents were told at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is anticipated that during the meeting the heads of governments of the two countries will discuss in depth the state of economic ties between the USSR and Italy. to recall: last year Italy became the Soviet Union's second trade partner in the West after the FRG. However, problems are emerging in bilateral cooperation, relating to the current transitional stage of the Soviet economy. Work has slowed down on a major project for the construction of an automobile plant, a gas power project and a program for the development of agro-industrial complexes in Stavropol and Krasnodar krays. At the same time, people in Italy believe that the existing problems will be overcome. Proof of this confidence in perestroyka has been Italy's granting of credits totalling 7.2 trillion [currency not given] to the USSR. It is anticipated that matters of the use of these credits and of removing obstacles to bilateral cooperation will be discussed in detail during the head of the Italian Government's conversation with Valentin Pavlov.

Gorbachev, Andreotti Meet

LD2205092691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0900 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] This morning in the Kremlin a conversation began between USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. The guest is on a working visit in Moscow at the invitation of the head of the Soviet state.

As TASS correspondents heard at the press office of the head of the Soviet state, it is believed that today's conversation will cover a broad range of issues concerning primarily the development of bilateral relations. The situation in the Near East and the Mediterranean, and the situation in Eastern Europe will also be under discussion.

Four-Hour Talks Held

LD2205141491 Moscow TASS in English 1327 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voitsekhovich, Igor Peskov, and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev described as "very useful and very important" his four-hour talks with Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti today.

He told a news conference here that the discussion revealed "a concurrence or close similarity of views" on most issues.

The two leaders attended the news conference together.

Gorbachev said he briefed Andreotti on the political situation in the USSR and expressed gratitude to the Italian people and government for their invariable solidarity with Soviet reforms.

On prospects for bilateral contacts in various fields, Gorbachev said the talks helped identify possibilities of increasing cooperation not only in trade but also "in realising new projects involving new forms of cooperation".

When they discussed European developments they agreed, Gorbachev said, that there are "great opportunities" to pursue cooperation in every direction.

The two leaders also compared notes on the situation in the Middle East, primarily ways to solve various regional problems, according to the Soviet president.

He said Andreotti asked him about Soviet expectations for military Chief of Staff Mikhail Moiseyev's visit to Washington. He answered Moscow hopes for "positive" results.

Communications Link Set Up

LD2205123991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1159 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS Diplomatic Correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 22 May (TASS)—An intergovernment Soviet-Italian agreement on setting up a direct communications link between the Kremlin and the Palazzo Chigi was signed in Moscow today. In this way the

residences of the Soviet and Italian governments will be able to exchange information urgently.

The ceremony, which took place in the villa of the USSR Foreign Ministry on Aleksey Tolstoy Street, was attended by Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR; Valentin Pavlov, the prime minister; and Giulio Andreotti, the head of the Italian cabinet, who is in Moscow on a working visit. Afterward Mikhail Gorbachev gave a luncheon in honor of Giulio Andreotti.

Also today the president of the USSR and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Italy attended an unveiling ceremony of "Solar Disc," the sculpture of the well-known Italian monumental sculptor Arnaldo Pomodoro. The monument, which has been erected at the Palace of Youth on Komsomolskiy Prospekt, is a gift of the head of the Italian Government to the president of the USSR and the Soviet capital.

Defense Ministry Issues Statement on Kessler

LD2205164591 Moscow TASS in English 1626 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—The following official statement of the USSR Defence Ministry Press Centre has been released here:

"As was reported by the mass media, German authorities arrested on May 20, 1991 some members of the former leadership of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), including Willi Stoph, Heinz Kessler, Fritz Streletz and Hans Albrecht.

"In connection with some actions taken by the German side to arrest former Defence Minister of the GDR Heinz Kessler, as well as attempts by some media outlets in the West to spread a version about the alleged attempt by Heinz Kessler to find refuge at a Soviet military airfield and escape to Moscow, it is necessary to stress the following.

"Facts testify that Heinz Kessler and his wife were indeed preparing for a trip to the USSR at the invitation of the Museum of German Anti-Fascists in the city of Krasnogorsk, with which Kessler had been cooperating for a long time. Tickets were booked for Kessler and his wife to travel by Aeroflot airliners from Berlin to Moscow and back on May 22 and June 4. In keeping with the established procedure, entry visas to the Soviet Union were entered into their travel passports.

"Despite all this, on May 20, from 14:00 to 19:10 all roads of approach to the Sperenberg airfield were blocked by German policemen. Without notifying the command of the Western Group of Troops, the policemen inspected cars and trucks of the group on their way to the airfield and asked Soviet servicemen for identification.

"These actions are clearly at variance with the letter and spirit of the agreements signed by the USSR and Federal Germany, in particular of articles two point seven and Article 11 points one and three of the Treaty on Conditions of the Temporary Deployment and Gradual Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from German Territory.

"These actions by no means facilitate the strengthening of mutual understanding and trust as the basis of Soviet-German relations at the present stage. Of destructive nature is also the circulation by some German mass media outlets of slanderous reports, versions and rumours which are devoid of any real grounds."

Kohl Cited on European Future, Gorbachev

PM2205130991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by A. Blinov: "H. Kohl: 'The USSR President Knows That There Is No Way Back'"]

[Text] Washington—The processes of European economic and political integration should lead to the creation of a European union or the United States of Europe. This is how FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl sees the future of the European Community.

The head of the FRG Government, currently on an official visit to Washington, delivered a speech entitled "Germany's Political Program for the Nineties" at a session of the U.S. Atlantic Council.

According to H. Kohl, present-day Europe is going through a process of transformation which is capable of profoundly changing its face. Among its key elements are the reunification of Germany and the reforms in East European countries. The expansion of the German market as a result of the reunification of Germany has strengthened its economy—the FRG has become the "economic locomotive" of Europe.

The paramount task on the agenda for the nineties is the creation of a European economic, currency, and political union. In the longer term, H. Kohl believes, the EC must promote the involvement of East and Central European countries, initially in the form of associate, and later full membership.

The overcoming of the East-West confrontation has noticeably improved the situation on the European continent, the FRG chancellor noted. At the same time it is necessary to continue to create conditions which guarantee stability and security in Europe. What is needed is the institutionalization of the Helsinki process, continued arms control, and development of regional and bilateral cooperation.

"We must place even greater emphasis," H. Kohl stated, "on monitored armed forces reductions, confidence-building measures, active forestalling of crises and conflicts, and a peaceful solution of disputes." A new strategy is needed which will place less emphasis on nuclear arms and will substantially alter the current concept of forward borders.

"We also want to help the Soviet Union to solve its problems," H. Kohl declared. "I am certain that Mikhail Gorbachev wants to continue to travel the road of new thinking and cooperation in foreign policy. I am profoundly convinced: He knows that there is no way back, and he knows it better than anyone else."

However, H. Kohl noted, in order to achieve the set objectives it is necessary to overcome obstacles. "The Soviet Union must introduce market mechanisms and create a new federative system. That requires patience."

"This is why I do not support the wait-and-see policy," Kohl declared. "On the contrary, I believe that we must take up an active stance, we must help the Soviet Union." "Since the decisions on reforms must be adopted and implemented by the Soviet Union alone, we can only provide the impetus, and offer support and assistance within the limits of our possibilities. I do not consider it fitting... to hope that this vast country will fall apart, will disintegrate. Those who believe this should consider what problems this could entail for arms control alone..."

The topics raised by H. Kohl in his Atlantic Council speech were the subject of discussion during his meetings with U.S. President G. Bush, Secretary of State J. Baker, and other U.S. Administration leaders. According to press reports, the FRG chancellor assured them that Bonn does not intend to pit the process of West European integration against cooperation with the United States within NATO. At the same time, the press writes, he made it clear to the U.S. leadership that West Europe will not allow itself to be pushed onto the sidelines in the solution of important international problems, and primarily the Near East problem.

In his public pronouncements in Washington, the FRG chancellor emphasized Germany's important financial contribution to backing economic reforms in East European countries. Noting the considerable expenditure for the economic reconstruction of the eastern part of Germany now reunited with the FRG, he urged Washington to encourage in every way U.S. capital investments on the territory of the former GDR.

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuban Army Implementing Economic Austerity

PM1705090791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 May 91 Union Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent A. Kamorin: "Zero Option. The Cuban Military Prepares for Hard Times"]

[Text] Havana—In one of his recent speeches, once again warning his compatriots of the growing U.S. military threat, Fidel Castro declared: "We need more weapons more than ever. However, not only are we not getting more weapons than before, but it is perfectly possible that there will be fewer arms deliveries than before. And we must adapt to this reality and be realists."

It is hard to say precisely what the Cuban leader had in mind. Maybe the call for realism was occasioned by the general worsening of the situation with regard to deliveries from the USSR—Castro devoted a considerable part of his speech to this topic. It cannot be ruled out, however, that it might also be a question of specific symptoms of a reduction in Soviet military aid to Cuba: Data on this sphere of bilateral cooperation are strictly secret, and the only thing that is officially known about it is that it is carried out "on a scale necessary to maintain defense sufficiency."

Be that as it may, these words by the supreme commander recorded the fact that the Cuban Army, in whose upkeep and development money has never been any object here, has entered a "special period in peacetime." Let us recall that this term is used in Cuba to denote the state of emergency in the economy which has arisen following the disruption of trade ties with the island's former partners in CEMA and with our country above all. Moreover, the military has gone further, from the "special period" proper to its extreme manifestation, which has been named the "zero option."

It has become known that an experiment is being conducted in some parts of the Cuban Armed Forces for the purpose of modeling conditions in which the country would be totally deprived of deliveries from outside. In my view this is possible only in three cases: Either given a total U.S. blockade of Cuba—which virtually means war; or in the event of the USSR's disappearance from the map of the world; or following a radical change in existing Soviet-Cuban relations.

To all appearances, the military has tackled the matter in earnest. The island's residents have already seen on their television screens tanks and combat vehicles powered by gas generators fueled by firewood. Methods of vacuum-packing weapons in polyethylene, so as to protect them from "voracious" tropical corrosion and thus avoid the need to replace them, are also being demonstrated. The use of the draft strength of animals and bicycles for army shipments and of medicinal herbs in military field medicine is being publicized.

And the first results of the experiment have been published. Thus, it is reported that during the first quarter of this year the republic's Western Military District reduced fuel consumption by 61 percent compared with the same period last year, without at the same time reducing the pace and scale of combat training. It is, you will agree, an impressive figure, but it also makes you wonder how wastefully things were run in the past.

The "zero option" is now being given very wide coverage in the press. The newspaper JUVENTUD REBELDE writes that "the 'zero option' in the armed forces has a dual aim: To maintain the army's combat training and not only to reduce the cost of its upkeep to the country

but also to help it by means of its reserves." In this sense mention is made of the units' and subunits' experience in providing their own food from subsidiary plots and of the military's broad involvement in fulfilling the national food program.

It may also be assumed that extensive propaganda of the experiment in the Revolutionary Armed Forces also pursues entirely civilian ends: The "special period" is cruelly invading the life of the Cubans. It is becoming increasingly difficult to exchange food coupons for food, the public transport situation is deteriorating, and the housing problem is being exacerbated. Naturally, this cannot help but alarm the population. The "zero option" is designed to demonstrate that it is possible to survive even at the limit of the "special period."

I recall the words which F. Castro delivered at the close of the Second Communist Party of Cuba Congress in December 1980: "If they (the United States) believe that they will be able to break us because we will not have sufficient electricity, or buses, or petroleum, or anything else, they will see that we will never surrender and will be capable of holding out for a year, for 10 years, for as long as is necessary, even if we have to live like the Indians whom Columbus found here 500 years ago." True, in those days these words sounded like a declaration of principles, not like an accurate political prognosis.

Soviet Journalists' Exodus From Cuba Viewed

LD1805143491 Moscow All-Union Mayak Network in Russian 0930 GMT 18 May 91

[Commentary by Yuriy Isayev]

[Text] Esteemed listeners, you may already know the report by our national agency, TASS, about the fact that the correspondent's office of the newpaper TRUD in Cuba closed down last Wednsday. And, a few days earlier, the correspondent's offic of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was also closed. What is more the offices of the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA and LATINSKAYA AMERIKA are preparing to close soon. The question arises—maybe it occurred to you—as to how to explain such a massive flight of Soviet journalists from the island of freedom. My colleague, commentator Yuriy Isayev, has decided to provide the answer.

[Isayev] Firstly, I would not call it a flight. I venture to assure you that our colleagues are not leaving Havana willingly. Of course, the main reason is the financial difficulties that currently confront the editorial offices of many newspapers and magazines. There is a disastrous shortage of foreign currency, and, unfortunately, it is impossible to maintain a correspondents' office without it.

But that it is one of the reasons, and it does, as it were, lie on the surface. Without doubt, in the current situation, both the Cubans and ourselves might have shown flexibility and switched over to some new ways of maintaining correspondents in the country. For example, you create the conditions for our journalist, and we will do the same for a Cuban journalist in the Union. It's a peculiar kind of barter, if you like.

But other, ideological reasons are involved, and they play a not inconsiderable role here. Probably, many people remember that at the start of perestroyka the sale of our magazine SPUTNIK was banned in Cuba on the pretext that material critical of the now former socialist camp was printed in it. It was precisely then that an unpublicized censorship appeared in Cuba for all material leaving the island or entering Havana. Needless to say, there was no direct influence or effect on articles or reports. But there are many ways of making a journalists' professional work all but impossible. For instance, in order to conduct any interview or carry out filming, it is necessary to submit a suitable application to the Information Ministry. Well, if need be, officials may take months to reply to your request.

In our journalists' block, there was also an independent correspondent's office—I mean KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The newspaper's correspondent published several rather critical items on the Cuban leadership. I don't fully agree with those items, but a journalist has a right to his point of view, so long as it is objective, naturally. Admittedly, in this situation, many of my colleagues transfer to coded language. I remember a report by our television correspondent from Havana's embankment: the Cubans fired their catapults at American imperialism. In that way, they illustrated the comment in a report by Fidel that they were not afraid of their powerful northern neighbor. Or there is another device that can be used: so as not to criticize openly, my collegues often quotes whole chunks from the local press. Well, for example, about how the Koreans express their love for Kim Il-song, calling him the most intelligent one, the most powerful and just one, the torch-bearer in the darkness of the night, the lotus blossom, and so on. Journalists working in Cuba also resort to this device.

The closure of the correspondents' offices is, of course, sad news. After all, 30 years ago, when the revolution was accomplished, Cuba was named the island of freedom, and that is what journalists accredited in Havana do not have enough of.

PRAVDA Notes CPSU's Melnikov's Cuba Visit

PM2005152391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 May 91 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report under the "Official Reports" rubric]

[Text] I.I. Melnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, was in Cuba 8 through 15 May at the invitation of the Cuban leadership.

During his stay in the country he was received by F. Castro and had meetings and conversations with other Cuban leaders.

Supreme Soviet

22 May Supreme Soviet Session Proceedings Noted

LD2205223691

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 2107 GMT on 22 May carries 47 minutes of recorded highlights of the USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 22 May.

The session begins with one minute's silence in honor of Rajiv Gandhi. Debates on the bill on protection of the consumer follow. An unidentified official gives a report on the progress of the bill through its various articles. In a year's time we shall have to return to it and put in the necessary adjustments.

At 2120 GMT debates on the bill start. An unidentified member of the committee speaks on how necessary the bill is. He says bills on transport and on food quality will also be needed, as these topics are not entirely covered in the bill. Millions of people will make use of the bill. Questioned on how and when the bill will be introduced, he says it cannot be introduced immediately.

At 2128 GMT Deputy Kiselev opposes the bill as having been overtaken and needing to be redrafted. Further debate on various provisions of the bill follows.

At 2152 GMT the session votes on articles of the bill. The bill is passed. This is followed by voting in favor of the USSR signing the Union treaty.

Agreement To Sign Union Treaty

LD2205142991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1300 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow, 22 May (TASS)—Today the USSR Supreme Soviet stated its intention to take part along with the republics in the signing of the Union treaty aimed at transforming the USSR into a more flexible and freer federation.

In the decision adopted today following the discussion of the draft treaty that took place yesterday, the Union parliament also stated the need to make the text of the treaty correspond to the results of the referendum on the future of the USSR held on 17 March this year.

In the course of the referendum the overwhelming majority of the country's citizens spoke out in favor of the preservation of the USSR as "a renewed federation of sovereign republics enjoying equal rights, in which the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be guaranteed equally."

Immediately after the referendum the influential deputy group "Soyuz" subjected the draft Union treaty to pointed criticism and spoke out against signing it. "Soyuz" justified its stand by the fact that the draft treaty allegedly envisages the transformation of the USSR into a confederation while the country's citizens opted for its federative system.

During today's discussion on the draft decision, some deputies expressed doubt about the correctness of the participation by the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the signing of the Union treaty. Thus, Sergey Ryabchenko, the leader of the interregional deputies group, stated that the Union treaty should be signed by the republics, and the center's attempt to interfere in the process will only obstruct its conclusion.

Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, stated in his reply that since it is not a question of setting up a new state, but of changing the existing one, the country's central bodies of power have the right to participate in the signing of the Union treaty.

Text of Decision

LD2205200391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1854 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 22 May (TASS)—The following is the text of the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the draft union treaty:

Having discussed the draft of the new Union treaty, the general concept of which was supported by the fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet has resolved:

1. It is deemed necessary to bring the text of the Union treaty into line with the results of the USSR referendum of 17 March 1991.

2. The information about the results of the discussions on the draft Union treaty in the committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, standing commissions of the chambers, and in groups of USSR people's deputies is to be taken into consideration. The proposals and remarks of the committees, commissions, deputies' groups, and USSR people's deputies are to be handed over to the preparatory committee formed by the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, in order for them to be taken into account when the draft Union treaty is finalized.

3. Participation in signing the Union treaty by representatives delegated by the supreme bodies of state power of the USSR is deemed advisable.

The decision was signed today by USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov.

Condolences on Gandhi Assassination

LD2205201691 Moscow TASS in English 1802 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—The Soviet parliament today sent a message of condolence to President Ramaswamy Venkataraman and Vice President Shankar Dayal Sharma of the Republic of India on the death of Rajiv Gandhi.

"The USSR Supreme Soviet expresses deepfelt condolences to you and all people of the Republic of India on the bereavement that befell your country—the tragic death of Rajiv Gandhi," the message says.

"USSR people's deputies with deep sorrow feel keenly the bitterness of the bitterness of the passing of the outstanding political figure, statesman and a convinced friend of the Soviet Union. We request you to pass our sympathy on to the relatives and next-of-kin of the deceased," the message reads.

The Soviet parliament's message was signed by parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov and the chiefs of parliamentary chambers—Ivan Laptev, chairman of the Council of the Union, and Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities.

International Affairs Committee Meets

LD2105230791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1930 GMT 21 May 91

[Report by Correspondent Igor Senyavskiy on the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee session in Moscow]

[Text] The state of Soviet-Japanese relations at the present stage. That, perhaps, was how one could head the agenda of today's session. The topical nature of this subject increased particularly following USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to the Land of the Rising Sun. However, there are still a number of unsolved problems in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, first and foremost the problem of territorial demarcation, linked with four islands of the Kurils ridge—Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai.

Sumio Edamura, Japanese ambassador to the USSR, who set out his country's position, addressed the Russian deputies at the session.

The Soviet Government, Sumiol Edamura says, has put the supremacy of the law to the forefront in accordance with the diplomacy of new thinking. We welcome this step and we hope that it will be embodied in the territorial question which is the biggest problem in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

The Japanese ambassador dwelled on relations between our countries as a whole. He took economic relations as an example. Edamura said that Japan's potential as an economic partner of the Soviet Union has not been exhausted. Our government is not impeding any economic links which the Soviet Union has in the private sector. The Japanese Government reaffirms that if we are able to place bilateral relations onto a level of stability, by settling our territorial dispute and concluding a peace treaty, the world's richest capital will ease your transition to market channels.

The Russian deputies also had the opportunity to learn the viewpoint from the Soviet side. It was made in a speech by Igor Rogachev, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs.

[Begin Rogachev recording] With the purpose of demonstrating the Soviet side's readiness to solve the problem of a peace treaty by meeting half way, The Soviet side has put forward a proposal to implement measures in the very near future on broadening contacts between the Japanese population and the population of the Kurils Islands, on establishing a simplified, visa-free regime by Japanese citizens to visit these islands, on developing joint mutually advantageous economic activity in this region, and on a reduction in the Soviet military contingent which is deployed on the islands.

In putting forward these proposals, we have taken into consideration the mood of the islands' inhabitants and the inhabitants of Sakhalin Oblast who have actively asked the question about the realization of economic cooperation projects with regions of Hokikaido Island which lie close by. The parties have deemed it expedient to develop constructive cooperation in an atmosphere of good-neighborliness, mutual benefit, and trust between Japan and the USSR, including the RSFSR, in the most varied spheres, first and foremost, trade and economic ones. [end recording]

Progress on Land Reform 'Unsatisfactory'

OW2105055891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0930 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] The Supreme Soviet committee on the agrarian and food policy has pointed to the unsatisfactory process of land reform. It worked out a draft decree which states that the implementation of central and republican legislation concerning land is too slow. "Serious changes in the structure of land cultivation and the relevant relations are not in evidence", the draft says. "Several republics have not concluded their endeavours to draft codes on the use of land. They failed to devise economic mechanisms for carrying out land reform."

According to the parliamentary committee, a lack of coordination and differences between central and republican legislation, particularly in regard to land ownership, have a negative impact on the course of land reform.

The committee recommends the Supreme Soviet to instruct the USSR Government to seek during the effectuation of its anti-cricis program to liquidate together with republican governments what is hindering the implementation of land reform.

Political & Social

Gorbachev To Meet Yeltsin 24 May

LD2205183591 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 22 May 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Russian Information News Agency [RIA] has learned that the day after tomorrow, 24 May, President Gorbachev is to have a meeting with Boris Yeltsin, the head of the Russian Parliament, and the heads of the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Gorbachev Stresses Solving Transcaucasus Problems

LD2205213191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1833 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 22 May (TASS)—M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today met the delegations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia.

A.F. Dashdamirov and A.G. Sarkisyan, secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan and Armenia, reported on the content of the exchange of opinion which had taken place between delegations and on the jointly agreed steps for promoting normalization of relations between the two republics.

The great concern of the country's and party's leadership about the protracted interethnic conflict was expressed. M.S. Gorbachev supported the delegations' opinion that the confrontation and attempts to resolve disputes by force are a dead-end without prospects, and he approved the initiative of the Communist Parties for an active joint search for ways of getting out of the crisis.

A serious obstacle to a settlement of the conflict, he noted, is the presence in the region of illegal armed formations which terrorize the peaceful population. The measures being taken under constitutional provisions, and the decree of the USSR president on the disarming of these formations, are meeting fierce resistance. In this situation, as events of the last few days have shown, certain forces are again striving to make political capital out of people's suffering and grief.

In the situation which has taken shape, M.S. Gorbachev stressed, the natural human and political duty of communists and of all sensible people in both republics is to effectively promote mutual understanding, concord, and the restoration of trust between the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples. The normalization of the situation and the settlement of questions on a constitutional basis will also open the way to the restoration in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the local soviet and party bodies and the insertion of real content into the status of the autonomous oblast, taking into account the changes underway in the country. This reflects the interests of all the republics, all the peoples of our great multi-ethnic country.

Communists, together with the whole democratic, progressive public, acting by means of politicl methods within the law, must tirelessly promote a constructive solution to the problems and the return of the life of all citizens of the region to its normal course.

M.S. Gorbachev stated that the Union bodies of power will give every support to these urgent, vitally important aims.

Ryzhkov 'Ready' to Suspend CPSU Membership

OW2305045091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Answering the question of IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent whether he is going to suspend his CPSU membership in case of victory in the election, former Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, candidate for the Russian presidency Nikolay Ryzhkov gave affirmative reply. He said he will not attend party plenums and congresses then and will be guided by his own principles.

N. Ryzhkov also noted that he had not thought about his first decree as the Russian President, because he got disappointed in all decrees and orders. He believes the top priority now is to create a mechanism for implementing those decrees and laws, but before that an efficient and competent team should be formed.

Presidential Candidate Bakatin's Election Program

OW2305044391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1530 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] At a news conference in Moscow Wednesday candidate for the Russian presidency Vadim Bakatin made public his election program which is based on 7 principles.

The first principle is concord. "It is better to search for compromise than waste time in confrontation", he said.

The second principle is non-violence. "In the present difficult situation when society fights lots of problems, people are discontent and angry, state bodies should not show signs of irritation and impatience, provoke and commit violence. The state must resolutely stop any violence using the force of law."

As the third principle Vadim Bakatin named human rights, which, as he put it, must be in line with the world standards.

He will be guided also by common sense which means not to run to ideological extremes.

Also important for Bakatin is the principle of continuity opposing to indiscriminate destruction of what has already been done. He pointed out that the future

Russian President should firmly adhere to the laws. In this connection, answering the question of IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent whether he is going to break away from the Communist Party, V. Bakatin said that he is ready to do so, if the law demands that.

V. Bakatin believes Russia is particularly responsible for the preservation of the Union. "Russia is the basic component of the Union", he said.

Finally, V. Bakatin favors integrity of the Russian Federation as the unique sovereign state. He emphasized that he favors the sovereignty of all republics and administrative units of the Russian Federation, but within certain limits, out of which the danger of Russia's collapse emerges.

Among other important provisions of his program, V. Bakatin indicated education and housing, noting that privatization will not bring about more houses and stressing the need to boost housing construction.

V. Bakatin urged to guarantee real conditions for the transition to a market economy and to grant all manufacturers economic freedom independently of forms of ownership.

Speaking in favor of the tandem Bakatin-Abdulatipov, candidate for vice presidency, Ramazan Abdulatipov said that it represents a combination of the great practical experience and the possibility of carrying out a scientific analysis, the unification of Eastern and Western cultures, Christianity and Islam, the Russian statehood, and the interests of autonomous formations.

Ligachev Letter Charges Misrepresentation

PM2205160191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 May 91 p 2

["Letter From Ye. Ligachev to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA," under "Returning to a Previous Publication" rubric]

[Text] In the 12 May 1991 issue of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA a report was published under the headline "Ye. Ligachev as the Pioneer of Perestroyka," which alleges that he [Ligachev] purportedly made the statement: "If communism collapses, then the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia will collapse."

What is there to say about this? The author is exploiting a familiar device: He starts off by attributing some absurdity to somebody, and then he presents this somebody in an unattractive light. It is clear to everyone that the downfall of an idea does not mean the disappearance of classes and a society.

And now to serious business. I believe that communism is mankind's historic future. This remains the programmatic goal of the CPSU. But communism is not the task of today. As long as the working class exists, communism, as an idea, however much its opponents rant and rave, will exist as an expression of the aims and interests of the laboring masses.

And, finally, about the pioneer of perestroyka. Yes, I am one of those who, together with the party, initiated the renewal of society within the framework of socialism. I believe we must take many things from our past, which includes taking things from the first years of perestroyka, when—in the words of V.I. Lenin—"completing the job" and "making anew" went on systematically, by stages, without improvisation and foot-dragging, life was changing for the better, and the economy was improving (and not as a result of a time lag, as some people imagine, since the indicators for 1981-1985 are substantially lower than those for 1985-1988). I particularly want to stress that the foundation of economic growth was a combination of planning principles and the broad development of commodity-money relations. Then this basic principle began to be abandoned. The details are in my memoirs.

Now, incidentally, when society is in a state of total disorder, people are starting to get nostalgic not for Stalinism (certain people are attempting to impose this idea), but for the good traditions of our past, for the first years of perestroyka. People did not live as badly in recent years as they do now. I was convinced of this once again when I met with Donetsk Oblast miners.

CDP 11th Congress Set for June; First Since 1917

OW2205084791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1230 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] The central committee of the Constitutional Democracy (People's Freedom) Party held a plenum on Monday to consider the results of work done by a commission on the party's historical legacy. The commission concluded its work on the party's history. Based on materials from archives, the documents will be sent to the USSR Ministry of Justice along with other party papers required for the official registrations of the Constitutional Democracy Party (CDP).

The plenum decided to hold the 11th party congress in mid June. The previous, 10th party congress, was held in 1917.

Kadety-2 Party To Present Registration Documents

LD2105225191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1900 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Kadety [members of the Constitutional Democratic Party] have their own short course now. This is the title of the document in which they are trying to prove that they are direct successors of the famous Kadety party created by Milyukov. This work, toegther with other required documents, will be presented to the USSR Ministry of Justice for registration of Kadety-2. Apart from historiographic issues, a plenum of the Central

Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party has considered some program provisions of the party.

Plan for Social Democratic Party Ridiculed

PM2305075591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 May 91 Second Edition p 4

["Echo" article by Valentin Yevseyev: "We Are Still Strutting"]

[Text] It appears that an event could soon occur which some have long awaited, pinning their hopes on it, others have feared, although thinking there was little possibility of its happening, and yet others simply considered improbable, inconceivable. What are we referring to?

The paper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (No. 19, 1991) reported, through its chief editor, that a number of well-known politicians are showing "increasingly active interest" in the formation of a constructive opposition in the shape of a parliamentary-type mass social democratic party, "for which the law is of overriding importance." It has been said of the initiators that the "vast majority of them were both authors and ardent supporters of reforms when in the CPSU."

One should perhaps rejoice with the champions of the fatherland's young democracy. A constructive opposition, an alternative to the CPSU, is no barrier to perestroyka processes. In fact, it could help make them more dynamic and irreversible. But somehow one does not feel particularly cheerful on reading Ye. Yakovlev's essay "A Child Will Be Born—Not the CPSU's, Hopefully." Why does the author make scathing attacks on communists? Obviously, he is frightened lest there be another "arriviste" like the Travkin-Lysenko offspring, which became hysterical, hollering about anticommunism.

We would agree that there is no need to beget moral and, indeed, physical monsters. This certainly troubles the esteemed publicist. After all, those from the "two, three or four parties" in the CPSU who are mentioned further on in the same issue could try to emulate certain figures. And what guarantee is there that there would be no "neo-Bolsheviks" among the deserters? Indeed, would the initiators themselves be able to "get across from the withered branch of Bolshevism to the green tree of world social democracy..."? Would they go "for a society that encourages enterprise, a society of free economic initiative, in which the enrichment of one persion benefits (?) everyone..."?

That is the crux of the matter, it seems to me. Although you would not work it out right away. So you might say to your former CPSU comrades, now the newspaper's cofounders, and those involved with them: "Are you prepared to renounce the socialist idea and be the embryonic class of entrepreneurs?" No, in the style of the old "masters of the proviso," the author delicately takes the reader back to 1903, "when home-grown social democracy was demolished," and finally to the allegedly obvious incompatibility of the "scale of the transformations that the CPSU has been forced (?) to carry out and those that are necessary for the rebirth of society." So the position of "being more liberal than the CPSU" does not suit him, of course: He has his sights on something else.

What, then, is the impatient editor inciting the potential founders of a party, the "ardent supporters of reforms" to do? He discards the concept of perestroyka as useless: "Only an inveterate joker could call our existence the era of perestroyka." However, principles have to be observed, if only to save the social democratic pregnancy. To keep on claiming that black is white and vice versa, until as many fools as possible believe it. Therefore the "independent" newspaper, in the same issue, without noticing the really principled conclusions of the joint CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission plenum on ways of extricating the Soviet economy from the crisis and on the protection of working people's interests, latched onto the odd word in participants' speeches and organizes the words accordingly. They are right-wingers these communists, it says.

The next issue of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI publishes a plan of action to organize the proclaimed party. It is expounded by A. Sobchak. It is the same old refrain: "The CPSU is essentially incapable of regeneration in the new society..." And it proposes finishing off, no later than the end of summer, what the notorious Democratic Platform failed to do. That is, form at a founding congress an apparently alternative (to whom?) party... by dismantling the CPSU (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No. 20, 1991).

Ah well, gentlemen and comrades... Let us honestly admit what fraction or perhaps even large proportion of holders of CPSU party cards who are not too attached to it could yet go. It is undesirable as far as the CPSU is concerned, but not fatal. Particularly as last year alone over 108,000 joined the communists' ranks and there were 46,000 new members in the first three months of this year. The CPSU has first-hand experience of how hard it is to bear the burden of initiative, how difficult it is to be born again on the basis of truly democratic, humanitarian principles. Nonetheless there is no doubt that it will endure, undergo renewal, and grow strong.

But what can you expect of turncoats? Clearly, no new party could count on them—they would let it down. Even if they used to strut about in some part of the CPSU organization.

CPSU CC Secretariat Views Party's VUZ Role

PM2205095591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "The Party and Higher Education"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee press center has disseminated a report on the [17 May] routine CPSU

Central Committee Secretariat session chaired by V.A. Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Opening the session, V.A. Ivashko highly praised the conduct of the 9 May Victory festival, which was held in the spirit of the Soviet people's heroic feat and was celebrated as an outstanding landmark in our homeland's history. The party organizations did much to make this festival, which is sacred to all of us, proceed in an atmosphere of great patriotism and of homage rendered to the older generation for a great feat of arms and labor.

The deputy general secretary emphasized the necessity of preserving and developing the patriotic spirit, stimulated by the memory of the Soviet people's feat during the years of the Great Patriotic War. There is a reason for this: A whole series of important dates is coming up, beginning with the 50th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War. A good opportunity is emerging to expand mass work to instill in young people a feeling of pride in the fatherland and in our multinational Soviet people.

The press center report says that an important question for the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat agenda was to scrutinize the Kharkov State University party organization's activities under conditions of renewing forms and methods of party work. Taking into consideration the significance of a collective interpretation of communists' activities in VUZ's [higher educational establishments], the need to search for the best possible conception of the processes and tendencies in the higher education sphere, and the need to determine the most urgent directions in communists' activities in higher education, the party committee secretaries and rectors of a number of the country's most important VUZ's were invited to the session.

Kharkov University is a major center for education, with its established scientific schools and democratic traditions. It was one of the first VUZ's to receive accreditation from the state. The basis of its party organization's activities is to work out a stance regarding key issues in the collective's life and the most acute political problems. In his report, party committee secretary M.I. Bondarenko analyzed self-critically the role played by the detachment of more than 1,000 communists in resolving the main issues of the VUZ's activities: achieving new quality in the training of specialists, in cadre policy, in the renewal of forms and methods of political work in the collective, and in social protection for students and for scientific and teaching staff.

V.V. Ryabov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the CPSU Central Committee Humanitarian Department, dwelt on the peculiarities of the social and political processes in higher education and on political realities in the student body, the professorial and teaching collectives, and the party organizations. Characterizing the Kharkov University party organization's work, he noted that it is among those which not only have stood their ground in the political struggle but also actively influence the state of affairs in the collectives in the present complex situation. But not all of its potential is used to the fullest. Less attention is paid to resolving young people's problems and to the condition of and affairs within the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] organization. There is still an acute atmosphere surrounding the problem of depoliticization, which has been imposed on the party. Speeches also contained specific proposals for the priority development of higher education across the country.

We consider that the party should rely on people who work creatively, people of great professional competence and high civil morality, Kharkov University Rector I.Ye. Tarapov said. It is particularly important to take care in combining the efforts of professional scholars and party workers.

G.A. Yagodin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, placed particular emphasis on the need to follow the strict guidelines in the area of education and youth policy contained in the 28th CPSU Congress resolutions. Such important documents for society as the "Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics on Public Education" and the state program for the development of higher education in the country have been prepared and require urgent adoption. We need to step up concern for student youth and set about resolving their social problems.

V.Ye. Ostrozhinskiy, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and I.S. Maslov, secretary of the Kharkov party obkom [oblast committee], spoke about the problems of renewing the forms and methods of party work in VUZ's.

A.P. Dyakov, member of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee and secretary of Voronezh State University party committee, who attended the session, spoke with alarm about the exacerbated economic problems of student life and about the importance of achieving unity in VUZ's organizational and political work. A.A. Logunov, rector of the Moscow State University named for M.V. Lomonosov, focused the attention of those present on the weak material and technical resourcing of VUZ's, which is leading inter alia to an undesired brain-drain of capable young scholars and postgraduate students to foreign VUZ's. In his view, it is necessary to resolve the question of at least creating a group of well-equipped educational centers here in this country.

In the opinion of A.S. Dzasokhov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Kharkov University's experience has universal significance. It is important to bring together literally every grain of those new elements which have appeared in the work of VUZ party organizations, noting it in good time. The CPSU Central Committee Humanitarian Department is required to be more vigorous about disseminating modern forms of

work generated by perestroyka which allow us to fundamentally renew party life in the VUZ's. Much depends on the personal professional and moral qualities of the party committee secretaries, who are constantly under the watchful eye of scholars and students. They should be people from professorial and teaching staff who are authoritative and devoted to their work.

A.S. Dzasokhov put forward a number of proposals aimed at simplifying social scientists' position in VUZ's, pointing out at the same time that many of them should resolutely break free from dogma, increase their level of knowledge, and broaden their horizons. The speaker noted that the All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Committee does not play a sufficiently active role in the resolution of student issues and could make its presence felt more.

The draft document under discussion today, CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.M. Falin said, should give an answer to the main question: How does the party view the problem of increasing the country's intellectual potential? Whether or not the student body will be drawn to us depends on this. The speaker emphasized that success can be achieved only if conditions are created for revealing the individual's creative potential. In his view, the part of the draft resolution which pertains to questions of party tactics in the area of public education should be strengthened.

F.K. Luchinskiy and O.S. Shenin, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, and V.A. Gayvoronskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, put forward a number of constructive proposals aimed at renewing party life in the VUZ's.

It was resolved to complete the document, taking into account the proposals and observations which have been advanced, and to publish it subsequently in the party press.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat confirmed measures to implement the decisions of the April (1991) combined CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission Plenum.

Organizational questions were also examined.

RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee proposals to confirm the following as first secretaries were adopted: A.V. Batmanov of the Komi Republic Party Committee; B.D. Muyev of the Kalmyk Republic Committee; V.A. Skoptsov of the Mordovian Republic Committee; and S.A. Markarov of the Khabarovsk Kray Committee.

Trade Union Leader Reviews Government Agreement

LD2105191391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1215 GMT 21 May 91

[Interview with Albert Mikhaylkovich Yakovlev, deputy chairman of the USSR General Confederation of Trade Unions, by commentator Yakov Smirnov, in program entitled "The Agreement Has Been Signed: What Next?"; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] This program, dear listeners, will deal with the agreement between the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the country's General Confederation of Trade Unions which was signed exactly a month ago. [passage omitted] This [agreement] was the basis for a meeting between commentator Yakov Smirnov and Albert Mikhaylovich Yakovlev, deputy chairman of the USSR General Confederation of Trade Unions. Here is their conversation:

[Smirnov] Albert Mikhaylovich, we and our listeners are of course interested in knowing how that agreement—in effect the first agreement in Soviet history between the trade unions and the government—is being implemented.

[Yakovlev] In general terms we do not as yet have any serious complaints. The resolution is being implemented. The positions we laid down in April, which were built into the agreement, have been complied with. A draft presidential decree has been prepared on general principles for structuring a minimum budget for consumption funds. That document lays down the general principles for the formation of a minimum budget for consumption funds, for minimum pay levels, as well as for pension provision and student grants. It is to be signed in a few days' time, having been agreed with all the union republics.

[Smirnov] What about the new minimum living wage?

[Yakovlev] Well, as far as that is concerned, a new minimum living wage will indeed by set, on the basis of the new prices. Talks are under way to conclude industry-related pay-rate agreements—in the coal, oil, and gas industries, in rail transportation, the steel industry. And in principle the aim is to look at all wage-rates this year, along with new pay principles for all industries. And then when it comes to concluding agreements for the next year we shall do so on the basis of those pay-rate agreements. [passage omitted]

[Smirnov] I have a question, quite an important one. There was talk of the state budget allocating funds for the social insurance fund which is managed and used by the trade unions. I even recall that figures were mentioned: whereas the contribution to that fund was 5.1 percent it is now to become 7 percent. But then we heard that Pavlov had said it doesn't need to be restricted. Let's see how it works out.

[Yakovlev] We agreed with the government and wrote into the agreement a definite figure. Last year, when we were planning, it was around 22.5 billion rubles [R] but the figure now agreed is R30.2 billion. So that is an addition for the increase in the cost of living. We shall be using that money to finance sick leave and maternity leave, and for the maintenance of our network of sanatoriums and convalescent homes and compensation for

the increased costs of attending these. We have not laid down an exact percentage, but as far as financing from one particular source goes—the pension fund for social insurance, where there exists an agreed rate of 26 percent—we have calculated, in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance, that it is not enough. And at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on 16 May I raised this question, and there and then the president spoke to the prime minister, who confirmed that it was necessary to add 1 percent—which means that the president's May decree will have to be changed to add these extra funds. [passage omitted]

[Smirnov] In conclusion, Albert Mikhaylovich, I would like to ask you what recommendations you would give to local trade union activists and workers now.

[Yakovlev] Well, my first recommendation is to be bolder in dealing with questions on the spot. We here in the center have overcome the inertia of centralism and have stopped waiting for instructions but out there in some places there are still some who wait for us to give a lead.

[Smirnov] You mean, they are afraid of taking responsibility?

[Yakovlev] Yes, they should not be afraid of responsibility. Then the next problem concerns the fact that the employment law comes into effect on 1 July. Today we have two million unemployed, though nobody in this country has actually counted them ...

[Smirnov, interrupting] Well, rumors spread like wildfire, Albert Mikhaylovich. For instance, I have heard figures of not far off 34 million unemployed in this country by the end of the year.

[Yakovlev] Well, that is one of those scaremongering figures. There will not be that sort of number of unemployed. But there will be a substantial number—I think it will be of the order of 10 million. This is because our economy is in a sorry state, and those figures for the unemployed will come from competition or from enterprises closing down here or there but from the fact that our economic relations have broken down, there are many raw materials which we are not buying in now, and we are going to have a lot of unemployment in light industry, where [words indistinct] have developed which have based themselves on imports. So this is a very serious matter and we have to prepare for it. We have to prepare first of all at enterprise level, then in trade union organizations at the oblast, kray, or republic level. What else? Well, the question of strikes is a thorny one. People have reached such an extent of desperation that they naturally seize on the strike weapon as the last one available. And unfortunately, nobody takes into account that it is a two-edged weapon. So I would call on trade union members and managers of enterprises to take a very carefully weighed approach to the use of this weapon, particularly this year. Particularly this year, because of course we first of all have to stabilize the economy, to stop the downward slide. Of course things are difficult at present—for the government and the president things are difficult, and trade unions are not finding it easy and things are worse and worse for the working people. But we have to get out of this situation together. There is no other way.

Procuracy Collegium Discusses Anticrisis Program

LD2105212891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1900 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] A session of the collegium of the USSR Procuracy, headed by USSR Procurator General Trubin, took place today. Procurators of the Union republics took part in its work for the first time as members of the collegium. The collegium is working hard and with interest. Procurators are defining priority directions for joint activity during the implementation of the anticrisis program and a mechanism for putting it into practice. It was recommended that first priority be attached to the correct implementation of the anticrisis regulations; laws on ownership, land, and cooperation; general principles for enterprises; price formation; and observance of lawfulness in foreign economic activities of enterprises and organizations. Speedy elaboration of an antimonopoly legislation is under discussion.

Kalugin Refutes KGB Defection Allegation

LD2205225991 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1959 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] [Announcer Kiselev] On 14 May SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reported a sensation, claiming that Oleg Kalugin, USSR people's deputy, ex-KGB general and today the main critic of this department, had not returned from a trip to the United States. Other newspapers hastened to refute this information. But rumors to the effect that Kalugin has stayed behind in America are continuing to do the rounds. I think that our next video feature will properly clarify this story.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent is shown with Kalugin on Cathedral Square of the Moscow Kremlin]

[Correspondent] Oleg Danilovich, what do you think, what was the underlying cause of this report in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA?

[Kalugin] I think that this was the latest KGB provocation, because SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has always been notable for close ties with this organization and was used as a channel for discrediting many public figures in our country, especially those taking part in the democratic process.

[Correspondent] Do you intend to react in any way to this move by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA?

[Kalugin] I think that they do not deserve that attention. Honestly speaking, I do not condescend to have anything

to do with them. Let them go their own way. I have not the slightest desire to have anything to do with the organs of disinformation.

[Correspondent] Unlike the president and the USSR Council of Ministers. By the way, how are things there with you?

[Kalugin] It was recommended to me that I should appeal to the Supreme Soviet and to try to get my rights and pension, etc, reinstated through it. Well, I think that this remains as a variant, even though I have not abandoned the thought of trying to achieve through the courts what I started doing half a year ago. [end recording]

New Plan for Guarding Borders Near Completion

LD2205215691 Moscow TASS in English 2138 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—"Frontier Troops: The Contemporary Stage and Development Prospects" was the subject of a news conference at the Press Centre of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee here today.

The elaboration of a new concept of the guarding of the state border and the economic zone of the USSR is nearing completion, Lieutenant General N. Britvin, first deputy chief of the border troops of the KGB of the USSR, told journalists.

Priorities will be to raise the effectiveness of the activity of frontier troops at international communication routes, to ensure the regime of the border and order in the economic zone of the USSR, to counter foreign hostile organisations' subversive activity against the USSR and, together with the customs service, to thwart attempts at smuggling contraband merchandise, arms, narcotics, explosives and toxic substances into and out of the country, Britvin said.

The news conference was attended by representatives of the main department of frontier troops, and by officers of units directly guarding the state border of the USSR.

Speakers said that border guards annually detain about 2,500 transgressors of the state border (20-25 per cent of them during attempts at leaving the USSR).

Forty-three foreign ships were detained for poaching in the Soviet economic zone last year and fines amounted to five million foreign-exchange roubes.

Border guards confiscated 1,597 units of weapons (948 units of firearms) and 124.5 kilograms of narcotics at checkpoints.

Now that the Soviet parliament has adopted an entry and exit law, the border guards are prepared to ensure compliance with it, speakers emphasised. This will require about 100 new checkpoints in addition to the already functioning 235 ones and an increase in checkpoint personnel by 13,000 men.

Aeroflot Deficit Reaches 2 Billion Rubles

LD2205124691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 22 May 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Two thirds of Aeroflot enterprises are currently making a loss. The total deficit has reached 2 billion rubles.

Civil Aviation Minister on Costs, Strike Situation

PM2205153191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 May 91 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with Civil Aviation Minister B.Ye. Panyukov conducted by V. Parfenov; date not given; first paragraph is journalist's introduction: "The Air Is No Place for Irresponsibility: Strike Does Not Take Place"]

[Text] Moscow—May 21 was the deadline for the threatened strike by pilots and air traffic controllers. We asked Civil Aviation Minister B.Ye. Panyukov to answer the most pressing questions of concern to air crew and passengers.

[Parfenov] Boris Yegorovich, the air controllers' basic demand is a doubling of their pay. I would like to know how much pilots and controllers have been earning hitherto.

[Panyukov] Flying personnel earn on average 689 rubles [R] a month, but to be more specific, the pilot of the smallest aircraft receives R554 and the commander of the biggest airliner, the Il-86, receives R1,269 a month. The air traffic controllers earn between R455-648.

[Parfenov] What is the Civil Aviation Ministry doing to ensure that air crews make flight safety even better and more reliable?

[Panyukov] The USSR Cabinet of Ministers adopted ordinance No. 476-R on 17 May entitling the Ministry of Civil Aviation to increase the basic quantity of money channelled into consumption in the period June through December 1991 and ordered that the level of pay be increased on average by 50 percent, taking working conditions and the level of personal responsibility into account.

[Parfenov] But where will the sector find the resources for this; will passengers really have to pay even higher ticket prices? Only this, after all, will allow aviators' wages to be increased.

[Panyukov] Indeed there are no resources in the sector or the state budget. It is no wonder that we were forced to increase our air ticket prices by 80 percent on average on 2 April. Incidentally, this is because the prices for aviation fuel have almost tripled, the cost of new aircraft

doubled, and the price of engine spares quadrupled. With such a "balance sheet" our sector has become even poorer since 2 April. Two-thirds instead of one-third of the sector's enterprises now make a loss, and our total deficit has reached R2 billion. We are now above all cutting expenditure on the management of the sector and are closing some of the small, lossmaking enterprises...

[Parfenov] When will an agreement on wage rates be concluded with the pilots and controllers?

[Panyukov] The USSR Cabinet of Ministers has instructed that the agreement for 1992 be concluded by 1 August this year.

[Parfenov] At which airports is the situation most fraught?

[Panyukov] The situation has changed rapidly. A specially alarming situation was created in Irkutsk and in certain other cities. It is a good thing that the majority of collectives did not respond to the extremist calls and are continuing to work to schedule.

[Parfenov] But what if the situation does deteriorate?

[Panyukov] I have informed the USSR president about the situation. We will act in strict accordance with the law. If strikes disrupt the regularity of flights we will take economic and administrative measures. And to avert any disruption of traffic movement we will bring in Air Force transport personnel. But I am confident that the chaos which certain forces have been seeking has not only not happened, but will not happen. The air is no place for irresponsibility.

Air Controllers Agree to 60 Percent Wage Hike

OW2205113591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 21 May 91

[From "Business Today" feature]

[Text] Soviet air traffic controllers and civil aviation pilots have cancelled the strike due to start on Tuesday, May 21.

A member of the Central Council of the Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Trade Unions of the USSR (FPA), Mr. Vladimir Denisov, told IF [INTERFAX] that late on Monday evening representatives of the strike committees signed an agreement with the Soviet Government in which the basic demands of the air traffic controllers and the civil aviation pilots are met.

The main demands made by the trade unions were the shortening of the working week to 36 hours (from 41), the inclusion of air traffic controllers in the list of workers of the most demanding professions, which would mean lowering of the retirement age from 55 to 50, and an increase of annual vacation from 24 to 48 days.

The biggest disagreements in the talks centred on the question of pay, which the unions demanded be increased by 300 percent while the government offer was only 50 percent. As a result of the agreement wages will be risen by 60 percent. In addition, the secretary of the executive committee of the National Flight Crew Association, Mr. Eduard Bychkov, told IF that the government had agreed to a gradual increase in the pay of air traffic controllers and pilots.

Mr. Denisov said that a strike could be called for August 10, 1991, if the unions are not satisfied with the way the agreement is being put into action. According to him, the FPA could apply to the Supreme Court of the USSR in connection with the decision of the Ministery of Justice to cancel the registration of the union on the basis of the protest of the General Procurator of the USSR, Nikolay Trubin. The protest contended that the proclaimed right of the FPA to hold strikes, a right confirmed in the charter of the organisation, goes against Soviet law, which bans transport strikes.

The Association of Civil Flight Crews of the USSR unites forty of the fifty-seven thousand Soviet pilots.

Soviet Mafia Bids To Control Disunited USSR

PM2205142391 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "'Window on Europe' for the Mafia?"]

[Text] The Soviet mafia's activity both inside the country and in Europe has sharply intensified in the last two years. Its international links have also expanded. Interpol officers are aware of agreements having been concluded between the criminal worlds of the USSR and a number of East European countries on joint operations in a number of spheres. The Soviet-Polish mafia today thus constitutes the third-most important in Europe in the trade and production of narcotics so far as influence and financial turnover are concerned.

The leaders of the three largest mafia centers of the USSR—Moscow, Odessa, and Vladivostok—have concluded an agreement with the underworlds of Poland and Belgium on shipping and selling stolen automobiles.

Close cooperation has also been set up between the Soviet and Polish mafia in printing and distributing forged banknotes, particularly dollars.

However, it is the ties between joint ventures and the mafia which are most alarming.

It is a fact that East European countries, including the USSR, have seen a rapid increase in the last two years in the amount of money accumulated by individuals associated with legally dubious transactions. According to figures in a [unspecified] newspaper, the annual revenue of mafia groups in the countries of East Europe is equivalent to $20 billion.

The mafia's influence in the disintegrating Soviet Union continues to grow. Mafia groupings are ready to take power into their control in various republics and oblasts as soon as the process of destroying the unified state is completed. The country has already had to contend with this once—during the civil war, when hosts of armed bands of robbers appeared. What is involved today, however, are not anarchic groupings but disciplined and strictly regulated organizations. And how can you combat the mafia if an ordinary bodyguard with them earns 3,000 rubles a month, which is many times more than the wages of an ordinary worker or employee, including a militiaman, the [unspecified] newspaper notes.

Study Reveals Difficulties in Traveling Abroad

OW2305051091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 22 May 91

[From "Viewpoint"]

[Text] The National Public Opinion Studies Center (VCIOM) carried out last March, an opinion poll among 3,006 urban and rural residents to find out what difficulties Soviet people came across while going abroad (the respondents were offered to choose no more than 2 answers.)
34 percent said the greatest difficulty was to obtain a visa.
18 percent named the absence of a law on free exit as a major impediment.
16 percent complained of lack of money to pay the government duty connected with exist from the country.
7 percent said they could not go abroad because of the secrecy of their work.
5 percent cited low professional skills as a barrier to finding a job abroad.

As many respondents complained of problems related to obtaining an invitation from a foreign party.
16 percent said they had not come across any difficulties at all in filling out the necessary papers for a trip abroad.
22 percent expressed no definite opinion.

The statistical error margin was set at 3 percent.

Economic Stabilization Conference Held in Moscow

LD2205092891 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0700 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] An all-Union conference Stabilization of the Economy and the Market starts work in the Grand Kremlin Palace today. Its main aim is to make a profound and all-round examination and discussion of the theoretical and practical aspects of the work of enterprises and organizations at the stage of implementation of economic stabilization measures. Members of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and Russia, leading specialists of ministries, academics, heads of associations and enterprises and of foreign firms and international centers will be taking part in the conference.

Extra Compensation Planned From Raised Prices

LD2205222691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 22 May 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] An agreement between the USSR and the republics on matters relating to the reform of retail prices and the social protection of the population envisages conducting a common policy in the field of prices and incomes. At the same time, the leadership of the republics and local organs of power have mede a decision to raise the retail prices and tariffs of certain kinds of community and everyday services, as well as of a range of consumer goods for which prices are fixed by republican and local administrative bodies. This was not envisaged by the agreement. In these conditions, the USSR Government considers it expedient to channel the income received from this raising of prices and tariffs into increasing the size of compensation payments to the population; on which the corresponding decision was adopted.

New Timetable Cuts Baltic, Southern Republic Trains

PM2205142991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[POSTFACTUM report from roundup of news agency reports: "New Train Timetable"]

[Text] Specialists from the USSR Ministry of Railways have finished drawing up a new passenger train timetable for 1991-1992. The timetable features a number of new domestic routes, notably Kharkov-Tynda, Kishinev-Adler, and Moscow-Chernovtsy, and also international trains and through cars running on the Moscow-Belgrade, Moscow-Cologne, Leningrad-Cologne, Kiev-Munich, Chernovtsy-Sofia, Novosibirsk-Beijing, and Chita-Beijing routes. POSTFACTUM reports that 15 trains that ran to the Baltic, Central Asia, and Transcaucasus regions have been excluded from the timetable. This has been done because recently trains bound for these areas were no more than one-third full. The new timetable will come into operation starting on the night of 1-2 June.

Sakharov Museum Opens in Nizhniy Novgorod

PM2205133191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Anatoliy Yershov report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "A.A. Sakharov Museum"]

[Text] The Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov Museum has opened in Nizhniy Novgorod.

The museum is housed at 214 Gagarin Boulevard, where the scientist lived for seven years in exile. The building now bears a memorial plaque.

"If we're being accurate, a center has been set up in Nizhniy Novogorod to study the history of the rights defense movement in the country," museum director S. Ponomarev said. "Andrey Dmitriyevich's widow, Yelena Bonner, supports this idea."

"We have tried to restore a 'Sakharovian' atmosphere in apartment No. 3. There was previously a departmental hospital here. Therefore we had to collect furniture and crockery from storage, from the neighboring hostel. Restoration work will continue in order to finally restore the interior of all the rooms in the apartment."

Apartments Nos. 1 and 2 contain exhibitions, along with a unique "Book of Grief"—the story of Nizhniy Novgorod's political prisoners, victims of the Stalinist repressions.

The week 19 through 26 May will be celebrated in Nizhniy Novgorod to mark the 70th anniversary of A.D. Sakharov's birth.

TASS Reviews Central Press for 22 May

LD2205070891 Moscow TASS in English 0658 GMT 22 May 91

["Soviet Press Review"—TASS Headline]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—Today's newspapers open their front pages with reports about the opening of the Fourth Russian Congress of People's Deputies in the Kremlin on Tuesday.

The Congress met to discuss the creation of an executive-style presidency in Russia, the biggest of the 15 Soviet republics.

Boris Yeltsin, former prime minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and former Soviet Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin are the key contenders for the new post, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA writes.

The first day of congressional work was "constructive" and "deputies strived to avoid political confrontation", PRAVDA writes.

"To vote for President Yeltsin means to vote for capitalism," SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA quoted a deputy as saying.

Delegates booed at him as he accused Gorbachev of betrayal, TRUD says.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA writes about various congressional factions attending the forum.

Soviet air traffic controllers and pilots decided to suspend a planned strike two hours before the stoppage was due to begin after the government agreed to meet their demands, TRUD reports.

The strike has been suspended until the "planned measures are implemented", S. Yevsyukov, vice-president of the Trade Union Federation of Air Traffic Controllers, told the newspaper.

The government will take economic and administrative sanctions and use the air force if strikes disrupt flight schedules, Civil Aviation Minister Boris Panyukov said in an interview with PRAVDA.

The Soviet-British space mission aboard the Mir space station is proceeding according to the plan, PRAVDA reports.

PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA publish president Mikhail Gorbachev's decree "On Minimum Consumer Budget".

The measure regulates minimum wages, pensions and other payments.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA comments on the suspension of the Soviet miners' strike.

A recent open letter by senior Russian Communist Party official Gennadiy Zyuganov to "Prominent ideologue of perestroyka" Aleksander Yakovlev is a "military Communism-style revelation", the newspaper writes.

The letter is openly hostile to perestroyka and reflects the thinking of extremist neo-Bolsheviks, it says.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA comments on clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA denied that Soviet troops looted, killed local residents and took people hostage in border areas in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The crimes were committed by bandits dressed as troops, it says.

SELSKAYA ZHIZN carries an interview with Soviet agricultural academy vice president N. Milashchenko, who comments on Soviet grain production.

PRAVDA carries an interview with deputy Russian parliament chairman Svetlana Goryacheva.

Soviet society has divided into two warring camps—pro-socialist and pro-capitalist, she believes. It is too early to introduce a new presidency in Russia, she said.

It is high time to apply to Israel the very same standard of international legal and moral norms that was so effectively applied to Iraq, PRAVDA writes in a report from Cairo.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA comments on the recent visit to the Soviet Union by Chinese Communist Party Leader Jiang Zemin. "The visit completed normalisation in bilateral inter-state and inter-party relations," it says.

23 May Press Review

LD2305070591 Moscow TASS in English 0641 GMT 23 May 91

["Soviet Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 23 TASS—Today's PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA highlight the second day of Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti's visit to the Soviet Union.

On Wednesday Andreotti met President Mikhail Gorbachev to discuss international issues, Soviet-Italian relations and Soviet domestic problems.

The newspapers cover a joint conference held by Gorbachev and Andreotti and report a meeting between Andreotti and Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov.

The fourth Russian Congress of People's Deputies began its second day of work on Wednesday with a minute's silence in the honour of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was assassinated on Tuesday.

The congress passed a bill on the Russian president and discussed amendments to the Russian Constitution aimed to reform local self-government.

Georgy Zhukov, chairman of the parliamentary committee on local councils and self-government, made a report about the proposed amendments.

Presidential candidate Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the Liberal Democratic Party addressed the Congress in the afternoon. He needed the support of at least a fifth of deputies to be included in the ballot for the June 12 election.

Zhirinovsky called for an end to the confrontation between Russian and central authorities and ethnic tensions. He was included in the ballot after a 477 to 417 vote with 36 abstentions.

Six candidates will be running in the June 12 election, including Russian parliament Leader Boris Yeltsin, former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, Security Council Member Vadim Bakatin, Volga Urals Military District Commander Colonel General Albert Makashov and Kemerovo Regional Council Chairman Aman Tuleyev.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA interviews several lawmakers about the possible outcome of the election. Russian Democratic Party leader Nikolai Travkin said he is certain in Boris Yeltsin's victory. Lawmaker Sergey Baburin prefers Vadim Bakatin and historian Roy Medvedev, admitting that Boris Yeltsin stands a better chance of winning, said that neither of the candidates will win enough votes in the first round.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA carries several speeches by deputies during the congressional debate on bills on presidency and presidential elections.

The newspaper carries a transcript of a press conference held by Vadim Bakatin and his vice-presidential nominee Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of the Russian parliament Council of Nationalities.

Mikhail Gorbachev met delegations of the Azerbaijani and Armenian Communist Party Central Committees on Wednesday, PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA report.

The two delegations met on May 20 and 21 to discuss the situation in their republics and ways out of the crisis.

At the meeting with Gorbachev the sides summed up the results of the May 20 and 21 meeting and discussed measures to improve the situation.

Newspapers publish a resolution on the draft Union treaty, passed by the Soviet parliament on Wednesday.

PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA publish a cabinet resolution on additional measures to protect the public socially in connection with recent price hikes.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reports about the first Army conference of Soviet soldiers-internationalists in Moscow on Wednesday. It publishes a speech by Soviet Defence Minister Dmitry Yazov at the forum and extracts from a report by Deputy Defence Minister Valentin Varennikov.

Newspapers comment on the situation in India after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA publish a message of condolences Mikhail Gorbachev sent to Indian President Ramaswamy Venkataraman in connection with Gandhi's killing and a message of condolences by Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev to Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi's widow.

Newspapers publish various telegrams Indian president and other leaders received from heads of state and governments in various countries, including a telegram from U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

PRAVDA carries an article about the possible use of East European experience of round table talks between various political factions in the Soviet Union.

TRUD carries comments by Bulgaria's Foreign Minister Viktor Vulkov on Bulgaria's new role in Europe.

Economic

Gosbank Chief on Domestic Convertibility of Ruble

PM2105134991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with V. Gerashchenko, chairman of the USSR State Bank Board, by I. Zhagel; first paragraph is

editorial introduction; date and place not stated: "Domestic Convertibility of the Ruble—A Road Traveled by Others?"]

[Text] At a recent enlarged session of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers the transition to the domestic convertibility of the ruble, which is to be implemented from the start of 1992, was among the main measures in the anticrisis program now being drafted together with the republics. Our correspondent asked V. Gerashchenko, chairman of the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] Board, to talk about this in greater detail.

[Zhagel] Viktor Vladimirovich, the specific and not-so-distant date for the transition to domestic convertibility of the ruble inspires the hope that the changes are realistic, although on the other hand, after the planned economy you acquire an aversion to precise dates and figures. Especially when someone intends to begin the new life at new year...

[Gerashchenko] The transfer of the financial system from one condition to another cannot be accomplished in one fell swoop. There is no need to belabor that point, I think.

At the same time we need to change, as it were, the rules whereby enterprises operate in the hard currency market. For that purpose 1 January is an entirely appropriate date: That is when the budget year begins with definite sources of revenue and definite expenditure items. Both before and after that date, however, it will be necessary to implement a whole package of complex and sometimes painful measures.

[Zhagel] Our economy, of course, has its own characteristics. Nevertheless, it seems to me, when elaborating the program for the convertibility of the ruble we hardly need to reinvent the wheel. Surely, that would mean taking a road traveled by others before?

[Gerashchenko] A group of scientists and specialists is now being formed to compile this program before 1 July. The program will not only undergo the most thorough expert analysis abroad, at the IMF, but will also be compiled from the outset using experience gained in the FRG, Japan, and the East European countries. It is too soon to talk about its details now, of course, but the most fundamental features are evident.

[Zhagel] Let us begin by saying what in general the domestic convertibility of the ruble means. This concept has been used very often recently, although I am not sure that many people really understand what it means.

[Gerashchenko] The very concept of convertibility presupposes the possibility that organizations and individuals can buy and sell hard currency in market conditions—that is, at the rate prevailing in the currency market. Domestic convertibility, however, imposes certain restrictions on the scale and character of that market. For example, it does not allow our enterprises the possibility of buying currency for investment abroad. Another major restriction applies to organizations and individuals operating in the currency market. These will mainly be Soviet organizations and private individuals. Foreign organizations will be free to sell currency for rubles although the reverse operation—buying foreign currency for rubles—will be possible only as a result of their economic activity in our country. Then they will be able to switch their dividends abroad at the market rate.

People may ask: Will our enterprises sell the foreign currency that they have earned? Under domestic convertibility they will simply be obliged to do so. Furthermore, with an advantageous exchange rate for foreign currency against the ruble it will be possible to earn far more when selling products abroad than if they had been sold inside the country.

I am confident that during the switch to domestic convertibility of the ruble our main problems will be not with those who are vigorous exporters of their product but with those who are forced to import raw and other materials and components for their own production. Their purchase of foreign currency at the market rate will hit subcontractors and customers hard.

[Zhagel] Do you mean that the introduction of domestic convertibility of the ruble will trigger abrupt new changes in the price structure?

[Gerashchenko] Undoubtedly. That is what our recent experience suggests. When a commercial rate for the ruble—three times above the official rate at about 1.7-1.8 rubles to the U.S. dollar—was introduced last year, many light industry enterprises were on the verge of collapse even then and began using every means to inflate prices for their output.

Now, however, the jump in the rate may be far greater. Prices will react accordingly. But we can see how painful such processes are in our society. Thus I would like to constantly warn those who take an extremely simplified view of the process of transition to the domestic convertibility of the ruble.

[Zhagel] Of course, there cannot be any question of rigid administrative monitoring of prices either...

[Gerashchenko] Quite the reverse, there must be a further liberalization of prices, otherwise there will be no convertibility to speak of. This process in turn is bound up with a sharp demonopolization of the national economy and the creation of competing production units, including the involvement of foreign capital. Without developed competition, prices cannot be stable and thus the ruble cannot be stable either. That is why the program for the transition to the domestic convertibility of the ruble must go hand in hand with the processes of demonopolizing the economy—this must not be confused with denationalization.

As for the possibility of the state's influencing the price level in those production units which are linked to the import of raw and other materials, this should be done

by adjusting the rate of the ruble against other currencies via intervention in the currency market. In other words, through the active sale of currency from our own reserves, which at the moment are not great either.

[Zhagel] There is a view which holds that during the switch to the domestic convertibility of the ruble we will be obliged to borrow billions from abroad. What might the scale of those loans be?

[Gerashchenko] I also think that we will need additional currency stabilization reserves created through large loans. But it is too soon to talk about the actual scale yet—it will all depend on the situation in the national economy. It is far more useful now to think not about how much to borrow but what to do to ensure that major international currency organizations are ready to grant us Most Favored Nation status.

I, of course, often have occasion to meet with important bankers and financiers and I know very well that they are all waiting for political and economic stability in our country as the main condition for mutually beneficial cooperation. Thus the next few months must be a time of energetic and coordinated actions on the part of all republics and sociopolitical tendencies. These actions must be free from personal ambition and based on common sense and responsibility for the country's fate.

[Zhagel] Clearly, your words apply first and foremost to the credit and financial policy being pursued in our country, do they not?

[Gerashchenko] Yes, much must be reconsidered here. The day after the USSR Cabinet of Ministers session there was a conference of the union-republic currency committee where disputes arose again over the distribution of foreign currency earnings. We just cannot understand that, with the introduction of domestic convertibility of the ruble, all currency will go into the market and must be controlled by enterprises and not the government.

Enough of this populism under which paternalistic leaders buy grain and consumer goods for the people. And if someone wants to influence this process, let him resort to taxes, customs duties, and other civilized measures.

[Zhagel] And the republics will participate in elaborating a program for the transition to the domestic convertibility of the ruble?

[Gerashchenko] Undoubtedly. And that is precisely why it is premature to talk about the details of the problem today.

Reintegration Into World Economy Discussed

PM2305090591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Mikhail Zadornov, Aleksey Mikhaylov, and "Epitsentr" group: "Plus the 'Big Seven'; Program for Organized Return to the World Economy"; first seven paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Some newspapers, citing the British FINANCIAL TIMES, have published a report that USSR President M. Gorbachev has appealed to the seven most developed Western states to render the Soviet Union financial and technical aid in exchange for in-depth transformations in the Soviet economy. This report is almost true. On 5 May G. Yavlinskiy and Security Council member Ye. Primakov sent a letter to the "Big Seven." The letter suggested creating a joint group of Soviet and Western scientists and experts for reforms in the USSR.

If the jointly elaborated program is approved by the "Seven," our country can count not only on financial support, although it cannot manage without it, but also on specific assistance from the "Seven" in implementing reforms.

This letter was born after G. Yavlinskiy's trip to Washington at the invitation of the U.S. State Department to attend a session of the "Big Seven's" consultants council. It was there that he voiced the idea of creating a joint plan of action. He was asked for confirmation that the Soviet Union is interested in cooperating with the "Seven." M. Gorbachev himself, as far as we know, has not sent any written address to the "Seven," but at the meeting with G. Yavlinskiy he supported the importance of the cooperation plan and, as the above FINANCIAL TIMES 17 May item notes, the president said that this support is more important than internal party interests.

Obviously, expectations that M. Gorbachev will implement market reforms more resolutely and state this absolutely clearly to the West are so great that the letter written by the president's close adviser and by the author of the "500 days" program, who is well known in the West, was interpreted as an appeal from the head of state. But let us hope that, first, this reservation does not contradict the president's possible intentions and, second, that it is a sign that the "Seven" will treat this appeal favorably.

Last September, when G. Yavlinskiy was asked what he would do if the "500 days" program were not adopted, he replied that he would start to work with his group on a new concept for emerging from the graver position in which the country will inevitably find itself within a few months. And when the need for this work arises, we will be prepared for it.

To all appearances, that is what is happening, and there is nothing surprising in the fact that G. Yavlinskiy and the economic and political research center ("Epitsentr") he leads is prepared for the new situation. It is something else that is surprising. A man who does not officially hold any high administrative post, a man who played a key role in last year's Gorbachev-Yeltsin alliance on the basis of the "500" program, is today taking an active part in bringing the USSR president closer to the "Seven" on the basis of a new concept of cooperation.

A group of seven people headed by G. Yavlinskiy is now in Washington working on a draft program together with Harvard University specialists. The editorial office also knows that G. Yavlinskiy has presented M. Gorbachev, B. Yeltsin, and N. Nazarbayev with a concept worked out by "Epitsentr" for a negotiations process to elaborate public consensus inside the country. You can familiarize yourself with the basic propositions of "Epitsentr's" work by reading this article. [end of introduction]

The policy of perestroyka began with the proclamation of new guidelines: general human values, political freedoms, parliamentary democracy. The continuation of the transformations and the maintenance of control over the development of events are impossible without a coherent answer to the most fundamental questions of the country's present and future. One of the main ones is: Are we moving toward integration into the world community or will we, as before, "rely on our own efforts?"

From what has been done in recent years it follows that we have chosen the first option. Moreover, integration into the world for the USSR today is a priority question, an urgent question, and in the present situation it is also an enforced issue, primarily because of the country's economic state.

Situation

Let us compare today's economic situation with that of early last year. Of course, prices had increased even then, although without official recognition, but inflation was controlled, and with a tough financial policy and large-scale commodity interventions (using Western aid again) it was possible to avoid an uncontrolled price explosion. In early 1990 the growth of incomes was restricted at least to some extent. Today, however, the tidal wave of demands for an increase in wages, grants, and compensation is sweeping away all obstacles in its path.

Before N.I. Ryzhkov's notorious speech at the 24 May 1990 Supreme Soviet session a consumer market did exist—a wretched, gradually dwindling market, but it did exist. The speculative flurry was not all-embracing. Today even the threefold increase in prices has not done away with empty shelves. The slump in production even then affected the base sectors, but few people could have imagined a 15 to 17 percent reduction in the production of meat, milk, textiles, and so forth. All that is happening now.

In 1990 we had a budget—traditionally unreliable with a mass of hidden items and juggling with arithmetic—but we were still guided by it. This year, for four and a half months now, the country has in fact been living without a budget.

Finally, in early 1990, the USSR still had currency reserves—about $15 billion were kept in foreign banks. By the end of the year they had been thoroughly "eaten up." And, conversely, since last November the total of nonpayments to foreign partners for goods already delivered has been fluctuating from $3 to 5 billion. The country's reputation as a financial and trading partner has been lost—one would like to believe not completely.

Nor let us forget that only recently it was possible to pursue a single economic policy from the center. Today six union republics are considering in what form they should accede to economic agreements and whether they should accede at all.

The conclusion is simple—today the economic situation differs qualitatively from that which existed in early 1990. And it is not only a question of the depth of the recession or the pace of inflation. In a year the state has lost the basic levers for controlling the economy, reserves have been "eaten up," and the very structures of management are collapsing. The economy, which has entered the crisis phase, is so far being held up by the inertia and force of habit of millions of people who continue to go to work every day and to receive for it multicolored pieces of paper which for reasons of inertia are called "money."

The further development of events is clear to specialists—an inevitable increase in incomes, new spirals of price increases, the intensification of the production recession and the disorganization of entire sectors in connection with the lack of currency for which raw material and equipment were bought for them. By the end of the year mass unemployment will become a fact and will grow. Combating it with incantations like, we shall now allow an economic recession, is pointless—it is caused by objective reasons. In addition, the underinvestment in truly essential enterprises and sectors which has been continuing for two to three years now is leading to the physical deterioration of equipment and a reduction of production capacities. There is a real threat of major new accidents.

These trends are developing faster and faster and we shall get a new, qualitatively worse, situation not in a year's time but earlier.

Of course, it is possible to proceed along the usual path—to "snatch" credits now here, now there, a billion at a time. They will be given—no one wants famine for the Soviet Union. But these credits will be "eaten up" without taking us a step closer to a way out of the economic impasse. And the further we go the more we lose our own identity in the face of our partners by virtue of the aggravation of domestic problems.

There are also external factors which compel us to hurry and make decisions. In the past year the world situation, too, has changed to our disadvantage. The growth of the world economy has slowed, the leading countries of the world are encountering their own serious problems: For the United States there is the growing budget deficit and the U.S. corporations' loss of market share for some goods; the FRG is resolving the problems of reviving the East German economy, and so forth. In addition, the leading Western countries have incurred considerable expenses in connection with the war in the Persian Gulf and so far there are no guarantees there will not be a repetition of similar events.

The situation on the world financial market has deteriorated—there has been a reduction in the size of the capital supply.

Finally, one cannot fail to see the trend toward the cooling of the attitude of business circles and the public in the West toward our country and its development prospects. This cooling obviously began after the declaration of the blockade against Lithuania and was aggravated by the failure to meet payment commitments, and reinforced after the events of December through March, interpreted in the West as an attempt to return to the past. And indeed, how can one build relations with a country whose prime minister alternates appeals for credits with menacing statements about some "plot among the banks" to "dump a mass of money" in the country, while another official publicly accuses foreign partners of delivering substandard goods the day before appealing to these same partners for urgent aid?

But the main thing is that our integration into the world community is predetermined not by today's problems and not only by economic interests. It is an objective trend and is based on historical, religious, and philosophical factors and an understanding that we are an inalienable part of the world. And the earlier this objective trend is realized, the more chances there are of success.

New Conditions of Cooperation

Today there is every prerequisite for the emergence of conditions favoring the start of a qualitatively new policy of cooperation between the USSR and the leading countries of the world.

Recently signs have emerged of an improvement in the political situation in the country. The retreat from confrontation is the "Nine plus One," the end of the miners' strikes, and much else. In addition society is "swallowing" the increase in prices and adapting to the new economic situation.

But the balance is unstable and could be "disrupted" by social and interethnic problems unless the first accords and declarations are followed by joint practical actions and unless we shift to a policy of results.

The world community, gradually "retreating" from the conflict in the Persian Gulf, is paying increasing attention to the reforms in East Europe and the USSR.

The consultations held in recent weeks attest to the sufficiently high level of readiness of some Western countries for collaboration if the necessary steps are taken on our side. Let us note that situations favoring the pursuit of a policy of cooperation and large-scale programs—both inside and outside the country—do not arise often. Thus, after the accords between Gorbachev and Yeltsin in July-September 1990 there followed a relatively long period of overt confrontation before a rapprochement between the country's main political forces was noted again. Do we have the right again to let slip a moment convenient for the start of actions?

The implementation of economic transformations in cooperation with the most developed countries gives us a chance, an opportunity for an "organized return" to the world economy and more widely to the world community. Conditions will appear for the use of all common human experience to overcome our lag.

Economic cooperation will give impetus to the activation of contacts between people in all fields—science, culture, and business. Friendly relations will be established with citizens of other countries. Opportunities will increase to replace hopelessly obsolete technologies in many sectors of the economy—and that means an increase in the production of goods, the easing of ecological problems, and the improvement of working conditions. It will be considerably easier to find the solution to problems arising during the transformations themselves.

Economic reforms have to be implemented under conditions of the profound recession and they demand substantial resources. Retraining the unemployed involves serious expenditure. To introduce the convertibility of the ruble we need certain currency reserves—we do not have them today. Finally, colossal funds are needed for the structural perestroyka of the economy—many sectors will have to be created virtually from scratch.

We must find the bulk of the funds for this in our own country—by reducing ineffective production facilities, overcoming thriftlessness and enormous losses, and so forth. But in the most crucial period—the "lowest" point of the recession, of mass unemployment and inflation—direct resource support from the developed countries would be a very great help.

Finally, a clearly stated program of cooperation will help to preserve a single economic space within the framework of the new Union, intensifying the interest of all republics in the joint solution of economic problems. Those who do not want to take part in the common economic program—that is their right—will be able to assess their losses for themselves.

But the West is also objectively interested in closer cooperation with the USSR, in the creation of a mixed economy in our country, and in the conservation of the embryonic democratic institutions. That interest has two sides—inevitability and cost.

Let us begin with the former. Many people in the West have perhaps now adopted the following position: It is unclear what is happening in the Soviet Union and efforts and funds could be spent in vain; let's wait until the situation is settled and then we will decide how to act. A sensible position, but only at first glance.

One cannot "fence oneself off" from our country by allowing events to develop by themselves. Not only

because the USSR occupies one-eighth of the world's territory. There is also its very large nuclear potential. There are its stocks of chemical and bacteriological weapons, dozens of nuclear electric power stations, and many other industrial establishments. In the event of the escalation of violence in the country this will not be forgotten—the lesson of Chernobyl is too graphic.

The economy of the USSR is part of the world economy, albeit a rather isolated part. But it is here that there are traditional sources of raw material and sales markets for the output of the countries of East Europe, which is also experiencing difficult times. Hundreds of firms in the developed countries are geared to the fulfillment of Soviet orders. If an uncontrolled crisis in the USSR coincides with a general recession in the world economy and any major international conflicts—there will be no way of avoiding a serious destabilization of the world economic order.

And will the escalation of interethnic conflicts in the USSR, inevitable if the single economy and state is destroyed, not lead to the intensification of similar conflicts in other countries, primarily among our neighbors?

The list of such questions could be extended, but one thing is clear—one way or another the world community, and primarily the developed countries, will have to take part in resolving the Soviet Union's problems. And if that is so then the question of cost arises.

The developed countries are interested in minimizing their expenditure on supporting the transformations in the USSR—that is natural. But after all the earlier the cooperation program begins, the less expense and effort it will require from our partners. As long as the larger part of the economic potential is retained, as long as state institutes operate, as long as the economic recession can still be controlled, outside support will be a very important addition, but still only an addition, to our own efforts. But with every year and recently with literally every month the proportions between the Soviet economy's own potential and resources and outside support necessary to overcome the crisis are changing in the latter's favor. The price of the adverse consequences of the uncontrolled development of events in the USSR and the destruction of its economic potential will undoubtedly exceed many times over for the whole world the expenditure required by a cooperation program.

That is why it is time to think seriously about what the program for collaboration between the developed countries and the Soviet Union could be like.

Program of Collaboration [subhead]

Obviously, this should not be a purely economic plan, although support for economic transformations will become an important part of joint actions. It should also reflect problems of arms limitation and disarmament, collaboration in resolving international conflicts, humanitarian cooperation—all that should scale new heights.

Actually, economic cooperation is not simply aid in the form of food, consumer goods, and hard currency, as is usually supposed. We see it as a joint program of actions geared to a period of three to five years and including stages with specific goals and mutual commitments. On our side there must be resolute actions to create a mixed economy: the reduction of state spending and the abolition of the budget deficit; the devaluation of the ruble and the gradual transition to its convertibility; privatization and demonopolization of state property. The structural perestroyka of the economy in favor of its consumer sector and the renewal of technologies will be required.

Only such an economic policy will give hope of a way out of the crisis and of a return on the funds invested.

Forms of cooperation with foreign partners can be varied:

—technical support for reforms (the joint preparation of economic legislation, the provision of know-how, consultations and work by foreign specialists, expert appraisal;

—the training of cadres;

—work to settle the problem of the country's foreign debt;

—the granting of Most Favored Nation status in trade to the USSR, participation in international economic organizations; the repeal of various restrictions;

—investments in accordance with agreed priorities—humanitarian aid at the most complex period.

The question of money in this program plays an important role, but not the main one—everything will be determined by the logic of the transformations. Money will perform the function of a shock absorber for social expenses and upheavals.

The implementation of this program is possible only with the conservation of political stability in the country and the development of democratic institutions. That can be ensured by the pursuit of a policy of "social consensus" within the Union.

We understand this policy not as a unique measure but as a prolonged negotiation process encompassing economic agreements, questions of the future state structure, and the settlement of interethnic conflicts.

The policy of "social consensus" can lend stability to the new institutions of representative democracy and ensure broader public support for the decisions which are taken by enlisting all the main political forces to their elaboration.

In our opinion, the preparation and holding of negotiations should be initiated by the power structures on the basis of mutual concessions and the renunciation of unrealistic demands. In other words it is not the declared but the real desire to reach agreement which is essential.

That a policy of "social consensus" can bring success is borne out in particular by the examples of the accords reached between the main social forces in postwar West Germany when implementing the Erhard reforms, in Spain after the Franco regime, and in other countries.

Obvious Answers to Obvious Questions [subhead]

And in conclusion, a few answers to perfectly obvious questions.

What preliminary conditions may be set for us? The special feature of the situation is that the political conditions which could be set for us have in fact already been fulfilled—for instance the "Nine plus One" statement speaks unambiguously of the election of new organs of power, of the redistribution of powers in favor of the republics, and of a precise sphere of responsibility for each level of management. Nationwide elections for Russian president will be held soon. And what can be said of economic conditions—after all, no one will carry out the reform for us.

Will we not lose our independence? Indeed, the ordinary idea of independence based on isolation from the world will have to be reviewed. For a long time we were proud of our "exclusiveness" until we began to realize that the gulf in development between the USSR and the rest of the world is not diminishing but growing. Economic isolation has in fact resulted in such dependence on imports that the lack of currency this year threatens to paralyze many sectors of industry.

In turn, our partners in the West will obviously have to renounce their customary ideas of the advantage contained in the formula: "The worse things are in the USSR, the better." Understandably, the Union is no longer an adversary in pursuing policy today.

And finally, about the chances for success of a policy of cooperation. They are undoubted. It is clear that in any case the pursuit of a policy of "social consensus" and the implementation of economic reforms in cooperation with the West will encounter many complexities both inside and outside the country. And the complexities are not restricted to the economy itself—there are also problems of disarmament, the question of mutual trust, and the certainty of our domestic policy. Much will also depend on the professionalism of politicians and diplomats. But if we choose the path of integration into the world community, then we must act immediately while we are still able to travel that path in an organized manner. It looks as though there are no other chances.

If someone sees another prospect of development, we would like to hear his arguments.

SCIENTIFIC

'Resurs-F' Satellite Launched 21 May

LD2205114191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1031 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 22 May (TASS)—A regular artificial earth satellite, 'Resurs-F', was launched in the USSR on Tuesday [21 May] by a 'Soyuz' carrier rocket. It is designed to carry out widescale, multi-zonal, and spectrozonal photography, with the purpose of continuing research into the earth's natural resources in the interests of various branches of the USSR national economy and solving the tasks of ecology and international cooperation.

The satellite has been placed in an orbit with the following parameters: Initial period of revolution—88.8 minutes; apogee—274 km; perigee—194 km; orbital inclination 82.3 degrees.

The apparatus aboard the satellite is working normally.

Progress of Soviet-British Space Mission Reported

LD2105192191 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Rena Kuznetsova]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—Helen Sharman, the British researcher on board the Soviet space station Mir has been granted the best living quarters aboard the station—a room with a view of the earth—by her male colleagues—members of the Soviet-British space crew.

Cosmonauts Viktor Afanasyev, Musa Manarov, Anatoliy Artsebarskiy, Sergey Krikalev and Helen Sharman have been working on board the station for two days already.

A spokesman for the Mission Control Centre told TASS that the cosmonauts devoted their efforts on Tuesday to technological and biotechnological experiments.

The Soviet-British crew's mission programme includes space biology research. A set of devices and biological samples have been delivered on board to test possible technologies for creating promising life-support systems using well-developed plants.

Helen Sharman is busy doing a series of experiments to identify the impact of raw space on the properties of construction materials.

The Vita installation is used to carry on the complex experiment which began on May 20 to study the dynamics and peculiarities of the growth of complex cell cultures capable of producing biologically active substances.

All five cosmonauts are feeling fine. Specialists in the mission control centre noted that Helen Sharman has well adjusted to zero-gravity.

The mission is due to end on May 26. Back on earth, Helen will mark her 28th birth anniversary on May 30. Her age is now known to all people on earth so there is no point in keeping mum about the occasion. After all, her age is an asset which there is no need to conceal.

Crew Conducts Experiments

LD2205122591 Moscow TASS in English 1200 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS correspondent at Mission Control Centre]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—The Soviet-British space team aboard the Mir space station today were busy doing medical, biological, technological and biotechnological experiments.

Briton Helen Sharman used an instrument called reflotron to conduct biochemical blood analyses in order to increase information about the peculiarities of a human organism's adaptation to space.

She will also perform an experiment to evaluate an equipment operator's efficiency in weightlessness.

The team, who also include Soviet cosmonauts Anatoliy Artsebarskiy and Sergey Krikalev, started experiments in the Svetoblok, Vazon and Magnitogravistat greenhouses to study possibilities to grow higher plants in zero gravity.

In addition to other work, Artsebarskiy and Krikalev are getting briefings from the station's resident crew of Viktor Afanasyev and Musa Manarov, whom they are going to replace, on the whereabouts of various equipment and the peculiarities of operating on-board systems.

'Space Dialogue' With European Firms Begins

PM2205132591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 May 91 Second Edition p 1

[TASS correspondent L. Dunayeva report: "Space Dialogue"]

[Text] Moscow, 15 May—A meeting involving leaders of foremost Soviet and European aerospace firms closed today with an accord on cooperation in and cadre training for the aerospace industry and on conversion studies. Scientists and business people from Belgian, British, German, and other Western firms took part in the work of the first meeting, entitled "Soviet-European Industrial Space Dialogue."

They had an extensive exchange of opinions on the use of satellites in establishing meteorology and communications systems and obtaining ultra-pure substances in space and on ways of shipping them back to earth. The problem of energy procurement and transfer in space using laser beams aroused great interest. It was noted that the incipient conversion in the USSR will make it possible to utilize defense sectors' scientific potential in metallurgy, machine building, and electronics.

The development of the space industry urgently requires special cadres. Their training is being undertaken by the "Kosmos" academic scientific center set up at the Moscow Aviation Institute. O. Alifanov, the center's general director, said during a conversation with a TASS correspondent that both Soviet and foreign students will receive instruction at the aerospace school.

Baltic Republics

New Incidents on Latvian-Lithuanian Border

LD2305090891 Moscow TASS in English 0845 GMT 23 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga May 23 TASS—The Latvian customs department reports today that "attacks were made" on five customs houses on the Latvian-Lithuanian border today between 02:00 and 07:00. In the opinion of the customs department, the attacks were mounted by the all-Union Interior Ministry Special Task Force.

The department's spokesman alleged that customs officers and militiamen "were beaten, and firearms were seized from militiamen". Fire was lit up to all the customs houses.

Landsbergis Addresses Lithuanian Supreme Council

LD2205233291

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 0915 GMT on 22 May carries a 40-minute report on the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius on 22 May. The announcer say that Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis and Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius both spoke at the session.

A recording of Landsbergis' speech is broadcast in which he speaks of the 21 May session of the Salcininkai Rayon Council. He says the council's resolution was "probably" prepared in advance. He says: "It is the most crude provocation against the Lithuanian constitutional order and sovereignty. It states, as before, that the Soviet Union's laws are valid in that part of Lithuania." Landsbergis notes that the resolution provides for "the abolition of all state institutions in the rayon which have been set up and are operating in accordance with Lithuania's laws." He says that although this resolution is invalid, it means a challenge is going on for confrontations.

Landsbergis continues: "This is being done at the most difficult time for us, when the attacks of the military have become more frequent. It seems that our customs services are being methodically eliminated. There is also such an emotional intention directed against our country's defense service.

"Thus, the Salcininkai Rayon Council which, as you know, is being led by the CPSU—which has an emissar coming from the Moscow CPSU Central Committee—is now making a constitutional challenge."

Landsbergis refers to today's congress of Polish deputies, saying that he has been personally politely invited to the congress, and that he is going there. He says it is difficult to say what forces are dominating there and what resolutions will be adopted.

Landsbergis next speaks on a planned meeting of agricultural workers protesting against Supreme Council actions: "I have expressed my view and asked that such a meeting not be organized this week."

Landsbergis continues: "The general political situation is such that the consolidation of Lithuania's independence, this main issue, may enter a decisive stage next June or July, when some people sign the union treaty, and others will experience maximum political, military, economic pressure and various provocations in order to break us. We will be among those against whom attempts will be made to break us, and this escalation is already in progress. It is being implemented in a planned and consistent manner. "This will be the greatest test for Lithuania, greater than ever before. It will be a test to all political forces, too. We will either advance toward independence united, leaving behind the squaring of accounts and competitions, possible struggles for power now, the collection of points for the division of power, or we will not be able to do this, we will be vulnerable and will have to fight on three fronts instead of on one. This will be a test for us, and for this parliament. Thank you for your attention".

In response to a deputy's question, Landsbergis replies that he would be making a report to parliament about his visit to the United States and that a letter by Stelmachowski, marshal of the Polish Sejm, indicated that he hoped Lithuanians would reach an agreement which is essential to both nations.

The announcer says that Prime Minister Vagnorius spoke next. Vagnorius said: "I am disturbed not by the fact that the south eastern Lithuanian region may proclaim to be a Polish autonomous area and thus maintain closer relations with Poland—in examining various problems each day, I am disturbed by the fact that they more often speak not about Poland, but about the Soviet Union, Soviet agreements, Soviet Lithuania. In other words, an impression is created that to some people there, the Polish problem is only a cover to solve political and ideological obsolete issues. It seems that this is so, only some people understand it and support it consciously, other people do not understand."

The announcer says Vagnorius announced that Navickas, minister of economy, has tendered his resignation. The deputies accepted the resignation and Navickas was instructed to continue his duties until another minister of economy is appointed.

Urges Destruction of 'Diabolical Plans'

LD2205151191 Moscow TASS in English 1056 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius May 22 TASS—Delivering an address on Lithuania's independent T.V. channel at midnight on

Tuesday, Chairman of the Republic's Supreme Soviet Vytautas Landsbergis urged Lithuanians to "destroy diabolical plans".

He said the current political situation in Lithuania is strikingly similar to the situation in the republic on the eve of the tragic events in Vilnius last January.

He cited support for Polish autonomy by the Congress of Deputies of the Vilnius region, Thursday's scheduled protest rally by the Union of Lithuanian Peasants against the authorities' agrarian policy, the recent tragic incidents on the Lithuanian-Belorussian border, and, as he put it, "the large-scale movement of Soviet troops."

Landsbergis asserted that these measures are "directed by Moscow". He urged peasants not to go to the rally in Vilnius, or, at least, not to gather near Parliament but in the park on the outskirts of the Lithuanian capital.

Landsbergis asked heads of the Peasants' Union to support his call, but the sponsors of the rally have not reported any changes in plans.

Salcininkai Council Resolutions Criticized

OW2305012291 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] The head of Lithuania's Supreme Council, Vytautas Landsbergis, spoke in parliament on Wednesday and described the recent decision by the District Council of Salcininkai to obey the laws of the Soviet Union as "the most outrageous of all provocations against Lithuania's sovereignty and constitutional order."

He referred to the council's ruling that Lithuanian state structures—border posts and custom checkpoints along the border with Belorussia—be scrapped on the Salcininkai district's territory as "an act exceeding the local authorities' powers" and "a juridically ineffective" decision aimed at fomenting tensions at a time when the military are "consistently workling to liquidate Lithuania's custom services." According to Mr. Landsbergis, the CPSU-controlled Salcininkai Council is "challenging Lithuania's leadership and constitution."

BF's [BALTFAX's] correspondent stresses the point that the government of Lithuania has canceled the Salcininkai Council's decision concerning the removal of custom checkpoints and border posts from the border with Belorussia.

Desputies from the Vilnius and Salcininkai districts are holding a congress in the village of Mostiskes on Wednesday, and are planning to proclaim the autonomy of the Vilnius Region embracing both the districts.

V. Landsbergis confirmed the fact that he had been invited to attend the congress, and said he would accept the invitation.

Earlier, the Lithuanian leadership described attempts to proclaim unilateral autonomies as "anti-constitutional" and as "no more than recommendations for the republic's Supreme Council." Later this month parliamentarians are scheduled to discuss a draft law on Lithuania's administrative division providing for the autonomy of the Vilnius Region.

Landsbergis Sees 'Provocation' in Salcininkai Move

LD2205202191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1930 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Salcininkai (Lithuania), 22 May. (TASS) [dateline as received]—"Customs posts within the territory of Salcininkai rayon are to be abolished, and the activities of the units of the department for the protection of the country are to be suspended until the status of state relations between the USSR and Lithuania is determined." This decision was adopted at a session of the rayon soviet which took place here.

The decision states that the activities of these services are being examined and strengthened at an accelerated rate, which has created a stained situation; in the past few days this has resulted in several deaths, and it is sowing discord between the inhabitants of Salcininkai rayon of Lithuania and Voronovskiy rayon of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic."

The session instructed the rayon's local government to "expel these services from the premises of the local government within two days." The rayon internal affairs department was instructed "to ensure the fulfillment of the session's decisions."

The rayon soviet's decision evoked a sharp reaction from the republic's authorities. Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Vytautas Landsbergis called it "a provocation" in his address at the congress of deputies of all levels of the Vilnius region.

The session of the Salcininkai rayon soviet envisaged that "in the event of aggressive actions on the part of the republic's leadership, the rayon soviet reserves the right to appeal for assistance to the appropriate sectors of the USSR and of the world community."

Soviet Paratroops Seen at Salcininkai, Lithuania

LD2205231491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2130 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] It became known after last night and was made public at a news briefing in parliament this morning that two battalions of the Pskov paratrooper division have been stationed by the Porechye settlement in Belorussia, in the vicinithy of the Lithuanian border.

Unofficial sources say that two companies of Soviet troops are staying along the Ratnycia rivulet in the district of Varena. Up to 1939 this rivulet served as a

demarcation line between Lithuania and Poland when the latter held under its occupation a large area of Lithuanian land.

Today a top official of the national defense department told Radio Vilnius that Soviet paratroopers had also been spotted in Salcininkai district, about 50 km south of Vilnius.

Lithuanian View on U.S. Credit for USSR

LD1705133191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 17 May 91

[Text] At today's briefing at the Supreme Council, press spokesman Audrius Azubalis announced the official stand of the Republic of Lithuania regarding a U.S. Senate resolution providing for a $1.5 billion credit to the Soviet Union.

The Lithuanian press spokesman said that this support, if granted, should also be useful to Lithuania. The government of the United States, like the governments of other Western states, is familiar with the requests of the Baltic states and the Russian Republic to obtain economic aid not through the center but directly. The Senate resolution contains an important passage stating that this aid should be granted to the Baltic states and those republics of the Soviet Union that did not sign the Union treaty. Therefore this decision should be regarded in a very businesslike manner. If Moscow does [words indistinct] aid to Lithuania, we are not going to refuse it. Whether we will succeed in doing this and what kind of political speculations could arise in Moscow from all this, we can only guess, remembering our bitter experience in relations with the Soviet Union.

If the Baltic countries do not receive aid via Moscow, this would be, above all, a blow to the political prestige of the United States.

Conference of Lithuanian 'Right-Wing Forces'

LD2105185791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2130 GMT 20 May 91

[Excerpts] Last Saturday the consultative council of Lithuania's political parties and movements held a conference in Vilnius that upgraded the council to the status of a coordinating body. Since now on the coordinating council will have a permanently functioning secretariat.

The consultative council of Lithuania's right-wing political parties and movements was set up last year. During the Saturday conference, where those forces were represented in large numbers, a decision was reached to ally more closely and to outline a concrete plan of action.

The leader of Lithuania's Independence Party Virgilijus Cepaitis defined the objectives of the conference as follows: We have convened because it is a rather important moment for Lithuania. The situation in Lithuania is not very good. There are attempts to destabilize it, to stage strikes and pickets to build up tension in Lithuania. On the other hand, the talks with Moscow are imminent. Lithuania has won certain international recognition and the first steps of the new Lithuanian Government are starting to yield some results. Since we back up this government we want to ascertain what we can offer it. Thus we are trying to map out a constructive program, he said.

Taking part in the conference of right-wing forces were high-ranking Lithuanian government officials, majority MP's as well as some ministers. Towards the end, legislature Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, who had just returned from the USA and Germany, arrived and addressed the conference.

The speakers at the conference analyzed in detail the current situation in Lithuania, emphasizing the big threat to Lithuania's independence not only from external forces but from domestic ones too. The most frequently mentioned amongst such was the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, the former independent Communist Party, and the organizations linked with it.

The statements adopted by the political coordinating council drew attention to the fact that those organizations had been lately yielding to the semi-independence version proposed by the Kremlin. The so-called opposition forces received a broad range of assessments, from proposals not to pay much attention to them to labeling them the fifth column.

Meanwhile, in the opinion of the organizers, the conference should not be interpreted as a response to the forces calling themselves opposition, including Lithuania's Future Forum, which has been lately criticizing the legislature for its inflexible policy towards the Soviet Union.

Chairman of Lithuania's Democratic party Saulius Peceliunas explained his stand to Radio Vilnius: All the forces in Lithuania will sooner or later split into two pyramids, the right and the left, and Lithuania's political system must stand on two legs. If the left side is already trying to set up structures and coordinate its actions, this conference is an attempt of the right to do the same. We are trying to stand Lithuania's social-political system on two legs, since in any case elections will sooner or later be held in Lithuania, and it is absolutely clear that one single party, whatever its orientation, will be defeated. The elections will be won by some or other coalition, and such a coalition must have its own structure. The people must know who is on who's side, he said.

In the opinion of some participants in the conference, the right-wing forces should have allied more on Saturday by automatically admitting into the political coordinating council those right-wing organizations which had observer status up to this time. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, MP [member of parliament] Vidmantas Ziemelis, who does not belong to the political coordinating council but attended the conference as observer,

told Radio Vilnius that the conference's principle objectives have been achieved. He said: The conference attained its objecives since it consolidated the forces which are aware of the impending danger to Lithuania, not only from the East but from internal forces too, which disapprove of the legislature's policy in consolidating Lithuania's independence, and which would like to keep up friendlier relations with Moscow, to make concessions to it and then come to terms with it in the most negative sense.

Lithuanian Draft Law on Polish Autonomy Published

OW2205052591 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1800 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Deputies of the Vilnius region open the third stage of their 2d congress in Salcininkai on Wednesday, to discuss a draft law "On the Statute of the Polish National-Territorial Region of Vilnius" prepared by the congress's coordinating council.

On Tuesday the district newspaper ZAVETY LENINA in Salcininkai carried the text of the draft, under which "the Polish national- territorial region of Vilnius shall be a democratic law-ruled autonomous administrative-territorial entity within Lithuania acting on the basis of the Statute of the Vilnius Region adopted by the Sejm of the region and written into an appropriate Lithuanian law."

The region's supreme legislative body, the Sejm, will consist of 75 members elected for a term of 5 years. It will be expected to pass laws and resolutions, elect a court of law, appoint the region's Procurator, enforce security measures, etc.

Under the draft law, each citizen of the Vilnius region will simultaneously be a citizens of Lithuania and will have the right to request also Soviet and Polish citizenships.

The region will have a flag, coat-of-arms and anthem of its own.

The Lithuanian press reported last week on a meeting in Moscow between representatives of the Salcininkai district and the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities, Rafik Nishanov, and gave it to be understood that Mr. Nishanov had supported the idea of setting up a Polish autonomy of the proposed kind.

On Monday, the head of Lithuania's Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis told journalists that "any decisions concerning Lithuania's administrative division that have not been approved by the republic's parliament will have no juridical force." The likely decision by the congress of Vilnius region deputies to set up a Polish autonomy on the region's territory would, according to Landsbergis, be viewed by the Lithuanian Supreme Council as no more than a "recommendation".

Mr. Landsbergis did not rule out the possibility that the Center might try to "forcibly divide Lithuania."

Moscow 'Procrastination' Over Talks Viewed

PM2205122791 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 14 May 91 p 1

[Announcement by Lithuanian State Delegation: "Who Does Not Want Talks"]

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic State Delegation to the Interstate Talks with the USSR has issued the following announcement:

At the Lithuanian Republic and USSR delegations' third official working meeting in Moscow 4 April 1991, it was agreed that the next official meeting would beheld in late April-early May this year. At this meeting between the delegations, the subject matter for future talks between 11 expert groups was also confirmed, and it was decided that a joint working group would be set up to coordinate the work of the expert groups and to prepare the official delegations' meetings. Each side was to name the group members and leaders and inform the other accordingly before the next official meeting between the delegations. The expert groups should have started work back in April, and the joint working groups should have prepared the forthcoming meeting between the delegations.

Although we are already almost two-thirds of the way through May, not one of the said agreements has been implemented, and the reason for this is procrastination on the part of the Soviet Union. Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, sent a telegram to Vitaliy Doguzhiyev, USSR first deputy prime minister and leader of the Soviet delegation, expressing concern at the lack of progress in preparations for the talks. Regret is expressed that the agreements are not being honored, that a time and place for the next meeting has still not been set, and that up to now it has been impossible to establish contacts either with Doguzhiyev himself or with the other authorized representatives of the USSR delegation despite repeated efforts to do so. The telegram contains a request to appoint the leaders of the expert groups and the joint working group so that they can begin their work.

RSFSR

22 May People's Congress Proceedings Reported

LD2205221691

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1900 GMT on 22 May begins to carry a program including recorded excerpts of the proceedings of the Fourth Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Congress of People's Deputies session at the Kremlin in Moscow on 22 May.

Vladimir Petrovich Lukin, chairman of the RSFSR Foreign Relations Committee, starts proceedings by asking the congress to agree to pass a message on the

Gandhi assassination. Deputies rise for minute's silence. Boris Yeltsin, session chairman, says the presidium is going to draft the message.

Deputy Viktor Alekseyevich Yegorov says he thinks most deputies want to end the debate on the presidential law. Deputy Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pavlov says the Communists no longer present a viable political force, and that was proved by Polozkov's [RFSFR Communist Party leader] statements. He calls the alliance between Democratic Russia and the Communists as embodied by Yeltsin and his running mate Rutskoy an unnatural symbiosis. He says he will not be voting for Yeltsin.

A vote is taken to allow presidential candidates Makashov and Zhirinovskiy to speak.

At 1913 GMT, Makashov says that he wants encouragement for genuine cooperatives. There should be measures to stop Russia from being bought up by foreign capital, he says. He wants help for veterans, proper conditions for returning servicemen, and a revival of patriotism. He challenges Yeltsin to a television debate without assistants or advisers. He will take steps against idlers and spongers. If he does not fulfill his promises, he says he will let deputies crucify him on the congress platform.

At 1920 GMT candidate Zhirinovskiy says the RSFSR presidential elections should be postponed because the campaign as currently scheduled is too brief, and he hands an appeal on this to the platform. There has never been a state in the world where a president was elected in 20 days. The 12 June elections will not be free, he says.

Ruslan Khasbulatov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, says some presidential candidates are casting doubt on decisions already made, and they should not be doing this. The idea that the law on elections was drafted without due consideration is an illusion, he says. He outlines the history of the legislation, and demonstrates that all serious remarks from deputies were taken into account, and proper majorities were achieved. He says one particular measure would have been an incitement to separatism, which was not accepted: a minority would have had too much influence on the majority.

At 1933 GMT Sergey Mikhaylovich Shakhray, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Legislation Committee, notes specific suggestions from deputies on provisions of the Presidency Law. He asks the congress to approve the law. A vote on the presidential law "as a whole" passes.

At 1941 GMT an unidentified deputy says he is worried about the power of the constitutional court. Yeltsin says this will be discussed in the context of the constitutional debate.

Georgiy Zhukov, chairman of the Committee for Local Soviets and Development of Local Self-Government, reads out the committee's report on constitutional amendments and addenda in light of legislation on local self-government, outlining some of the main provisions and explaining the reasons behind them. The law on the amendments has to be passed at this congress, he says. He outlines the relevant articles.

Yeltsin calls for a debate. (?Zhigurin), of the Committee on Architecture and Town Planning, speaks. He says a combination of posts of soviet chairman and ispolkom (soviet executive committee) chairman needs to be permitted at least to oblast level, otherwise it will be impossible to get anything done. A local self-government bill must be flexible, he says.

Deputy (?Ploskov) speaks next, indicating that he favors division of legislative and executive power. Deputy Putilov criticizes various sections of the law on local self-government, but says he will vote for the draft on changes to the Constitution.

Deputy Mikhaylov from Kalmykia talks about mistakes made in the original law on enterprises and the steps needed to correct them, and about the chaotic state of executive power now, with bodies issuing conflicting decisions. He endorses the draft.

At 2029 GMT Deputy (?Balovnev) reassures local soviet deputies and executive members that they are not going to lose their posts overnight. The amendment allowing the Supreme Soviet to force local elections where the law is being infringed is useful and such provisions already exist in Belorussia, he says.

Deputy Serdyukov speaks about the importance of removing party control at all levels. He says a system of state-run monitoring of implementation of decisions is needed. He criticizes the 12 June date for elections, saying more time is needed to give candidates a truly democratic chance.

At 2036 GMT Yeltsin calls for a vote on the resolution. A total of 711 vote for the draft, 23 vote against. Yeltsin says a meeting with deputies from North Ossetia has been held in connection with this law. A document is being drafted and will be distributed, he says.

Kazakov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, reports on the candidacies for presidential election which have been registered. Ryzhkov is shown in hall as his name is mentioned.

At 2040 GMT Khasbulatov, now chairing, gives Zhirinovskiy the floor to speak as a presidential candidate. Zhirinovskiy says the main point of his election program is to put a stop to the conflict between Russia and the center. The nationalities question needs a proper solution, he says. He lists powers which should be delegated to the federation by its units, which should not be divided along ethnic lines. He says Russians are a deprived minority in some national republics, and promises that he would move the residence of the Russian President to the Kremlin. He would put a stop to the anti-communist campaign which is going on in some

places. Zhirinovskiy says he would issue a joint declaration with the USSR president on the day after his election that all conflict was over. On the economy, he says all restrictions on business must be eliminated, and that his proposals for cuts in military spending have been distorted. He contends that his policies will not be spoiled by ideological dogma. Zhirinovskiy boasts of his Turkish language ability. He says he can talk French to the French president, German to the Germans, and so on. He has already had a chat with Genscher in German. Let us make Russia rich, so the republics want to join it instead of seceding, says Zhirinovskiy. He says 12 June is too early for the election. The announcer says Zhirinovskiy answered questions after his 20-minute speech. One deputy is shown demanding an apology for Armenia and Azerbaijan, which he feels were insulted in Zhirinovskiy's speech.

At 2102 GMT other business is discussed. A deputy speaks about unnecessary injury rate among servicemen. A committee of parents of servicemen has been formed, which will be looking into deaths of servicemen, he says. The announcer says other questions were also discussed.

Yeltsin Views Opening Session

OW2305094891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0930 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] The chairman of the Russian parliament Boris Yeltsin has said that the first day of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia proceeded normally, in a business-like atmosphere, not worse than had been expected. He made the statement, in an interview with IF's [INTERFAX's] Vyacheslav Terekhov.

"The congress started in a more business-like mood than the previous one, he said, but the variety of political thoughts naturally influences its course. This is normal. That is the way it should be. It is time we got used to the existence of different viewpoints and positions."

The Russian leader felt that the Congress would approve the three draft laws on its agenda.

Yeltsin who is running for presidency in Russia thinks that out of the other candidates the greatest number of votes would be collected by Nikolay Ryzhkov.

In reply to a question about his relations with Mikhail gorbachev he said: "My relations with the President are normal and business-like. I think this will serve to consolidate the nation as a whole."

'Compromise' in North Ossetia Cited

LD2205174991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] The Fourth Russian Congress of People's Deputies continued work today. During the morning sitting the discussion which started the day before on the report "On the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] president and on amendments and additions to the RSFSR Constitution (Basic Law) was resumed. The congress adopted a decision endorsing the RSFSR law on the president by a majority of votes.

The deputies also heard a report on the RSFSR draft law on amendments and additions to the RSFSR Constitution in connection with the reform of local self-government.

Just before the start of the evening sitting, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, announced that, during the interval he had met the group of deputies from North Ossetia who had left the Hall of Sittings during the first day of the congress as a protest against the law on the repressed peoples, adopted by Russia's Supreme Soviet. Judging by the delegation's statement, the law had sharply exacerbated the situation in North Ossetia. Yeltsin stressed that a compromise had been found.

The congress will continue its work tomorrow.

Law on Presidency Debated

LD2205135591 Moscow TASS in English 1320 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Alexandrova]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—The morning meeting of the Fourth Congress of Russian People's Deputies in its second day in the Kremlin began with a minute's silence in tribute to the memory of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who was killed on Tuesday as a result of a terrorist act.

Today the people's deputies continued debating the report on the law on president of the Russian Federation and draft law on amendments and supplements to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The report was delivered on Tuesday by Chairman of the Russian Parliamentary Committee Sergey Shakhray. The law on president of the Russian Federation earlier adopted by the Russian parliament was endorsed by a majority vote. Under the law, [the] Russian president is the highest official of the Russian Federation and head of executive power. The document also envisages measures that prevent the head of executive power in Russia from concentrating dictatorial powers in his hands.

The endorsed law on [the] president of the Russian Federation will be included in the Constitution of the Russian Federation as a separate article. The law on amendments and supplements to the constitution of the Russian Federation remains to be endorsed. Besides amendments connected with the introduction of presidency in Russia, the fundamental law of the Russian Federation should include amendments related to the adoption by the Russian parliament in the first reading of the law on local self-government in the Russian Federation.

A report on the draft law about amendments and supplements to the constitution of the Russian Federation in connection with local self-government reform was delivered by Georgiy Zhukov, chairman of the committee on affairs of councils of people's deputies and development of self-government. He said that presidency in Russia will be effective only if all the structures of power function normally. It is essential for the implementation of self-government clearly to outline a range of questions that should be decided at local level.

In addition to the agenda, speeches were delivered at the congress by two presidential candidates who are not people's deputies of the Russian Federation, Albert Makashov and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Both actually set out their election programmes and delivered the putting off of the election from June to September-October 1991.

At the evening meeting the Congress will begin discussing and endorsing amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation clause by clause. No less than two-thirds of the votes are needed to pass them.

Deputy Warns of Authoritarianism

LD2205144991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 22 May 91

[Report by Yevgeniya Kondratyeva on the Fourth Congress of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] People's Deputies; with recorded remarks by RSFSR Deputy Pavlov]

[Text] [Kondratyeva] At the beginning of this morning's session, the deputies honored the memory of Rajiv Gandhi, an Indian prominent politician, by a minute of silence in connection with his tragic death. Then the deputies resumed the discussion they began yesterday of the report made last night, as you will recall, by Sergey Shakhray, chairman of the RSFSR committee for legislation, on RSFSR presidential laws and on amendments and addenda to the Constitution—the main law of the RSFSR. In the course of the debates, deputies voiced the most diverse views. Deputy Pavlov is on the rostrum.

[Pavlov] Yesterday it was put to us bluntly that the attitude toward Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin can be seen as a criterien for democratism. My own attitude toward Boris Nikolayevich is very good. But I did not and will not vote for him. Shakhray's remark I have in mind is his statement that those who want to move the election dates are the ones who are working to defeat Boris Nikolayevich.

But what Sergey Mikhaylovich [Shakhray] cannot understand is that just as well one can say that those who seek to rush the elections through understand that in the future it will be more difficult to gain victory. These too, are acting not in the interests of democracy but in their own selfish political interests for the benefit of their own specific political parties. I want to put this question to you:

Esteemed representatives of the Democratic Russia bloc: Do you understand that being guided by transient political interests and feeling euphoric from the struggle, you are putting your head on the block. Not to mention the communists—these have long been overcome and have long stopped being a political force. We could see that from [RSFSR Communist Party leader] Polozkov's behavior. You see, I am now deep in thought whether I should stay in the party which is being constantly disgraced and has long given up, anyway. I have been its member for a year now.

And if during the few days of the Congress we persistently rejected the attempts to impose immediate elections, but then...for some strange reason...I was ill myself so I do not know what happened to those in the hall that they scheduled the elections for 12 June. And people are laughing at us, you see, saying that it took us two months to elect people to rayon soviets. Since today we have more than 70 territories, the candidates will not be able to visit even half of them during the time left before the elections. You see, we say it is absurd to move the elections and we say that they must take place because such is the will of the people. Yes, it is true such is the will of the people. But the will of the people has nothing to say about the date. In Italy it took a year, you understand, a year to draw up the law on Presidency. We can see that our own law has not yet been properly coordinated either with the law on local self-management ready or with the union leadership.

What is at issue is not whether the president should or should not be elected, at issue is the fact that if we were to elect our first president we should do it in the way so as not to ever have any regrets, you see. And when I ask myself where Russia is going and when I can see that the Congress and the Supreme Soviet are becoming a single mode voting machine I answer that our Russia is moving toward authoritarianism. If we do not understand this then things will be bad for us.

Presidential Candidates Address Congress

LD2205124591 Moscow TASS in English 1213 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—Only the "unity of patriotic forces" can save Russia and overcome its acute economic and social crisis, General Albert Makashov, commander of troops of the Volga-Urals military district, told the Congress of Russian People's Deputies under way in Moscow today. Makashov addressed the forum as a candidate for the Russian Federation's presidency.

Presidential elections are fixed for June 12.

Makashov, who is reputed to be a firm opponent of democratic changes in the country, caused a stir in the hall. He declared "for a united and indivisible Russia within the 1945 borders, for stabilising the situation and

inter-ethnic accord, for restoring law and order and observing the Constitution and existing laws."

His economic programme includes the transfer of factories and plants to work collectives free of charge, free use of land without the right to sell it, the closure of "speculating cooperatives," the revival of a state monopoly on foreign trade and an end "to selling out Russia to foreign capital."

"I promise to restore lawfully the constitutional order under which everybody will have an obligation to work, not speculate," Makashov said. He is convinced that "food products and basic necessities would appear in the republic on this basis".

"Not a single state, even a barbaric one, elects a president in 20 days," such was the gist of the speech by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, presidential candidate and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of the USSR.

He said that during the past week-end he visited a number of Russian cities and met their residents. Zhirinovskiy said voters were not very eager to meet him. He believes this is explained by the undemocratic procedure for electing Russia's first president. Less than four weeks are allotted for canvassing.

Zhirinovskiy read out an address to the congress by three Russian presidential candidates (Zhirinovskiy, Makashov and chairman of the Kemerovo regional council Armen Tuleyev), demanding that the elections be put off until September-October 1991.

Presidential Frontrunners Established

LD2205181791 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Yuriy Kozmin]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—The Fourth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation today began its second day of work with revering the memory of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi killed in a terrorist attack.

The congress finished discussing the republican law on executive presidency in Russia, earlier passed by the Russian Parliament, and approved it. According to the law, the Russian President is the top official in the Russian Federation and head of executive power.

Deputies discussed the bill on amendments to the constitution of the Russian Federation in connection with reforms in local self-government. Chairman of the committee for local councils and developing local self-government Georgy Zhukov delivered a report on the issue.

In the afternoon, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, a presidential candidate from the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, addressed the congress. According to the law of the Russian Federation on elections of president of the Russian Federation, Zhirinovskiy has to receive support of 20 per cent of people's deputies to be included in the list of candidates.

Zhirinovskiy said it is necessary to end disputes between Russia and the centre and resolve the ethnic issue. A total of 477 deputies supported the candidate, while 417 opposed his inclusion in ballot papers, with 36 abstentions.

During elections of the Russian president on June 12, citizens of Russia will have to choose among six candidates. President of the Russian Parliament Boris Yeltsin, former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and member of the Soviet Security Council Vadim Bakatin are believed to have better chances for election.

Other candidates include commander of the Volga-Urals Military District Colonel-General Albert Makashov and chairman of the Kemerovo regional council Aman Tuleyev.

On Thursday, the congress will continue work and is expected to discuss amendments to the republican constitution.

Silayev on Yeltsin Presidency

LD2205215191 Moscow TASS in English 2111 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—"I do not see any danger—which some perceive, particularly if Boris Yeltsin is elected—in Russia's new structure of executive power—an executive Presidency," Russia's Premier Ivan Silayev told TASS today.

Silayev attends the Fourth Congress of Russia's People's Deputies. Matters connected with instituting an executive Presidency in the Russian Federation and preparations for presidential elections were the central item on the agenda of the congress that opened in the Kremlin on Tuesday.

In an evaluation of the activity of Boris Yeltsin, whom many analysts view as the main contender for Russia's Presidency, Silayev said that it was gratifying to work with this man.

Yeltsin gave his subordinates great latitude and independence, thereby ensuring, as Silayev put it, "the well-concerted work of the Supreme Soviet and the government of the republic".

Silayev rejected any assertions whatsoever about ostensibly dictatorial ways of the chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, emphasising that Yeltsin "is unlikely to make an abrupt turn and pursue a policy that would be differing from which he once proclaimed."

Upon receiving presidential powers, Yeltsin could more successfully pursue the proclaimed policy, Silayev said.

About Yeltsin's rivals, Silayev said that their chances remain serious. The Russian premier pointed out that prestige that this or that rival had enjoyed prior previously would be a decisive factor.

Asked about the chances of former Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov, Silayev said that he would not like to express his attitude to the man. "My attitude took shape long before this moment," he added.

Touching upon the economic problems of Russia, Silayev described the solution of the food problem as one of pressing issues. Evaluating the pace of the land reform, he pointed to difficulties in implementing it. Main problems, he said, arise at the local level.

The Russian premier said the government had come to terms with Western firms in order to buy agricultural machinery. Russia's farmers will receive 10,000-15,000 tractors already this year, Silayev said.

Polozkov Assails Presidency

LD2305090191 Moscow TASS in English 0745 GMT 23 May 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Surzhansky]

[Text] Moscow May 23 TASS—"The institution of the executive presidency in the Russian Federation contradicts the very idea of perestroyka aimed at society's democratisation and the development of openness," leader of Russian Communist Party Ivan Polozkov told TASS.

He is participating in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, which opened in the Kremlin on May 21.

The congress has been debating for the second day the institution of the presidency in the Russian Federation and preparations for the elections.

Polozkov stressed that "this step will lead to a personal power regime, which has never been democratic".

The institute of the presidency, as it was conceived by its masterminds, "actually means the destruction of all democratic principles and a turn from people's democracy to a kind of monarchy", Polozkov continued.

The Russian Communist leader claimed that "all this will only provoke a chain reaction in the republic, which will result in the appearance of several dozens of new presidents".

Polozkov expressed opinion that the law on Russian president was adopted by the republican parliament by violating legislative norms. He stressed that "there was juggling and deceipt" during the referendum on the Russian presidency.

Expressing his attitude to the recent joint statement by president Mikhail Gorbachev and the leaders of the nine union republics, Polozkov claimed that "this step, despite its good intentions, will result in a greater split of the union".

A political struggle began between the Communists of Russia and Democratic Russia parliamentary groups at the third Russian Congress of People's Deputies.

Some communists switched to "the democratic camp" at that time, forming a new group called "Communists for Democracy". Some regarded this fact as a split inside the republican Communist Party.

Polozkov rejected this approach to the issue. "There is no and there will be no split," he said. Although the party is experiencing some negative processes, he admitted, the Soviet Communist Party will "stand on its own feet", rejecting both ultra left-wing and ultra right-wing trends.

Candidates on 'Unequal Footing'

LD2205143291 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1014 GMT 22 May 91

[Interview with Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov, leader of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party, by "Vesti" correspondent Sergey Dorenko in Moscow; from the "Congress Diary" program—live]

[Text] [Dorenko] The leader of the Russian Communists, in today's COURIER OF THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES expressed the view that the elections being prepared for 12 June will be abnormal and wrong if they are held within this time-span. What is this view of yours related to Ivan Kuzmich?

[Polozkov] My view relates to the fact that, essentially, the candidates nominated for the post of president are finding themselves on an extremely unequal footing. The fact of the matter is that some candidates are known, well or badly, but in principle, they are already known to the electorate. While other candidates are absolutely new and interesting and they are on an unequal footing. The very raising of the issue of electing a Russian president in three weeks—and I was deeply convinced prior to this, and world practice testifies to this—is not a step toward democracy, rather three steps toward curtailing democracy.

[Dorenko] Ivan Kuzmich, world practice also shows that in all countries well-known political leaders are elected, in other words, a politician's career is not made in an election campaign. The people who always become presidents are, one way or another, well-known to the whole people long beforehand. In particular, the candidate backed by the Russian Communist Party, Nikolay Ryzhkov, former chairman of the Council of Ministers, is widely known among the people and he is also famous for at least three programs that have failed to be implemented.

[Polozkov] Now look, you are bringing me down to specific people. While I would like to bring you to the

processes of democratization. We are electing a president in Russia for the first time. Yes, we used to have the kind of cadre policy where we often used to hear it said by various leaders from the rostrum that there is no alternative to such and such a person, that such and such a person is irreplaceable, while such and such a person has no rival, and we have grown accustomed to this. As you can see, the very first steps alone toward the election, truly toward the election have immediately revaled to us several very interesting and promising candidates. And if, in the process of the election campaign, we were to give this process the opportunity of developing normally, I believe that there would be another 10 or so very interesting and talented organizers, all in all, popular people, on whom the public's attention is simply not focused today. These elections, on the other hand, are rather being based on personalities. Yes, people know Ryzhkov; yes, people know Yeltsin; yes, people in certain regions do not know Bakatin at all. But why then are we putting Bakatin, who has no less potential than Yeltsin, no less than Ryzhkov, on an unequal footing?

I have not mentioned Comrade Tuleyev. This is a very interesting person, a talented organizer. He is a bold person—I know him from the Congresses of People's Deputies, from Supreme Soviet sessions. He is a person of great potential and one about whom we are going to hear more in the future. But today, even with all our mass media, we are unable to present him even to our viewers, let alone the voters.

[Dorenko] We will do this, we will do this.

[Polozkov] Well do try.

[Dorenko] All the same, all the same, you believe that if three or four months pass before the presidential election, say, the candidate backed by the Russian Communist Party will reveal himself somehow differently and that the people's impression of Nikolay Ryzhkov will change radically?

[Polozkov] That is not at all what I think. I believe that in normal civilized countries an election campaign between candidates, say in the United States of America, will be conducted for over a year. It has already been launched there. So why should we not take from world civilization what is already running smoothly, what has been worked through, and what people have already grown used to? Why, on entering a law-governed state about which so much is being said, and proclaiming the democratization of our public life, are we immediately cutting it right down to nothing as hard as we can?

[Dorenko] You know there is a view in the congress lobbies—perhaps this is unpleasant for you—that the Communists are trying to drag out the election so that the people's worsening situation causes apathy and hostilty toward current leaders, that the election is being dragged out for this reason.

[Polozkov] Well I think that so many labels have been pinned on the Communists of Russia already that this latest one will add nothing to them. But, in principle, I believe that the 12 June election is not a lifebelt for the collapsing Russian economy, for the disastrous situation in which the Russians have found themselves. Incidentally, they have probably only ever been in such a disastrous situation during the Great Patriotic war. The election will not save them.

[Dorenko] Ivan Kuzmich, there is a movement within the Communist Party of Russia—the Communists for Leninism—which altogether rejects a presidency as such because it is a threat to Soviet power—as Nina Andreyeva said a few days ago. Are you for a presidency in Russia?

[Polozkov] I do not share Nina Andreyeva's view. But, incidentally, there are already dozens of tendencies in our Russian Communist Party, including Rutskoy's tendency. This by itself says nothing, but a presidency in Russia, firstly, is not a Russian attribute and as a Russian I have been categorically opposed to it right from when the issue was first raised, including a presidency in the USSR. It is not important what power is called. What is important is the essence of power and its efficient functioning. A presidency in Russia solves nothing and I am against the presidency because rather than an expansion of sovereignty of the people, it is a curtailment of sovereignty of the people. It leads away from democracy towards control by a single person [edinonachaliye]. In other words, a reverse process to those processes that perestroyka has proclaimed and which the people have believed in. In other words, we are beginning to turn off the restructuring processes which people have followed, to turn them back, put them into reverse.

[Dorenko] Thank you.

[Polozkov] Don't mention it.

Zhirinovskiy Seeks Union Rapprochement

LD2205180991 Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 45, leader of the USSR Liberal Democratic Party, today became Russia's sixth presidential candidate whose name will be entered in ballot papers on June 12.

He was the only contender who did not collect the necessary 100,000 signatures of constituents in his support and therefore, as a preliminary condition, was to muster not less than one-fifth of the votes of Russia's people's deputies.

Speaking today at the Congress of Russia's People's Deputies, Zhirinovsky set out his programme stating the need to do away with confrontation between Russia and the centre and to resolve the nationalities problem by renouncing the division of the country into regions on an ethnic basis.

If elected, he promised to transfer the residence of the head of Russia to the Kremlin and take measures to "stop anti-communist orgy".

Already on the first day after the election, if elected the president of Russia, Zhirinovsky is prepared to issue a statement together with the president of the USSR that the confrontation between the Russian Federation and the central administration has ended.

In the economic field, the candidate advocates the lifting of restrictions on all types of economic activity. In the sphere of foreign policy, he favours cooperation mainly with "wealthy and cultured countries".

As a result of voting at the congress, Zhirinovsky polled 477 votes (213 votes were necessary for the confirmation), with 417 deputies voting against and 36 abstaining.

After the voting, the deputies began to consider current matters.

Continuing Reportage on Presidential Election

Chances of Candidates Assessed

LD2205194591 Moscow TASS in English 1801 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS World Service observer Lyudmila Alexandrova]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—After the fourth congress of Russian People's Deputies today endorsed a law on presidency in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), it is expected to discuss candidates for the presidency of this, the largest Soviet republic.

As is known, the presidential elections are due to be held in the Russian Republic on June 12, as decreed by the third Congress of Russian People's Deputies.

The Central Election Committee has registered six candidates for presidency. The list includes Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Security Council member Vadim Bakatin, former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the Kemerovo Regional Executive Committee Aman Tuleyev and General Albert Makashov.

All of these are independent candidates: They have collected the required number of signatures—not fewer than 100,000—and do not need a formal approval by a congress. Only one of the registered candidates—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who runs from the Liberal Democratic Party,—has not collected the required number of signatures. Now he needs the approval by not less than one-fifth of deputies to start campaigning.

Most deputies believe that Boris Yeltsin is still the favourite, whose chances increased after he signed the nine-plus-one statement on April 23, thereby ceasing confrontation with Gorbachev.

However, supporters of Yeltsin's main rival and opponent Nikolay Ryzhkov believe in his victory. Incidentally, Ryzhkov is already leading in one respect—he collected more voters' signatures than any other contender—2,817,089 voters.

Boris Yeltsin is backed above all by the Democratic Russia Movement and its member-parties opposing the Soviet Communist Party, Nikolay Ryzhkov is officially supported by the Russian Communist Party.

According to analysts, the chances of the main contenders have been considerably boosted by their choice of candidates for vice-presidency. Both have opted for military men. Yeltsin invited Colonel Aleksandr Rutskoy, the initiator of the Democratic Movement in the Soviet Communist Party and the parliamentary faction 'Communists for Democracy', to run with him. Nikolay Ryzhkov opted for general Boris Gromov, first deputy minister of the USSR internal affairs. Both candidates for vice-president participated in the Afghan war.

It is difficult to say what Vadim Bakatin hopes to score. Many people believe that the former USSR interior minister, an ardent supporter of President Mikhail Gorbachev whose own position is clearly left of centre, can count on those voters who dislike both Yeltsin and Ryzhkov. Bakatin named the leader a Russian parliament chamber, Ramazan Abdulatipov of the North Caucasian Daghestan Autonomous Republic, as his second-in-command. This can win the population of the autonomous republics within the Russian Federation to his side. The March referendum revealed that Yeltsin cannot count on those.

As regards the other candidates, they are clearly "also-rans".

The June 12 elections may return no winning ticket to any of the contenders. Should none of them win a simple majority of the votes on June 12, there will have to be a second round.

Goryacheva Opposes Yeltsin

LD2205185991 Moscow TASS in English 1701 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—Russia is living through an economic and political crisis, this is how the situation in the republic was summed up by Svetlana Goryacheva, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Parliament, in an interview published in PRAVDA today. She said the crisis situation is seen from the fact that economic ties between regions, enterprises and union republics loosened. Rationing was introduced in many regions.

Society has split into two opposing camps—those who support the socialist road of development and those who support capitalism. Regrettably, the contradictions aggravated with the passage of time, which has been confirmed by the fourth Congress of People's Deputies which opened on Tuesday.

Regarding prospects for the developments in the country, Goryacheva said that the joint "address of the ten" can be regarded as the first step towards the stabilisation in general, as well as between the Russian and union leaderships.

"Nevertheless, those who know Yeltsin well are cautious in their optimism. He is an unpredictable leader. He says one thing today, and does the opposite tomorrow," said Goryacheva, one of the authors of "statement of the six" in which the deputy heads of the Russian Parliament and heads of the committees demanded early this year that Yeltsin account to an extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies.

"Quite possibly, after this dosage of criticism for confrontation, Yeltsin realised that this harmed him. Hence his 'peace' with Gorbachev", Goryacheva said.

Regarding problems of the election of Russian president, Goryacheva said that in this situation she believed she did right not to nominate herself. "As a practicing jurist, I shall be more useful in a legislative body. Besides that, I don't like the haste with which the presidency in Russia is being introduced".

The trouble is that other structures are not adjusted to presidential power, she said. Goryacheva believes that the entire structure of executive power should be reorganised before electing Russian president, and that only initial steps towards this have so far been taken.

She believes the future Russian president will be hostage to the present imperfect system of power and this will only increase the hardships of Russian people. Therefore she believes that presidency in Russia is premature until the union and federal treaties are concluded and executive power in Russia is reorganised.

Goryacheva believes it is difficult to predict who will be elected Russian president. The most prominent candidates are Yeltsin, Nikolay Ryzhkov and Vadim Bakatin.

She said the law on the procedure of presidential elections is tailor-made to suit Yeltsin. But she said confidence in him is being exhausted with every day and that his logic in this situation is understandable: To secure the still existing support of the people, and to conduct elections as soon as possible, for it may be too late tomorrow.

"I have nothing to conceal. I believe it will be a fatal mistake for the Russian people to elect Yeltsin president," Goryacheva said.

Bakatin Announces Independent Candidacy

LD2205204191 Moscow TASS in English 1900 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Vadim Bakatin, a candidate for the post of president of Russia, told a news conference today that he regards himself as an independent candidate and that he is refusing to stand for election to the post of vice-president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in the Yeltsin team.

Before the start of his election campaign, Bakatin conferred with Gorbachev. In the event of his election to the post of president of Russia and the adoption of a law on the president's non-party status, the former USSR minister of internal affairs intends to leave the CPSU and the country's Security Council.

According to him, the pursuance of a round-table policy is a guarantee of stability.

Bakatin Outlines Program

LD2205133591 Moscow TASS in English 1310 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Kozmin]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—Russian presidential candidate Vadim Bakatin has said he would prioritise creating an "open market economy" in the largest Soviet republic if he wins the Russian presidency.

The transition to market relations is possible only if austerity measures are implemented, the former Soviet interior minister, who is currently a member of the Soviet National Security Council, told reporters today.

"I am convinced I will put things in order," he said.

He pledged to forge a constructive dialogue will all political parties in Russia, interested in pulling the republic out of its crisis.

Bakatin said he supports "neither the extreme left nor the extreme right".

The presidential election in Russia has been set for June 12. The strongest contenders are Russian parliament Chairman Boris Yeltsin and former national Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

The press conference was also attended by Bakatin's vice presidential nominee, Chairman of the Russian parliament Council of Nationalities Ramazan Abdulatipov.

Commenting on ethnic relations in the republic, Abdulatipov called for measures to bolster the Russian Federation's integrity.

"However, this should not harm republics included in the Russian Federation, in terms of their sovereignty," he continued.

"This election campaign is very much like a race, and I am certain that we will win it," he said.

Polozkov Cites Decision Not To Run

OW2205081791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] First Secretary of the Russian Federation's Communist Party, Ivan Polozkov, told IF [INTERFAX] correspondent, Yevgeniy Terekhov, that he had "rejected the offer to run for presidency in the Russian Federation because," he said, "the press had turned me into such a retrograde and hard-liner that my involvement in the elections could only compromise the party."

Ivan Polozkov said that in his opinion the three candidates—Boris Yeltsin, Nikolay Ryzhkov and Vadim Bakatin—stood an equal chance of winning the election race. But, said the leader of the Rusian Federation's Communist Party, the election campaign should last for at least four months, or else "one can make a choice one will bitterly repent." Ivan Polozkov said he was sorry that "the democrats have made a race out of the election, actually depriving the people of the possibility to seriously analyse the candidates' programmes."

Asked, why in his opinion most of the candidates were members of the Communist Party, Ivan Polozkov said: "What else can one expect if the absolute majority of good, active and intelligent people are communists. That's the way things are."

Ivan Polozkov also noted that since Aleksander Rutskoy "has not violated the party rules, one cannot even raise the question of expelling him from the party." As was previously reported, Aleksander Rutskoy, the leader of the faction, Communists for Democracy, is running for the post of vice-president of the Russian Federation, with the candidate to Russia's supreme state post, Boris Yeltsin.

There have been reports lately saying that the leaders of the Communist Party "very painfully responded" to the nomination of Aleksander Rutskoy as potential vice-president.

Silayev Addresses Supreme Soviet 16 May

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[Speech by Ivan Silayev, prime minister of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow on 16 May; from the "RSFSR Supreme Soviet Session" program—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrades, esteemed chairman, I realize that it is my task to provide the information which you, Ruslan Imranovich [Khasbulatov], have just spoken about, but there were also questions there connected with so-called rumors about the true state of affairs of an exchange, or the authenticity of rumors about the exchange of corresponding banknotes, and the question of a 5 percent tax. The question of an emergency budget was also on the agenda there. However, you are tackling this, and I think I will start with the simple things—this information exists—the rumors and the authenticity of rumors on the exchange of banknotes.

The Union-republic currency committee met today, and I, given the necessary instructions, raised the question there. All the other representatives of the Council of Ministers took it up, and this is what I am authorized to announce and to inform you. It is that yet another exchange is to take place, with the withdrawal of all denominations—there are not only 50 and 100-ruble denominations, but also 25 rubles, isn't that so? Even the press is discussing this. There are no grounds for this, and there cannot be; nor is anything like this planned either in the very near future or in the forseeable future—the State Bank chairman has already said this, with the participation of all the main participants in this session. However, and clearly it is also very important for you to know this, certain actions connected with the protection of our existing ruble currency from any forgeries or any attempts at counterfeiting money—such intentions do exist. In particular, it is proposed that our small denominations, those that are known as treasury notes, these are not banknotes—you are aware that banknotes are 10 rubles and above—it is proposed to switch the of 1-ruble, 3-ruble, and 5- ruble notes to the category of banknotes.

The situation will be as follows. Today's 1-ruble, 3-ruble and 5-ruble notes will be valid, and in parallel 1-ruble, 3-ruble and 5-ruble notes with the same value will be launched, but already as banknotes. Both will be valid until gradually the old notes are phased out, until they completely disappear from circulation, and this money starts functioning normally.

I am telling you what the State Bank chairman said in the presence of all chairmen of councils of ministers and the leadership of the cabinet. In this way there will be a gradual transfer, a circulation with equal validity of both, of notes from 1 ruble to 5 rubles inclusive. At the same time the value of the banknotes will be supported with the appropriate bank assets.

As regards the 25-ruble notes, here—yes, the 10- and 25-ruble notes—similar operations will be carried out with parallel functioning of these old notes, today's as well as new ones, but again with the motive of defending against the same—shall we say—criminal actions. Evidently, these apprehensions exist. This is a world practice. That is why we were given the assurance that there will be no non-returnable exchange—what will happen is that both old and new notes will have an equal right to circulate while retaining their former value. This is what I have learned and what I am empowered to say to you in answer to these questions.

With regard to the 5 percent tax—its abolition—well, you know, comrades, that we, as one of the first, if not to say that we were the first—did not introduce, or more

correctly, we restricted the use of this 5 percent tax on the main consumer goods of the food group and on children's goods.

Afterward we brought out a number of additional documents, but in connection with the statement of the 10 in which the instruction is given to abolish the effect of this 5-percent law, tax, on virtually all consumer goods in mass demand, we implemented this in practice, having examined and having finally summed up the results at the meeting of the presidium two days ago yesterday on progress in the fulfillment of this decision. We believe that with the documents already adopted and for the greater part already issued we have already implemented this aim.

In the RSFSR the 5-percent tax only remains on a very narrow category: these are alcoholic drinks, tobacco products, coffee, and chocolate products, and cakes.

I have to tell you, comrades, that all these actions, as well as others relating to the measure adopted by us for the additional protection of some strata of our citizens, as well as canteen lunches and breakfasts at schools, lunches at secondary educational institutions and higher education institutions, all these form part of our task, and also have to be reflected in our emergency budget, 8.7 billion rubles which were not envisaged by us in the previous allowance of the state federative budget.

I apologize for the fact that I cannot tell you—if there is time I can, of course, read out all these cascades of measures which have in the end led to our abolishing everything from the standpoint of mass consumer goods, and not only foodstuffs, but non-foodstuffs, too, except for those things that I have new mentioned to you. It would probably be correct, if more detailed information comes up, for Comrade Korolev, deputy, first deputy minister of finance, to tell you about that. He has all the information.

Finally, as I understand from the agenda, there was an instruction to inform you about the progress in shaping the emergency budget. Well, first of all I have to say that the draft emergency budget has been examined fairly actively and in a fundamentally pointed manner in the relevant committees and commissions. There were very many remarks, absolutely fair remarks about it. The day before yesterday, at the Presidium, we examined the course of the work on the emergency budget. Besides its naturally specific nature, we considered it necessary fundamentally to enhance the approach to the formation in general, for the formation of emergency budgets. First, in the concept of the emergency budget itself, what its emergency nature consists of, and definite, let's say, normative approaches, in the type of income and the type of expenditure, what directions should be outside the influence of the emergency budget, and what can be, in certain proportions and to some extent, changed, and what unusual, non-traditional sources of incomes can be brought into operation in the emergency budget.

Well, I have in mind that it should be examined and confirmed once a quarter, starting from the third quarter of this year. Taking into account the fact that we cannot be unerring in adopting decisions on the entire complex of issues without having consulted with our regions and territories, we made the following decision. We organized a group headed by Comrade Skokov and consisting of our main subdivisions, the services that are in charge, that would examine the approaches to formation, the content itself proposed in the draft, the essence of it. It would analyze the remarks made by committees and commissions and would in the last few days of May again give a report on their ideas to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Then we are planning to send these ideas and the draft that has already been precisely defined to our regions and republics and at the end of the first 10 days in June—maybe either 10 or 14 June—we simply have to see and come to an agreement with the regions—hold a session of the Council of Ministers with a full complement, with the participation of the heads of the republics' councils of ministers and the executive committees of the krays and oblasts. In addition to examining several other general questions, we will discuss in detail, examine, and naturally try to gain approval for the final variant of the draft for the emergency budget. Then we will submit it for your final endorsement.

We would like—and we will come to an agreement on this—Supreme Soviet members to take part in the work of this group headed by Skokov—at least two committees of the Supreme Soviet. That is on the subject of preparation and work on the extraordinary budget. finally, the main question is information—I understand that that is how it was formulated—on the course of work on the government's program to stabilize the economy and go over to market relations. You know that this matter was considered at the Supreme Soviet Presidium. We received observations—quite a few from leaders of corresponding committees and commissions. We were given a five-day period—today is the third day of that period. Generally, we intended, and we guarantee that it will be so, that when the five days are over the program will finally be completed, taking into account—I repeat—the remarks which in the main are just and very correct, during discussion. Nonetheless, this does not mean that we are not now ready to give information on the main principled changes to the program which was handed out at the congress, and even to the one which was presented on 18 April on the Supreme Soviet—I mean the Supreme Soviet Presidium—for implementation in a period of one month. The work is continuing and, as Boris Nikolayevich aptly put it, this program must be a live organism and not a paralyzed one. Having acquired definite, clear, and concrete contours in terms of content, it will continue to function as a live organism, but also in the long term to perfect itself without distorting the main principled approaches.

As you know, since the time when the program was expounded in general outlines, social and economic—

the economic was added by Boris Nikolayevich, plus there were studies of the actual text of the program—serious events have taken place. This could not but have an effect on the introduction of corresponding changes, including a joint statement. Of course to some degree there is a certain mutual link with the Cabinet of Minister' program. Nonetheless I want to assure you that these changes which have been put in—we think that they embelish this program, and to a certain extent they strengthen it, but they absolutely do not distort its market orientation.

A little later on I will say that the program which was to you—well, I shall now let you have the final information—and was presented to you on 18 April is very similar to the original program of the cabinet of Ministers, and this is not a coincidence [sentence as heard]. Comrade Pavlov, delivering a report on his own cabinet's program at a joint sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers, stated outright that its individual thrusts, sections, and, shall we say, aspects were borrowed from the Russian program for the stabilization of the economy and transition to market relations. He stated that we.. [changes thought] they see nothing wrong in that and, actually, we did not object either. Evidently this testifies also to the fact that the center and the Union bodies alike have solidly and attentively studied our program and that to some extent they did review it. We will present the people's deputies with the entire set of documents for the opening of the congress. It would have taken us five days to do this and we did intend to do it—it is simply that we have run out of time, because of the information that was unexpected today. Nonetheless, I would like to tell you that we have a fair number of reviews and relevant experts' opinions.

Let me recall that the congress instructed us not only to finish the work on this program and to submit it in not later than a month. but also to have relevant expert opinion to hand. This we have done. We have a whole selection of relevant evaluation documents. For the most part, these evaluations are positive and their authors include economists from the State University in Moscow and so on. We also have, by way of supporting this, the expert opinion and evaluation of the world-famous economist Vasiliy Vasilyevich Leontyev, and there is a certain degree of coincidence here. Today we have had more talks with him in our building and I think that he is here and is present here in the meeting hall of the Supreme Soviet. My understanding is that he has been allowed and invited here. Well, here we are, here is Vasiliy Vasilyevich Leontyev, who is taking an active part in this, and I have in my hands his new remarks, handwritten on one of our copies. He is ready to continue to cooperate with us, having given a qualified but, on the whole, positive evaluation, and also to make suggestions to us where the implementation of specific chapters is concerned. I must tell you outright that today he made suggestions with regard to an aspect which we, to a certain extent, did not really pause to think over—the chapter on the social protection of the population. He suggested that an aspect be introduced here concerning the protection of hired labor, hired by private individuals. I think that it is very—and I am grateful to him—that it is a very correct suggestion. By this I wish to say that many people are having a hand in our program and apart from a negative, an absolutely negative article by an unknown author in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, signed by V. Ivanov, the main bulk of expert evaluations are complimentary to us. That this is indeed so you will have an opportunity of convincing yourselves when we have finally prepared everything, in five days' time. The list of expert evaluations by prominent economists at home and abroad will be included here.

Now let me report on the main features of the program that will actually appear in five days' time, and will take into acocunt the comments made during the discussion in the Supreme Soviet Presidium. The certain results of the analysis of, as well as the comparisons and conclusions with, the initial version of the Cabinet of Ministers' program are implemented in this program. We could also say that the cabinet program is now an outdated concept, because today it has already transformed itself into a joint action program for overcoming the crisis, drawn up by the Cabinet of Ministers and the governments of the Union republics. This is how this program is being known today. While informing you about the specific features of our program I shall talk about our evaluation of it, our efforts to influence this joint program of the cabinet and the governments in a positive way, and our position regarding its final revision. I shall say a few words about how the examination of this document was carried out at the Cabinet of Ministers session chaired by President Gorbachev.

So, having received comments on what we have presented, today we have mainly to add some finishing touches. Our program, first of all, is an energetic movement concretely directed toward market relations. The transition to the market is not an aim in itself, however. We believe that this transition is needed in order that everyone may enjoy a decent standard of living which will be firmly supported and guaranteed by the full force of the law and the government, and that the necessary conditions may be provided for entrepreneurial and professional self-realization, according to one's individual interests. Everyone should be able to own a certain part of the previously depersonalized property, and actively participate in industrial development and entrepreneurial activities with a real sense of ownership, in order to increase his prosperity, thus ensuring the economic growth of Russia. Everyone should have guarantees of personal safety and the safety of his property and the right to dispose of his property as he chooses—to sell, inherit, give it away, and so on.

Market economy will make it possible to rid our society of unproductive losses and structures, to make it healthier, and to bring into play the entire creative, intellectual, and economic potential of the Russian Federation. The situation which has historically come about is such that we all, irrespective of our age, education, and

occupation, are facing the necessity of acquiring what is a fundamentally new life experience in market conditions. It is a necessity of renouncing—and this will, at times, be painful—the stereotypes of a society endowed with an economy that was of levelling down and distributive nature. The transition to the market will not be simple. It will require serious effort and considerable strain. It will not be immediately that the standard of living will begin to rise. The state will take upon itself and is taking upon itself the obligation to ensure that the least protected groups of the population will have their minimum transitional subsistence level guaranteed. Experience garnered throughout the world and now also our own country's experience convinces one that to attempt a soft evolution toward the free market is tantamount merely to making the situation and the difficulties still to come even harder.

Correspondingly, all our activities will be aimed at making the market transformation vigorous and irreversible. The main guarantee of this irreversibility is the privatization of state ownership. If property is distributed to people by peaceful means, no one can any longer take it away and we can count upon a peaceful path of development. Moreover, a citizen who has his own home, a plot of land, who possesses shares and other financial assets is objectively interested in the stability of society and in social and national consensus. In contrast, our sad experience shows just how dangerous to society and its normal life are people who have nothing to lose. Hence the issue of privatization is, without a doubt, the vital issue. The social capital, currently frozen within state ownership, must be brought into play as soon as possible. However, the forms of privatization constitute a problem that is not so much, and not only economic, but also political. That is why it is very important that the work that is being done to examine and adopt the law on privatization, our joint work, should be completed as soon as possible. During the process of working out the program we have—as distinct from the 500 days program—set ourselves as task of finding ways to implement the program as independently as possible, as a separate entity, as they say.

Nevertheless—and this was reflected to some extent in yesterday's discussions—I would like to draw your attention to a number of fundamental points which we need to implement and on which the fate of this program clearly directly depends. Well, first and foremost, these are questions connected with property and with the demarcation of the functions of property on the territory of the republics; by this I mean Union property, which may be found in large amounts on our territory. We are rather persistently in favor—and there are grounds for saying that there is serious progress here—of the subject of the monoplization of Union structures, including industrial ministries, being declared and sealed in appropriate documents. An accord was reached—I express caution at the moment that this will be finally registered—to the effect that the processes of privatization will begin with large-scale privatization, so that enterprises will be presented with the opportunity of withdrawing from Union structures and coming under the jurisdiction of this or that republic on the territory of which this enterprise is situated. Today it is possible to say that we are close to coordinating these positions.

An important question is that of foreign economic activity. We have said more than once that we were a rich country and that we are in a beggarly situation. This can be entirely explained by the old structures. Our progam provides for the implementation of the rights to licensing and quota fixing through the powers of the republics, but, naturally, first and foremost, the Russian Federation. Three days ago, when discussing our bilateral relations with Comrade Pavlov, and yesterday at the cabinet session, it was agreed in principle that the licensing of the main area of output—export licensing—is the prerogative of the governments of the Union republics, including the Russian Federation, apart from a small area of output, the licensing of which remains with the Cabinet of Ministers. Well, first and foremost, this relates to weapons. We make no claims to this.

A few other items or, let's say, objects of export. We believe—and I am sure that we will achieve this—that the overwhelmingly greater part of the output capable of being exported must and will be put at the disposal of the Union republics.

Establishing quotas, quotas on supplies—this is a very important question. There is such a question. There is, let's say, a world quota, which is given to the Union. We have come to an agreement that the share of each republic in the quota for a limited quantity of goods—these are on the whole, mainly, raw materials—will be examined and decided at the Foreign Exchange Committee. In the process the volumes of the commodity being produced will be taken as a basis.

About the state order. The program intends to break away from the state order in its old concept, where it is not a matter of state needs but of the fulfillment of a mediating role by the state between producer and consumer. We believe that from 1992 onward it will be necessary to change over truly toward a state order that ensures that the state, in particular, republican needs, are satisfied. These are most important positions which really must be supported, nevertheless, by the state, including the needs of the agricultural complex, the budget sphere, as well as support for the appropriate state programs—such as Chernobyl, children, and so on. At the same time we have come to an agreement—this is to be put in writing—to speak not about percentages of some or other areas and categories of output, but about the volume of the stocks of commodities, goods, products needed by the state. The percentages which as a result are recalculated to meet this actual state order—they will be percentages of what is being ordered. In fact we intend, and we will incorporate this, that producers should have a stake in this state order. The main distribution will be through the new structures—through

the commodity exchanges, through mediating organizations. Here I must say that at long last we have come to an agreement with cabinet about the fact that the main supply organizations of the former USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply should pass to our jurisdiction—but not simply a re-subordination but a transformation into the relevant wholesale and commercial mediating organizations. We hope and suppose that this will really enable us not to overwhelm market relations but to have certain priorities of state interests in the common market.

I would also like to talk about such questions as the convertibility, the internal convertibility of the ruble. This is a very important question. It means the free purchase and sale at hard currency exchanges at the commercial rate, and purchase and sale using the services of the Russian Federation's State Bank at a fixed hard exchange rate. The banking system is a very serious matter and so far we have not reached agreement on this. We are firm supporters of seeing that the USSR State Bank receives not only the name but also the meaning of the USSR as a bank of a union of sovereign states. Consequently this means a board of the state bank, comprising six chairmen of state banks of Union republics, and a banking apparatus, both technical, and specialists in existing sections of the state bank. All operations giving credit, outgoings, and so on, should be considered and passed by the board of the state bank, comprising all representatives, or rather, all chairmen of state banks of Union republics. We consider that so far we do not have grounds to say that we have come to an agreement. We are going round these or other positions concerning this important question, but we think that we will succeed here in finding a corresponding accord. I say about the republics that on many questions we concur with the republics and we very much value the fact that we have a high degree of mutual understanding with all Union republics, at least those which took part in the signing of the joint statement. Nonetheless there are certain nuances which bring with them certain differences in position, but it seems to me that there is a possibility here to reach agreement on this. All the same, I am once again talking about the section of our program.

We are in favor of a truly open domestic market and free transfer of all types of commodities, a market transfer. This applies to production, financial means, and, in the final analysis, manpower resources. We are in favor of unified approaches to price fixing. A number of republics are at the moment insisting that the republics be given the powers to influence price fixing themselves in certain instances. We believe that this is not the way to do it. On the whole, then, I repeat that we are close—it seems to us—to having the required conditions for implementing our program.

We are presenting the question—and this was stated at yesterday's cabinet session in the presence of and under the leadership of Gorbachev—that we can see the following objective in the program of joint actions. This program—in line with certain measures of a truly anti-crisis nature, including certain administrative measures which should be considerably fewer than is the case at present—should enable and help the Union republics to implement their economic programs. We have made the maximum contribution to what is necessary to achieve this—the main part of it has been agreed on work still remains on the rest—and that which is preventing the republics from implementing their programs should be excluded from this document. That is our approach and we are continuing to work on it. We intend to see to it that these conditions are adopted, and we shall then be able to sign this document.

At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that the program of anti-crisis measures is merely a part of the work. It cannot be divorced from the program of a movement to market relations. There are certain things in this joint program which are more pretentious in nature. Nevertheless, we believe that the anti-crisis measurs, too, are economic measures enabling us to switch to stable market relations. Therefore, in informing you of this, we are setting out our positions, and I would like them to be supported. We, with your support, will be able to reflect those aproaches in the program that we will need to sign, in the confidence that we are not mistaken here.

I would like to say a few words about what we are doing, or what we have been doing, since the presidium session and the report of our program there. There was a rather interesting remark there by Comrade Grinberg. We believe that we have taken some of what he said into consideration, and we will continue with our work. A very interesting proposal was made by Deputy Kornilova. This was the role and place of interaction in the implementation of the program with the territories and the republics of the Russian Federation. We have introduced a whole section, called precisely that. This is a very correct proposal and we thank her for it.

But there is also a series of opinions, especially from Comrade Chairman Krasavchenko—I am sorry—from the commission. I work together with him, and a significant section of the proposals and remarks have already been taken into account. Well, work is continuing and there are still virtually two days at our disposal. During the course of these last two days we will practically finish taking the remarks into account, and to a significant degree, implementing them.

There was a very serious question, and we are in agreement with it, that an analysis of the possible consequences, forecast proposals, and other numerical calculations were absent in the program. We also agree with this. We have the preliminary evaluations. The work is based on these. But nevertheless, in the formulation which was put to us particularly distinctly by Comrade (Grinberg)—we are working on this now—we now already have additional estimates and evaluations which allow us to forecast when and what may be expected. Yesterday, incidentally, comrade Shcherbakov, the

speaker at the cabinet sitting, pronounced quite optimistic forecasts that by the end of this year the implementation of the joint program of the cabinet and of the government would enable the situation to be stabilized and the level of production of 1989 to be achieved next year.

We are far...[changes thought] or, at least, have a critical attitude toward such statements; the defeats, let us say, of the economy, are already too profound. And too serious measures are required for our economy to be put right and then imbued with positive processes. I would like to say that this process is extremely complex, and we are not prepared today to report all figures, all forecasts, by year and by time period.

Nonetheless, I repeat, we have these calculations, and it may be said that according to these preliminary calculations the situation may be such that some time around 1994, to be more precise in 1994, signs of overproduction of output will appear in our economy. This might seem improbable, and simply that this would be a great fortune. But nevertheless, you know that under market conditions this is not always a good thing, and is not always for the best. Consequently, being in possession of such, let us say, preliminary forecasts, we must start to think today about the actions of the government, of any government, whether ours or a future one, and how to act under these conditions.

According to our calculations, steady dynamics, which is positive and analogous to that occuring in the countries that are transferring to and introducing new market mechanisms and active and sure processes with a high pace of development, may ensue in 1995 or 1996.

You will say that this is too long, that it should be earlier. But these are the laws of economic development and, therefore, it is a forecast. It seems to us that a forecast is important because it makes it possible to introduce certain amendments in practical activity when the forecast time-limits are up, and the real results are compared to the calculations, and to—let's put it like this—to what was expected. Therefore, we would want to reach agreement in our programs, and we imagine that in the course of a month, or six weeks, every section of the program will be developed into a concrete program of implementation of that section, with detailed calculations and analyses, and even with time limits, the forecast time limits of one event or another. We would think that our preliminary forecast, which we will include into our programme, will be a general one, and then, already, I repeat, we, in the working programs, will have already such calculations on every line.

Comrades, I have not told you about a very important section in the program—about social protection measures. They, naturally, are present in that program, and we are continuing to work on it, along with the commissions and committees, which have expressed their remarks and it—I mean that program, that section—will also be completed within that same time-limit.

At the sitting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium we were critical of two sections of our program, self-critical, I would say. That is, the program of the scientific—of the section on scientific and technical progress, and on conversion and the market. It has been possible to do something and, furthermore, we are counting in a major way—especially in scientific and technical progress—we are counting in a major way upon close cooperation with the committees, with the relevant experts and institutes, not only Russian, but Union ones, too. But we have not done everything here yet and, therefore, obviously that section—these two sections—will remain as they are today. But in the working programs, as I have said, we should fill these most important sections with a concrete and deeper content.

Naturally, we need legislative provision of the main actions, without which we will not be able to implement these actions. These are questions of the repeal of legislative and normative acts contradicting the transition to market relations; these are questions of the defense of the rights of ownership; these are questions of land taxation and also of the elaboration of the existing and the supplementation of the laws already adopted and in force on taxation rights on real estate, on bankruptcy, on currency operations, on the protection of the investments of foreign owners.

This is an exceptionally topical question, which we are asked every day, every hour. So far, Western partners are refraining from active actions and investment. The question of the procedure of importing into, and of trade with Western firms in products on the territory of the Russian Federation is very important.

With this package—and bearing in mind that the main burden for making the laws, the draft laws, will lie with the government—we would like these laws to be met by the Supreme Soviet with understanding and to find their realization and implementation through acceptance. We are not counting only on the laws. Sometimes this will be a Supreme Soviet law, sometimes a decision, sometimes an instruction by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and sometimes this will be a decision made by the government. I mean the decision adopted by the congress on the redistribution of functions. We think that the adoption of this program and its final approval—I do not know in which form you are the ones who are making this decision—will enable us to bring the questions of the agreement about the conditions we need for the realization of this program to their conclusion with more confidence and, moreover, will enable us to confidently realize this program through the working plan. We had a working plan on the subject of what, when, to whom, and to what extent, and which we had prepared together with this version of the program of 18 April, but naturally, the changes in the program bring changes to the working plans. We consider that within 7-10 days after the release of this program we will specify the plan for realization, and it will become a guidebook on the realization of the program for every member of the government.

Thank you for your attention.

Answers Deputies' Questions

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[Question and answer session conducted by Ivan Silayev, prime minister of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), and deputies, at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow on 16 May; from the "RSFSR Supreme Soviet session" program—recorded]

[Text] [Bocharov] Bocharov, member of the Supreme Soviet. Respected Ivan Stepanovich, by a decision of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the development of the agricultural sector has been adopted as a priority. We have examples of the development of countries such as Hungary and China, where the reform of agriculture lay at the beginning of the economic reform. Questions: Was the option of an immediate transition of the agricultural sector to market relations discussed during the preparation of the draft governmental program? If not, what is your attitude toward this problem?

[Silayev] I thank you. Yes, it really was not only discussed, but it was also placed in the definitive draft program. We would like, together with you, in cooperation—our strength here is insufficient—to privatize, as quickly as possible, the whole—let us say—technological path of agricultural output from the field to the shops, including the shops. This means both a privatization of food shops, and this also means the privatization of the corresponding means of storage, processing, transportation, and so on. This is not a simple issue. It needs to be said that we have even set the aim of implementing, in the main, this task in the autumn, and have named 1 September. We were justly corrected at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Evidently we had quite drastically rushed into this. These are not simple processes. But we consider that doing this is an immediate task in order to put a stop to the outrage, which manifests itself in the loss of 40 percent of the harvest and other expenses, holding us in the iron clutches of semistarvation. Thus, this is envisaged in the program in the section of small privatization.

[(Beloshapko)] Deputy (Beloshapko) from Yakutiya. Respected Ivan Stepanovich, we welcome the government's measure on repealing the 5 percent sales tax. This was a necessary an essential measure. But the electorate is making serious claims in connection with the fact that the previous government instructions on the revocation of this law on a number of goods were not carried out by its immediate executors; I mean shop assistants in the shops. The electorate showed them the government's instructions published in the newspapers, but the shop assistants did not acknowledge them. They ignored them, and they demanded instructions from their own immediate managers, trade managers, with a stamp, and so on. In connection with this, I have a question. Within what time limit will the government's new instructions start to be implemented, and can we expect their implementation to begin within the next two or three days?

[Silayev] The date of the start of implementation is from the moment the document is recieved. If the time from which they are to be introduced is stated, then this is from the moment of the time published, even if this retrospective. But you are correct. Such incidents are taking place, however much we try to interfere in this. I would ask our body of deputies, in relation to this, to show support—alongside the oblast soviets, the republican soviets, and local soviets—to attempt to achieve this implementation jointly. But on the whole I think that the adoption of a law on local self-government will nonetheless allow us, by joint efforts, to bring order in this regard.

[(Bukovskiy)] Deputy (Bukovskiy) Esteemed Ivan Stepanovich, can you please tell us when the food compensations for school children and students will come into effect? This is the first question. The second one: In connection with the elaboration of the emergency budget, how will this prices avalanche be compensated in the countryside for the period from the beginning of this year, or for some other specific period?

[Silayev] We have already adopted the decision and established the value of the additional compensation for food in school, university, and technical college cafeterias. This takes effect immediately from the moment of its publication, literally today or tomorrow. We are now working on the calculations for the so-called indexation. This was the decision of the congress, and we must obviously fulfil it. We think we will be introducing the first corrections on the basis of the June results. We understand this to be a matter of foremost importance, and will be introducing these corrections. This, by the way, was also announced at the sitting of the Cabinet of Ministers. The appropriate Union law is probably being prepared. But we are talking here about our republican actions, and we will definitely be solving this. This is also the task for the emergency budget. We must do this, and we will.

Silayev Discusses Privatization, Economic Reform

91UN1513A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 19, May 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with I. Silayev, chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers, conducted by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent N. Zhelnorova; date and place not given: "We Are Starting To Work, Apparently"]

[Text] [Zhelnorova] We have, for all that, lived to see that "historic" moment when Russia's property will be privatized and shared among its residents. But how will this take place?

[Silayev] All Russian fixed capital will be divided by the number of inhabitants, and each will become an owner

of assets as start-up capital. According to our calculations, this is approximately 7,000 rubles. The amount will fluctuate depending on indexation. Everyone will have personal stock, and everyone will have the right to invest it in any undertaking and change this money for a particular quantity of shares. We will thus all become co-owners of Russia's property.

[Zhelnorova] What will be done in respect of the program to saturate the consumer market and lower prices?

[Silayev] We intend by the end of the year to "release" prices in respect of the bulk of products having protected from the impact of temporary price increases the commodities which are a part of the consumer basket and the part of the population which should be protected.

[Zhelnorova] How will conversion be effected—the retooling of the defense enterprises? It will have to be paid for since without expenditure one cannot make a dress from a coat or make a mini- tractor from a tank.

[Silayev] We will cease the distribution of budget monies and will extend credit only to the enterprises of the defense complex which start to restructure their economy for the production of consumer goods.

[Zhelnorova] The gold ruble coin—is this a reality?

[Silayev] A program for the partial convertibility—this year even—of the ruble has appeared here. We have come to an arrangement on the unrestricted buying and selling of currency—at auctions, at the banks.

[Zhelnorova] In other countries—Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea—anti-crisis programs have worked wonders. Are you confident that the Russian program also is talented and effective?

[Silayev] Our program will undoubtedly produce results given the incorporation in the process of all groups of our citizens.

[Zhelnorova] It is gratifying to hear all this, but for almost a year why did the Russian Government struggle not for economic reforms, which could have been your trump card, but for political power?

[Silayev] The third congress was convened not on the initiative of the democrats, although democratic transformations were at that time in jeopardy. It was this which led to the strong confrontation. But the congress culminated in the need for cooperation with all parties for the sake of economic transformations in order for Russia to stand on its own two feet.

The fruitless discussions at meetings and sessions are, of course, superfluities.

[Zhelnorova] They take up enough precious time. Why are you not learning from the mistakes of the Union Government; why do you duplicate them so often?

[Silayev] Yes, it would be better to learn from others' mistakes. All our efforts were thrown into the elaboration of a Union program under the leadership of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and this lasted until 15 October of last year, when it was rejected.

[Zhelnorova] Did you really not realize that with Gorbachev there may be all kinds of surprises and not have a backup action alternative? Was this political naivete, perhaps?

[Silayev] I would not say that this was naivete. We were, for all that, counting on the consistency of the president and the realization of his own promises. This did not happen.

[Zhelnorova] But when this "did not happen" why did Yeltsin declare that Russia would embark on realization of the 500 days program, but did not do so?

[Silayev] Without waiting for the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (but we hoped that it would be positive), the time frame of the introduction was simply deferred. This was an attempt to lend impetus to the program and push for its adoption. But this did not happen, unfortunately.

[Zhelnorova] Why, then, not start to do something without waiting for fall, winter, and spring to pass and for Russians' hopes to be lost and expectations to be deceived? What is the point of any remarkable program if it is not implemented? After all, your positions are vulnerable for the very reason that granted an abundance of declarations, there have been very few solutions!

[Silayev] First, the 500 days program was exclusively a Union program and did not afford an opportunity for autonomous actions. Second, we were the first to seriously prepare and confirm a land reform program. Political processes which deformed the intentions of our government were underway at that time. This was the case with the purchase prices, when we made them higher than the union prices.

[Zhelnorova] It was you, as prime minister, who was to blame for this.

[Silayev] But we do not have an independent state with our own currency and border. We must operate in the overall economic space, which prevents us operating independently, energetically, and boldly.

[Zhelnorova] But getting around possible barriers, employing both guile and "carrot and stick," as long as the right result is obtained, is part of the politician's lot. You, however, are operating in a straight line and endlessly running into obstacles and then appealing for sympathy. This is causing irritation. After all, if you have embarked on a specific job, it is immaterial who is hindering you and how; what is important is what you have achieved.

[Silayev] I am not a supporter of guile; this is not part of my nature. Unfortunately, perhaps. But I am as I am. I am a man of honest, scrupulous actions. Guile is the sphere of politicians.

[Zhelnorova] Why, please, should we not agree to a Marshall Plan?

[Silayev] You see, when the "140 billion" process began, people latched on very firmly to G. Filshin's words to the effect that this project was part of a Marshall Plan. And this played a part in the adoption of the decision to dismiss Filshin. But I believe that today this question is perfectly appropriate. And it is possible that the collective wisdom in the country could arrive at such a proposition.

[Zhelnorova] Why did you let go of Filshin so easily? After all, the deal about which so much noise was made could, in the event of its realization, even in spite of the annoying costs of a political order, have been of great benefit—this is the understanding of many economists.

[Silayev] We did not agree and categorically objected to the attempts to "clear out" Filshin and believed that this was organized, purposeful activity to discredit the Russian Government. This means the government was not that timid and weak.

[Zhelnorova] But it was weak, nonetheless, when it let Filshin go.

[Silayev] We expressed our position in support of Filshin honestly; what more could we have done?

[Zhelnorova] Why should we not invite the requisite foreign economists to draw up a program so that by their authority they might sanctify it, as it were?

[Silayev] This is already happening. W. Leontieff has studied and approved our Russian program and brought with him a professional attorney who will help us implement this program.

[Zhelnorova] Do you allow that all forces could once again become bogged down in political struggle?

[Silayev] It is entirely possible.

[Zhelnorova] Will the joint "declaration of the 10" exert a positive influence on realization of the program?

[Silayev] We very much hope so.

Western Republics

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Session Opens 21 May

OW2205120491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Early in the morning, Tuesday, May 21, representatives of worker collectives of Minsk and other cities, gathered in the central square of Minsk. On that day, the Belorussian Supreme Soviet opened its session.

The demonstrators demanded that the parliament focus on the following questions: the adoption of the law on the ratification of the normative acts, passed by the Soviet Supreme Soviet; the allottment to the Council of Strike Committees of a time span of 15 minutes on Belorussian radio and TV, and the termination of reprisals against the participants in the political strike last April.

Representative of the Minsk Strike Committee's press-centre, Leonid Sviridov, told IF [INTERFAX] that the session had confirmed the agenda consisting of 32 points. However, the demands advanced by the Strike Committee figure at the end of it and, Leonid Sviridov said, "had been included in the agenda formally."

In view of the position assumed by the majority of the Belorussian MPs, representatives of the Minsk Strike Committee had decided to resume the political strike on May 22, at 8 a.m., said Leonid Sviridov.

"The fact that the Supreme Soviet had not given the floor to representatives of the strike committees also influenced the decision to resume the strike," he said.

On Tuesday, at 8 p.m. the Minsk Strike Committee will hold a joint meeting with representatives of the strike committees from other parts of the republic to discuss specific actions and tactics of the political strike.

According to reports, among the questions included in the agenda of the session are presidency and the introduction of the state of emergency in the republic.

Leonid Sviridov said that the campaign to elect the Belorussian president is expected to be joined by several candidates from the republic's Communist Party, including the Party's First Secretary, Anatoliy Malofeyev, Chairman of the Republic's Council of Ministers, Vyacheslav Kebich and Chairman of the Belorusian parliament's Commission for Openness, Ivan Karacheni.

Mr. Sviridov expressed the opinion that the session may adopt legal acts on the introduction of presidency in Belorussia and that it may possibly elect the republic's president.

Opposition Leader's Address

LD2205100591 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belorussian 1710 GMT 21 May 91

[Address by Zenon Pozdnyak, leader of Belorussian Popular Front, at the Belorussian legislature sesion in Minsk on 21 May—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed deputies! Having analyzed the economic and political situation in the republic, the Belorussian Popular Front group, which is in the opposition in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, supports the demands of the worker's strike commitees of Belorussia and suggests that these demands should be included as points into the agenda of

the session. The anylysis of the situation shows that the demands of the strike committees are just and, the main thing, are based on a correct evaluation of the events. Neither the communist Supreme Soviet nor the communist Council of Ministers over the year of their existence did anything practical to improve the condition of the Belorussian people. On the contrary, by their inactivity, antidemocratic attitudes, cringing to Moscow and the CPSU and their antipopular policy of supporting the colonial regime in the republic, they have made the situation worse and brought Belorussia to the edge of an abyss. Production has considerably dropped. The republic's budget deficit has doubled in four months and continues to grow. By the end of the year it can reach 7 billion rubles [R] which will mean a financial crash and an economic bankruptcy of the republic.

Under such conditions it is necessary to carry out quick, radical, and complete, not compromised, reforms of transfer to the market. Such reforms should not be stretched for a long time because there is no time and compromising only aggravates the economic crisis. Meanwhile, experience has shown that no market reforms can be implemented without sovereignty. Moscow takes from Belorussia R5.5 billion in the so-called tax on turn-out. Over R7 billion [as heard] goes to military expenditure, on maintaining the Soviet Army, garrisons, and strategic nuclear bases. Belorussia does not decide, in practical terms, what to do with the results of the work of its own people, with its resources, and its future. Experience also shows that no market reforms are possible in the condition of monoply of a communist administrative regime.

All the nomenklatura's words about supposed transfer to the market are to deceive people. The CPSU, as a corrupted and criminal system of a shadow power, is antimarket in its nature. Using talking about the market as a sham, the communists are reshuffling the state and stealing from private property to add to party property. They are trying to modernize the rotten administrative system. Thus, the sovereignty and independence of Belorussia and de-partyization are the first conditions for market reforms in Belorussia and the guarantee of improving people's life. Without fulfilling these conditions there is no sense in further legislative activities and no sense in holding the session.

The Belorussian Popular Front opposition group in the Supreme Soviet suggests including in the agenda, and considering as the first priority issues of the session, the following questions: first, giving the declaration of state sovereignty by the Belorussian SSR the status of a constitutional law; second, de-partyization of the court, the procurator's office, the KGB, [word indistinct], enterprises and organizations; third, the draft law on elections in the Belorussian SSR; fourth, formation of a transitional government on a collective basis; fifth, the main principles of denationalization, privatization, and development of the economy in the Belorussian SSR; sixth, on the Soviet Army and military service on the territory of the Belorussian SSR; and seventh, on Belorussian citizenship. We suggest starting the agenda of the session with these questions in the suggested order. And, seeing that the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet does not cope with its work, a question of its resignation should be added to the agenda.

Strikers Present Political Demands

PM2205200391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 May 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Mikhail Shimanskiy: "In All 37 Questions for the Session"]

[Text] Minsk—The agenda for the fourth session of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet was approved in a difficult situation. Thirty-seven questions were accepted.

Most of the questions for discussion at the session concern new legislative acts. They include draft laws on entrepreneurial activity in the Belorussian SSR, on the priority socioeconomic development of the countryside and the agro-industrial complex, on culture, and others. A draft Belorussian SSR law on the institution of the post of president of the republic will also be discussed.

But what did the legislature decide in relation to the demands by working people and the participants in the April strikes and rallies in the republic? The agenda includes questions on the departyization of state enterprises and organizations, on the depoliticization of law-enforcement services, on CPSU-Belorussian Communist Party property, and on service on the territory of the Belorussian SSR for people drafted into the USSR Armed Forces.

The republic's legislature got right down to its main business: It listened to a report by V. Kebich, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers "On the Draft Belorussian State Program for the Social Protection of the Population and Stabilization of the Economy."

And what is the situation in Minsk?

Unfortunately, it has deteriorated once again. V. Rossosnykh, secretary of the city strike committee, told me that the tractor, engine and Kozlov electrical equipment plants are partially on strike. Working people at these enterprises are gathering in V.I. Lenin Square, outside Government House. One-fourth of the working people at the "Integral" association are still at their posts; the rest have gone to the rally. The strike participants are putting demands that were discussed at the republican conference of Belorussian strike committees. The four chief ones are: immediate efforts to implement the declaration on Belorussian state sovereignty; departyization of all state structures on Belorussian territory; adoption of a resolution on the nonprosecution of participants in political strikes and people helping them; the granting of 15 minutes' airtime on television.

'Tension Persists'

LD2205225891 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] A session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet is under way in Minsk. Deputies have started examining the main issue on the agenda. The republic's state program for social protection of the population and stabilization of the economy was submitted to them. Here is what Petr Mokritskiy, our correspondent, reports.

[Begin recording] [Mokritskiy] The draft program was published in the press for all of us to read about a week before the session opened. We all noticed many new features, compared to the published draft, in the report made by Vyacheslav Frantsevich Kebich, our prime minister. The program was improved, amended, and changed to take into account proposals by labor collectives, commissions of deputies, and strike committees. And although practically all economic demands have been adopted for implementation, work aimed at insuring social protection of people in conditions of the transition to market relations continues. Of course, you understand that many problems are difficult to solve. The economy and economic links have been upset. It is not for nothing that the government required extraordinary measures for implementing the budget of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic for the second half of 1991. They were reported to the legislative session by Mikhail Vladimirovich Myasnikovich, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers. Please, Mikhail Vladimirovich.

[Myasnikovich] No doubt, the conversation at the session cannot be described as unequivocal. There are different evaluations and a wide range of views. But the program presented by the government is aimed, primarily, at cushioning the reform of retail prices. It was stressed that labor collectives are working at a normal pace. Well, some people are still pondering this issue. But I think, however, that one should not simplify the situation. Tension persists, to a degree. [end recording]

Belorussian Committees Decide To Resume Strike

LD2205120591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1026 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Minsk, 22 May (BELTA TASS)—The strike committees created at Belorussian industrial enterprises have passed a decision to resume the strike. Today by 1100 hours, columns of workers began to move from their Minsk enterprises to Lenin Square next to the government building where yesterday the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet session resumed work. Among the first who came here were the strikers of the tractor works, the "Soyuzkhimprom" enterprise, and the "Vavilov" works.

Yesterday the Belorussian parliament decided to put on its agenda many of the questions that the strike committees had wanted their deputies to consider. These include the introduction of privatization of land, the depoliticization of law enforcement bodies, and the question of the Belorussian Communist Party's property.

However, the strikers believe that the decision was half-baked. After all, the deputies refused to consider the draft of the new law on multiparty elections, rejected the proposals on forming a coalition government, which would inspire people with confidence [rejected] discussing the draft of the Belorussian SSR's new constitution, and others.

Another three factors played a special role in the decision of the strike committees to resume the strike: Their representatives have been denied an opportunity to explain their position to people's deputies, as was the case in the Russian parliament. What is more, they are being denied their daily fifteen minutes of television airtime. Nor have they been given any guarantees by judicial bodies that they will not be persecuted for participation in the April strikes.

By no means all labor collectives support the idea of resuming the strike. The electrotechnical works, the works manufacturing motorcycles and bicycles, and a number of other enterprises in Minsk carry on working as usual.

Protest To Become General Strike

LD2205200691 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Belorussian 1923 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] The confrontation between the Communist government of Belorussia and Belorussian workers continues. Today, 10,000 workers held a rally at Lenin Square, opposite the Supreme Soviet building. This time, only delegates from enterprises, specially elected at the meetings of workers, participated in the rally. Besides speakers from Minsk, representatives of the strike committees from Zhodino, Grodno, Mogilev, and other Belorussian towns spoke before the demonstrators. Judging by everything, the Minsk workers strike this time, too, will develop into a general republican strike.

Moldovan Legislature Votes To Remove Druk

LD2205161691 Moscow TASS in English 1501 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Kishinev May 22 TASS—The Moldova parliament took a no-confidence vote in republican Prime Minister Mircha Druk today. He held premiership three days short of a year.

As many as 207 deputies out of 218, who took part in a secret ballot, voted for him to step down. There are 360 seats in Moldova's parliament.

The developments were dramatic in parliament. According to the legislation, two thirds of votes as a minimum were required to remove him. The attempts of various deputy clubs to reach consensus entailed a

hightening of the socio-political situation in Kishinev. Disorders took place there last night.

Speaking in parliament today, the president of the republic Mircha Snegur accused a number of leaders of the Moldova Popular Front and its supporters of organising a meeting and instigating people for disoders to exert pressure upon parliament.

The deputies then introduced amendents into the legislation, making it possible to take a vote of no-confidence in government members by a (?simple) majority of votes, which led to today's decision to remove the premier. The list of other ministers has not been put to vote.

'Target of Sharp Criticism'

OW2305045391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1530 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] On Wednesday, the parliament in Moldova expressed no confidence in the republic's Prime Minister Mircha Druk. The Moldovan Popular Front faction supporting the Premier walked out before the voting (by secret ballot) began.

IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent says Mr. Druk has been the target of sharp criticism, on the one hand, in connection with the performance of the foreign economic association MERKURIY which is charged with various malpractices, and, on the other hand, for his agrarian policy causing dissatisfaction with the agrarian faction in the republic's parliament.

Tuesday evening's clashes in Kishinev between Druk supporters and the police resulted in casualties and arrests.

Speaking in parliament shortly before the voting, President Mircha Snegur observed that "attempts to stay in power with the help of paid extremists cannot do merit to anyone." He said he had been under permanent pressure from those "who have not gone beyond empty talk to help out the republic."

President Snegur warned that "the effects of the provocation will be blamed on its organizers."

Daily Reports 'Casualties' in Moldovan Clashes

PM2205195791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 May 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Eduard Kondratov: "Passions Aroused"]

[Text] Kishinev—On Wednesday the president of Moldova submitted for examination by the session the question of Mircha Druk's tenure of the office of prime minister. It was decided not to examine the composition of the government for the time being.

On Tuesday dozens of deputies, representatives of the People's Front, left the chamber in protest at the legislative majority's demand that the fate of the government, above all its leader, Mircha Druk, be decided by a secret ballot. A few hours later mass disturbances broke out in the city.

There were few who doubted that the prime minister must resign immediately. He has been hit in recent weeks by a tide of accusations. Druk has been accused of ruining the economy, of involvement in dubious foreign trade deals, of wanting to strangle kolkhozes with taxes, and of squandering the people's assets. There was mention of his role in the campaign against the Gagauz and in the bloody events in Dubossary. Moreover, only recently, President Mircha Snegur frankly stated that it was impossible to cooperate productively with Druk.

However, to everyone's surprise, he submitted for legislative approval virtually the same government as before, headed by Druk. The legislative majority, in which the agrarian deputies set the tone, found itself in a difficult position, wanting, as it does, to remove the prime minister, because it needed two-thirds of the vote to express a vote of no confidence in the government. But the opposition of the People's Front deputies ruled out the possibility of such a result. The dour struggle went on for two days.

The debate, broadcast on the radio, was interrupted by the announcement of the clashes that had broken out in the streets between volatile crowds of Druk's supporters and the police. There were casualties. A noisy rally in support of Druk and independence for Moldova went on until late in Kishinev's central square. There were calls for the convening of a grand national assembly to save democracy and prevent a government coup.

Caucasus

Georgia Organizes Interior Ministry Troops

LD2205225791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2129 GMT 22 May 91

[Report by correspondent N. Gongadze from Georgia; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Gongadze] The decision to carry out a draft for military service in the Georgian Interior Ministry's internal troops was adopted as early as January. But some days ago, draft commissions started operating in all the towns and rayons of the republic. Military registration offices have provided the required documents. After all, in its essence, the draft for service in the national guard is an alternative: Each Georgian citizen is free to choose where to serve, in the Soviet Army or the National Guard. In your view, what function will this army, this guard perform?

[T. Tskakhaya, chief of the department for the training of conscripts] Well, this guard is one of the arms of the

service, that of internal troops; therefore, we will deal with our internal matters. Conscripts are arriving with great eagerness. There are very many volunteers. Many of those whom we do not accept refuse to go home; they want to stay and serve. There are even those who have served two years in the Soviet Army but have come here and said that they want to serve in their native army, in the guard, and are prepared to serve again for two years, as required.

[Announcer] I will add that the remuneration of officers of the National Guard will be considerably higher than in the Soviet Army. For example, a platoon commander will be getting 650 rubles and a company commander up to 800.

'Big' Election Rally Held in Tbilisi

OW2305055291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1130 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] A big rally has been held in the main square of the Georgian capital Tbilisi as part of the opposition's electoral campaign.

As Georgia holds presidential elections on Sunday, the leader of the ruling alliance, "Round Table - Free Georgia", Mr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia will have to face a number of opposition candidates, among them - Irakli Shengelaya, Valerian Advadze, Tamaz Kvanchantiradze, and Nodar Natadze.

Speakers at the rally attacked the policies by the Georgian government led by Mr. Gamsakhurdia.

The opposition accuses him of conducting destructive policies in the nationalities' issue, suppressing the local mass media and lacking a constructive long-range program.

The Government House was cordoned off by the national guards as part of the authorities' effort to tighten security following the opposition rally.

In yesterday's statement on Georgian television, the local interior ministry warned about possible provocations and called on city residents not to crowd on Rustaveli Avenue.

However, there are reports of incidents. Two people were wounded as an unidentified gunman opened fire near a teacher-training college in Tbilisi. Inquiries have been set up.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Border Conflict Updated

LD2205214191 Moscow TASS in English 2112 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Giandzha May 22 TASS—Night time sallies by militants on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border continue to bother people in the region. Late on Tuesday and early on Wednesday four rifle shots were fired from the road leading to Bashkend at an army checkpoint near the village of Mutudere of the Kedabeb District in Azerbaijan. The patrol responded in kind. No injuries have been reported.

Between May 15 and 21, a spokesman for the operational group of Soviet Army troops told TASS, seven cases of shooting at Army posts and checkpoints were reported.

Major General Vladimir Shironin told a briefing at the KGB Headquarters in Moscow today that in some spots along the Armenian- Azerbaijani border special groups have been set up with the help of the USSR committee for state security to avert new clashes between Azers and Armenians.

These groups, Shironin said, include representatives of local authorities as well as of the two republics' interior ministries and state security committees. These groups will seek to help the two peoples to overcome inter-ethnic confrontation and extend a friendly hand to each other.

"In the districts where both sides agreed to participate in such groups shooting and acts of provocation have abated and people have resumed peaceful work. And this despite incessant visits by emissaries recruiting new militants," Shironin said.

Asked about reasons for the KGB involvement in looking out for a solution to the problem, Shironin said that the state security forces are concerned over the volatile situation in the region, especially in close proximity to the USSR state border.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Border Clashes Resume

PM2205135391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 91 First Edition p 1

[TASS-attributed S. Ostanin report: "Shooting at Military Border Posts"]

[Text] Gyandzha—Mortar and automatic gunfire has again broken the silence on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

During the night of 19-20 May armed thugs opened fire on the military border posts in the population centers of Alikuliushagy and Seydlyar in Kubatlinskiy Rayon. Troops responded in like manner. The shooting lasted 30 minutes. The border troops suffered no casualties.

The Armenian population is continuing to leave the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and border villages. At the request of Armenians living in Stepanakert, servicemen from one Soviet Army subunit found vehicles to transport them and organized medical aid and food. During the past day more than 1,400 people wanting to leave the autonomous oblast have been transported to the Armenian border.

Combat engineers from the subunit headed by Soviet Army officer Yu. Grigoryev conducted a mine-clearance operation in the village of Chaykend after Armenian thugs had left. During the operation they discovered an

"Alazan" rocket launcher, three home-made mortars plus ammunition, 40 cast-iron [chugunnyy] mines, over 400 fragmentation grenades, and a large quantity of antitank and antipersonnel mines. This is the first time in the Soviet troops' operations in the Azerbaijan-Armenian border region that such a large quantity of homemade munitions as well as factory-made armaments have been confiscated.

Armenians Disguised as Soldiers Blamed for Acts

PM2205160391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 91 First Edition p 5

["Who's Who" article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Pronin: "Werewolves"]

[Text] Some mass media are circulating various reports that Soviet Army servicemen stationed in border regions of Armenia and Azerbaijan are robbing and killing local residents and taking hostages. That vile lie and slander has been exposed on several occasions both at official level and by the residents of these regions themselves.

Of late there have been plenty of facts to convincingly confirm who has carried out these murders, lootings, and robberies.

A group of people wearing servicemen's uniforms entered the population center of Farakhli in Azerbaijan's Kazakhskiy Rayon at roughly 1400 hours 6 May: eight men armed with submachineguns and equipped with portable radios. They had no insignia on their shoulder boards and bore very little outward resemblance, apart from their uniforms, to servicemen. Nevertheless, their ringleader introduced himself to the rural soviet chairman as "commander of a special purpose group, a senior lieutenant." He said that the group was performing a "special mission" in this area and demanded that two villagers with a knowledge of the area be detailed as guides. In response to the rural soviet chairman's question as to why all his subordinates were clearly not of soldier's age, the "commander" replied:

"I only have officers and ensigns in my group."

The rural soviet chairman could not bring himself to check out the "special-purpose" men's papers and met their demand. Two local militiamen took the group to the Armenian border. Nothing has been heard of them since....

The gang turned up once again in Kazakhskiy Rayon six days later. Taking over a restaurant in Kazakh city, the "special-purpose" men organized a shindig. They behaved so scandalously and insolently that local residents were forced to ask the commander of the troop unit stationed there to calm down the drunken brawlers. However, the military patrol sent to the residents failed to find them....

The "special-purpose" boys appeared 12 May in the village of Kushchu Ayrum, Kazakhskiy Rayon, in two "Niva" automobiles that subsequently turned out to have been taken from local residents. They once again demanded that the local militia chief supply them with guides.... He took steps to detain the criminals; however, they succeeded in escaping. They were located 15 May by one of the guard posts on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. After revealing themselves, the bandits rushed to escape.

According to data from competent organizations, these werewolves made up of several gangs are Armenian fighters hired to carry out subversive operations. There are reports that the guerrillas in disguise receive between 1,500 and 2,500 rubles for each act of subversion and terrorism they take part in.

Steps are being taken to detain and disarm the gangs and terrorists wearing military uniform.

Azerbaijani Official: NKAO Situtaion 'Tragic'

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[By TASS correspondent Ruben Shirinyan]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—Afrand Dashdamirov, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, described the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh [NKAO] and adjacent areas as "tragic".

He believes that the main culprits of that are "Armenian militants who convert Armenia-populated villages into their bases to make raids on Azerbaijani populated areas and on the military".

Speaking at a news conference at Azerbaijan's permanent mission in Moscow today, Dashdamirov urged the leadership of Armenia to begin talks to settle the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

Talks may lead to positive results only if the two sides take the actual situation into account and jointly look for ways out of the current situation," he said. [no opening quotation marks as received] "We cannot be endlessly in a state of conflict," Dashdamirov emphasised.

The Armenian side accuses Azerbaijani authorities of forcible banishment of Armenians and of attempts to resolve the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh by changing the demographic balance in the autonomous region.

Spokesman for the Interior Ministry, the procurator's office and the KGB of Azerbaijan, speaking at the news conference, qualified their actions in Karabakh and other areas as "acts to clear the Azerbaijani land of Armenian militants".

According to information from the Azerbaijani side, residents from some Armenian villages in Nagorno-Karabakh were brought to Armenia on an utterly voluntary basis, on the strength of their written requests.

The Armenian side maintains that those applications were signed under threats from OMON men (special-purpose militia) of the Azerbaijani Interior Ministry.